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ABSTRACT 
 
 
There has been debate over how environmental change will influence migration. This 
PhD explores one aspect of this: the impact of flooding on migration patterns and the 
subsequent move by government actors to govern these migration patterns through 
resettlement in Malawi. This research suggests that this move to govern migration reflects a 
broader shift in the discourse of seeing migration as a positive opportunity and as adaptation 
to environmental change. It focuses on the Lower Shire region of Malawi, an area particularly 
impacted by flooding, and especially reflects on the participatory nature of the resettlement 
process, as this is highlighted by influential international guidelines as being necessary for the 
resettlement to be adaptive rather than mal-adaptive. To this end the research focuses on 
the knowledges involved and the varying power dynamics. Fieldwork occurred between 
August and November 2017 and consisted of 48 Interviews and six focus group discussions 
with three communities in the Lower Shire that had three different attitudes (unwilling, 
undecided, and resettled) towards resettlement. As well as 21 interviews with stakeholders 
in government and NGOs involved in these communities and in the resettlement process at a 
national and district level. The data showed that flooding related movements already occur 
in the communities but, due to the increasing severity of flooding, there is a growing desire 
by those in government and NGOs to initiate their own resettlement. However, official 
resettlement due to flooding is novel in Malawi, and there is confusion over what it entails 
and who is involved. This appears to lead to a disconnect between Resettlement, established 
by the government and resettlement, movements initiated by those in vulnerable 
communities. The data suggests that a key reason this disconnect develops is due to the 
different perceptions of knowledge. It appears that there is a subtly pervasive disregard of 
community knowledge and this can reduce the community agency within the resettlement 
process and prevent it from being participatory. However, the data also highlighted the 
intriguing ways the communities themselves can re-appropriate resettlement to indicate 
their needs in the process, illustrating the fluidity of knowledge and power within the 
resettlement process in Malawi. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
There is ever increasing interest and alarm over climate change on global, national 
and local scales (IPCC., 2014b, Falkner, 2016, Brown, 2019, Glenza et al., 2019). Climate 
change will disproportionally impact those in poorer countries who have contributed least to 
the greenhouse gas emissions suggested to cause current climate change (McKinnon, 2012, 
IPCC., 2014b, Fazey et al., 2009). The inequality of emissions and impact reinforces the fact 
that climate change is a global responsibility (McKinnon, 2012, IPCC., 2014b). 
 
There is a well-established body of research on how to combat, mitigate and adapt to 
climate change (IPCC., 2014b, Adger et al., 2003, Fazey et al., 2009). Migration has increasingly 
been seen as one form of adaptation to climate change (Black et al., 2011b) and there has 
been growing interest by governments and international organisations to become involved in 
this movement. Yet there is currently little research on the governance of environmental 
migration (Draper and McKinnon, 2018, Arnall, 2018), and in this research I focus on one 
specific facet of this: resettlement as a way to manage flooding. Resettlement of communities 
that are vulnerable to flooding (flooding-vulnerable communities) requires governments, civil 
society and community members to work together. These actors have different 
understandings and priorities associated with resettlement. This research is interested in 
understanding how these actors determine the resettlement process and why, and what 
insights this provides for future interest in environmental migration governance. It focuses on 
the Lower Shire Region of Malawi, an area where the Malawian government is interested in 
using resettlement schemes to manage the impact of increasingly severe flooding on 
vulnerable communities. 
 
 I structure this introduction as follows, first, in section 1.2, I set out the relevant 
background for the research. I outline the literature on environmental migration governance, 
as well as providing some context for Malawi and its suitability as a research site for this work. 
Next, in section 1.3, I explain the specific research focus and value. Thirdly, in section 1.4, I 
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set out the research aims and questions and, finally, in section 1.5, the chapter will conclude 
by presenting the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Research Background  
 
1.2.1 The Governance of Environmental Migration 
 
The increasing interest on climate change from the 1980s has led to growing research 
on the impact that potential environmental change has on migration patterns (Black et al., 
2011a, Morrissey and House, 2009, Piguet, 2013, Tadgell et al., 2018, Piguet et al., 2018). In 
this research I view environmental change as the local and immediate consequence of climate 
change as well as other factors, such as land management (Fazey et al., 2009). The interest in 
environmental migration has evolved from predictions of large numbers of environmental 
migrants (Myers, 2005), to a more nuanced understanding: the environment is now seen by 
academics as just one of many drivers that influence migration decisions in a multitude of 
ways (Black et al., 2011a). There has subsequently been a shift within the literature to view 
migration as an adaptation strategy to manage environmental change (Black et al., 2011b, 
Foresight, 2011, McLeman and Smit, 2006). This allows migration to be seen more positively 
in academia and policy. It is now seen, by the academic and international communities, as 
part of the strategy to manage the impacts of climate and environmental change (IPCC., 2019, 
IPCC., 2014a, McNamara et al., 2018). 
 
 There is interest from many governments, particularly in places where environmental 
change is more pronounced, to ‘manage’ these movements related to environmental change, 
most notably through resettlement schemes, which involve the moving of vulnerable 
communities to safer areas, either permanently, seasonally or temporarily (Arnall, 2014, 
Draper and McKinnon, 2018, Johnson, 2012). This has been seen in discussions over 
resettlement on a large scale, such as the entire populations of some small island states like 
Tuvalu and Kiribati, in the Pacific, due to sea level rise (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012, McNamara 
et al., 2018, Mortreux et al., 2018). However, my research is focused on the resettlement of 
inland communities undergoing significant environmental change. According to Draper and 
McKinnon (2018), this is a particularly understudied area, and has high relevance as many 
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people live in inland places vulnerable to severe environmental change (IPCC., 2019). The 
external involvement of government within a movement, through resettlement activities, is 
often controversial (Stal, 2011, Dun, 2011, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). There can be a lack of 
appreciation by government of the importance of an individual’s sense of home, and all this 
entails (Campbell, 2010, McNamara et al., 2018).  
 
There is potential for multiple priorities to be involved in government resettlement. 
This makes it challenging for governments to facilitate, but also makes it an interesting area 
of study. This is especially due to the novelty of government resettlement to manage 
environmental change (Draper and McKinnon, 2018, Arnall, 2018). Previously, resettlement 
has mainly been associated with large development projects, like the Three Gorges Dam in 
China (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015) and slum clearances, often where there has been little 
choice for those undertaking the resettlement (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015, Chakrabarti and 
Dhar, 2010). However, the guidelines set out by international organisations, suggest that 
resettlement as adaptation to climate change, which resettlement due to flooding fits within, 
aims at being proactive, voluntary and participatory (Tadgell et al., 2018, Arnall, 2018). This 
approach is difficult to implement with the technocratic stance of most government 
resettlement schemes (Arnall, 2018, Wilmsen and Webber, 2015) and the multiple 
understandings and priorities involved in the resettlement process. In this research, I examine 
how participatory the resettlement process is in Malawi. At points, I use a governmentality 
approach to unpick the motivations for different understandings and to explore which 
understandings are dominant. This is useful because it highlights if the resettlement is being 
organised chiefly as a form of adaptation to increasingly severe flooding, or whether it is being 
used to fulfil other government objectives (Arnall, 2018).  
 
I focus on flooding, which can be viewed as both slow and fast onset environmental 
change. It is fast onset environmental change in that a single flood event can occur quickly. It 
is also slow onset environmental change, as an area can repeatedly be affected by increasingly 
severe flooding, making it gradually harder to inhabit. As I will explore in the literature review, 
the type of environmental change has different forms of movement associated with it. 
Permanent moves are usually associated with slow onset environmental change and 
temporary moves are associated with fast onset environmental change (Gray and Mueller, 
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2012). This provides potential for multiple perspectives on what type of resettlement should 
occur in response to flooding. This ambiguity means that flooding provides a pertinent 
backdrop to explore the participatory nature of the resettlement process: how different 
understandings and knowledges work together, particularly as there is no clear approach and 
some negotiation of understandings is required. In the next section I will set out the context 
and relevance of Malawi as a place to study this topic. 
 
1.2.3 The Malawian Context 
 
 Malawi is experiencing, and is predicted to continue experiencing, increasing 
environmental change (Suckall et al., 2015). Droughts and floods have always been part of 
the Malawian climate (MetMalawi, 2016). However, their occurrence is becoming more 
severe and the seasonal timings are increasingly unpredictable (IPCC., 2014a). This is 
especially negative for agriculture, which 85% of the population of Malawi rely on for their 
income (World Bank, 2016). Recently there has been severe flooding in Malawi: Cyclone Idai 
in March 2019 devastated Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The greatest impact of the 
cyclone was in Mozambique, but Malawi still had 86,980 people displaced due to the cyclone 
(DoDMA, 2019). Of even greater impact were the January 2015 floods, which displaced 
230,000 people and killed 106 (Chonghaile, 2015). According to the 2015 post disaster needs 
assessment report, the total cost of the disaster and immediate recovery work came to 
US$335 million, and the longer term reconstruction needs were estimated at US$494 million 
(Government of Malawi, 2015a). Additionally, there was a severe drought in 2016 due to a 
strong El Niño, which resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency by the Malawian 
government (Aljazeera, 2016).  Data collection for this thesis was conducted in the autumn of 
2017, in between the 2015 flooding and the 2019 cyclone. The 2015 floods were much 
discussed by the participants. There was also nervous speculation about future climatic 
events. 
 
 Thus, the recent events suggest that flooding in Malawi has become increasingly 
severe. This has caused more and more people to move due to flooding. The government has 
become increasingly interested in managing these movements through resettlement 
schemes and is now in the process of drafting a resettlement policy to guide this approach. 
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The policy is first of its kind in Malawi and is expected to be finalised by the end of 2020. This 
fits in with the shift to view migration as adaption to climate change outlined above 
(McLeman and Smit, 2006). The recent involvement of governments in the management of 
flood-related migration, coupled with the growing international interest in governing 
environmental migration, makes it an apposite time to be studying this issue. 
 
The governance situation and structure within Malawi also provides an excellent 
context to explore how different actors and scales work together in the decision-making 
process. Since 2002 Malawi has been undergoing a process of government decentralisation, 
although there is speculation as to its likely success in Malawi (Jagero et al., 2014). 
Decentralisation refers to the delegation of responsibility and resources from the central to 
local government (the district council) for them to manage as they see fit. Many district 
councils still rely heavily on the national government for funds, with few revenue generation 
activities at the district level (Jagero et al., 2014). Thus, the decentralisation process is still 
occurring and the different layers of responsibility and power are still being determined. 
Moreover, the local government includes both the district council and customary forms of 
governance, with TA (traditional authority) chiefs and village heads. All of these actors are 
involved in the resettlement process, providing a suitable backdrop to explore how different 
understandings work together within resettlement.  
 
 To further explore the process of resettlement, I focus on three communities with 
three different attitudes towards it. The community at Jombo resettlement site have 
resettled after the severe flooding in 2015. The community at village Mwalija have the 
opportunity to resettle, and assistance promised for that resettlement, but are undecided 
whether they want to resettle. Finally, there are those at TA Nyachikadza, which the 
government very much wants to resettle, and which are unwilling to resettle. These three 
communities give an insight into the varied understandings and knowledges involved in 
resettlement. 
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1.3 Research Focus and Value 
 
My research explores the participatory nature of the resettlement process by 
examining the role of different understandings and knowledges within it. In order for 
resettlement to fit with the existing guidelines on resettlement as climate change adaptation, 
outlined by various international organisations, it needs to be voluntary and participatory 
(Correa et al., 2011, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, UNHCR, 2014, Displacement Solutions, 
2013). For resettlement to be participatory it needs to involve those in the flooding-
vulnerable communities, to produce a resettlement process that services the needs of the 
communities whilst also adhering to the capabilities, resources and desires of those in 
government. This can be challenging (Arnall et al., 2019). I argue that a focus on 
understandings and knowledges involved in the resettlement process allows this research to 
appreciate how participatory it is, as it shows whose understandings are considered and 
prioritised, and why. This also helps to expose the motivations and influences in the 
resettlement process and to assess whether it is really assisting the vulnerable populations. 
This is especially important in Malawi due to the powerful presence of development 
organisations and ‘development’s’ reputation for prioritising Western knowledge (Escobar, 
2011). Vulnerable communities often have their own strategies to manage flooding, many of 
which involve periodically moving out of the vulnerable area, independent of government 
involvement. Within the research I highlight whether the government is using resettlement 
as a method to better control their population, as other research has found in a Chinese 
context (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019).  
 
This research is focused on the increasing interest in the governance of environmental 
migration, as a method for vulnerable communities to adapt to a changing climate. Therefore, 
this research is expected to make contributions to literatures on climate change adaptation 
(Tacoli, 2009) and the governance of migration and resettlement (Johnson, 2012, Mortreux 
et al., 2018), particularly participation in a development context (Arnall, 2018, Tadgell et al., 
2018). It is especially valuable at this time when there is much discussion about climate 
change and its impact, and growing public fear around the climate ‘crisis’ (Brown, 2019, 
Glenza et al., 2019). There is an impetus to govern climate migration from international 
development actors, such as the World Bank, but it is unclear how and if this should proceed. 
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I focus on one example where this is happening: flood-related resettlement in Malawi. I 
explore how the resettlement process is occurring and whether it is participatory, and, thus, 
a process that will enable vulnerable populations to better adapt to climate change.  
 
1.4 Research Aim and Questions 
 
 The aim and research questions are set out below with the rationale behind them in 
italics. These rationales are expanded in the Methodology chapter. 
 
Aim 
1. To explore the extent of the participation of relevant actors within the resettlement 
process in Malawi. Resettlement is an emotive issue, involving multiple priorities from the 
different actors involved. Thus, this aim will enable my research to examine how different 
knowledges are allowed for in the resettlement process. It will illustrate whether the 
resettlement is adaptive to climate change, as international guidelines on resettlement 
suggest it is necessary for it to be participatory to be adaptive. 
 
Research questions 
1. How and why is flooding in Malawi seen as an increasing threat? This will illustrate 
how flooding is viewed in Malawi, and whether it is problematised and why. It will 
open up discussion on existing strategies to managing flooding, particularly the 
movements related to flooding already occurring in the communities. 
2. How and why is resettlement used as a technique by government and NGOs to 
manage the population and flooding in Malawi? This allows for analysis of the 
governance approach to resettlement, what the varied understandings of resettlement 
are amongst government and NGOs, how these understandings are incorporated into 
activities and what influences the formation of the understandings. 
3. What role do flood vulnerable communities have in the government strategy of 
resettlement? This focuses specifically on the vulnerable communities, who are often 
perceived as least vocal in the resettlement scenario. It provides a platform to explore 
how they view and react to government resettlement. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 In the following, I provide a brief map of the thesis. In Chapter 2, I set out the relevant 
literature. I explore the development of the environmental migration literature to illustrate 
the genesis of the view that migration can be adaptation to environmental change. I also 
highlight how there is still much room for debate and varied perspectives. I introduce 
literatures on governance and resettlement and explore further the relevance of a focus on 
knowledge to current debates and the necessity for, but also the potential contradictions 
within, participation. In Chapter 3, I outline the methodology used to conduct the research 
and provide detail on the communities studied and the participants interviewed. Turning to 
the empirical findings, in Chapter 4 I explore results that illustrate the problematisation of 
flooding in Malawi and the legitimising of government control. In Chapter 5 I examine the 
government approach to resettlement, focusing on the key influences on this approach and 
the methods and structure that have underpinned its development. In Chapter 6 I set out the 
community response to government resettlement, highlighting how communities attempt to 
be heard. Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude by presenting the conceptual and empirical 
contributions of my research, as well as relevant policy recommendations. I summarise the 
answers to the research questions and suggest avenues for future research.  
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2. THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND GOVERNANCE 
LITERATURES FOR THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 
GOVERNANCE SCHOLARSHIP 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Scholars have long recognised that the environment plays a role in migration patterns 
(Piguet, 2013). However, the way environmental migration is being discussed within certain 
literatures and policy is evolving. New understandings around environmental migration and 
its role in adapting to climate change are being developed and utilised, particularly with 
regards to a rising interest in the governance of environmental migration and the way in 
which governments can advocate for, and actively try to persuade, communities to resettle. 
However, there is as yet little consensus on how the process of governing environmental 
migration, such as through a resettlement project, should take place, if at all. In this research 
I explore the various knowledges to understand how different groups work together in the 
resettlement process in Malawi, to particularly see how participatory it is. This will ultimately 
give greater insight into the use of migration in environmental policy and international 
development (Barnett and Campbell, 2010), specifically how to ensure that resettlement can 
be inclusive of different knowledges and therefore be voluntary and participatory, which is 
essential for resettlement to be adaptive (Arnall, 2018, Miller and Dun, 2019, McNamara et 
al., 2018). 
 
In this literature review, I first, in section 2.2, outline the broader context of 
environmental migration in academic literature. In section 2.3, I explore literature on 
governance, as it is the governance environmental migration that this research is interested 
in. Finally, due to my particular focus on knowledge production, in section 2.4, I examine 
literatures on different knowledges and participation. 
 
  Throughout the research the terms understanding and knowledge are used to 
represent either the process of something being known, or what is known (cf. Šakić Trogrlić 
et al., 2019). I use understanding because, as I will set out below, much of the literature on 
knowledge places categories or boundaries on how something is known, which can be 
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unrealistic (cf. Raymond et al., 2010b). Alternatively, referring to understandings enables a 
broader perspective on what influences how something is known, as the term ‘understanding’ 
has more fluid connotations and is often used when discussing an individual and not a group 
of people, making it more personal and subjective. However, knowledge is used widely in the 
literature and in order to draw on that literature I also use the term knowledge. With regard 
to the use of other terminology pertinent to the topic, while acknowledging their limitations, 
the terms Global North and the West are used to refer to those areas that are perceived as 
the ‘more developed’ regions of the globe.  
 
2.2 Environmental Migration 
 
Below, I provide context on how environmental migration governance has developed 
in migration studies. Following the dominant view in the literature (Black et al., 2011a), I view 
environmental migration as migration that is predominantly driven by environmental factors, 
but these do not need to be the only factors influencing the migration decision. In what 
follows, I illustrate the debate that led to this understanding of environmental migration and 
the problems it causes for its empirical study. Whilst some of these literatures are not directly 
relevant for the Results chapters, understanding their development is needed to appreciate 
how resettlement, as a governance response to environmental migration, came to be viewed 
as a strategy of adaptation to climate change. 
 
2.2.1 The Evolution of Environmental Migration Research 
 
Whilst environmental change has always affected people’s migration, it is only in the 
last 40 years that there has been a resurgence of interest in this issue in the academic and 
policy arena (Piguet, 2013). The effect of environmental change on migration was discussed 
within 19th century Geography (Ravenstein, 1891). However, it disappeared in the literature 
from the 20th century due to a combination of factors: the backlash against environmental 
determinism (Livingstone, 1993); the belief that humans could conquer nature (Hinchcliffe, 
2011); and the increasing interest in the role of economics within migration (Stark and Bloom, 
1985). Therefore, for roughly the first 70 years of the 20th century, the environment was not 
considered in migration theory and economics took a central role (Piguet, 2013).  
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Environmental migration re-entered academic consciousness as part of the 
conservation movement of the 1970s (Brown, 1976). This resurgent interest in environmental 
migration occurs in a post 1973 oil-crisis era where there were concerns over resource 
scarcity and there were other such neo-Malthusian writings, such as The Limits to Growth 
(Meadows et al., 1972) and The Population Bomb (Ehrlich et al., 1971). These writings 
suggested that there would be severe impacts due to overpopulation, such as mass famine. 
There has subsequently been some criticism that these writings were too dramatic in their 
predictions, yet they sparked the initial concern over environmental migration (Bardi, 2011). 
Thus, this early re-initiation of environmental migration was in an era before major concern 
over climate change, where over-population was seen as the key threat, particularly in so-
called developing countries. This is different to current understandings, where climate 
change, and the human actions which cause it, are seen as central to the issue. However, the 
interest in environmental migrants, or refugees, as they were discussed by many at this stage, 
began in earnest after El-Hinnawi’s (1985) UNEP paper, when anthropogenic climate change 
science was becoming more established (Hansen et al., 1981). 
 
El-Hinnawi (1985) and Jacobson (1988) set out the guidelines for much of the further 
study into environmental migration (Morrissey and House, 2009).  El-Hinnawi (1985: 4) is one 
of the first to set out a formal definition of an environmental refugee: 
 
“… those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, 
temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption 
(natural and/ or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or 
seriously affect the quality of their life. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this 
definition it is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the 
ecosystem (or the resource base) that render it temporarily or permanently 
unsuitable to support human life.” 
 
In this definition it is clear that he is referring to forced forms of migration, which, as will be 
explored in the next section, is not what all current research on environmental migration 
suggests (Black et al., 2011b). However, El-Hinnawi also acknowledges that it is a 
heterogeneous process, involving multiple typologies (El-Hinnawi, 1985). This is an influential 
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foundation for the subsequent developments in environmental migration research, which 
also stress the multi-causal nature of environmental migration (Black et al., 2011a). 
 
Jacobson (1988), writing for the Worldwatch Institute, attempts to turn El-Hinnawi’s 
(1985) theorising into empirical evidence, illustrating one impact of this viewpoint. Jacobson 
is the first to introduce empirical evidence into this arena and start the desire to audit this 
phenomenon. The empirical evidence given is based on the number of people situated within 
an area undergoing environmental degradation. The types of models Jacobson (1988) uses 
are termed ‘common sense’ models (Black, 2001), as they are based on the premise that all 
those in a vulnerable area will be impacted and will move out. Jacobson focuses on recent 
events (the Chernobyl disaster, the 1988 flooding in Bangladesh and the 1982-84 droughts in 
sub-Saharan Africa for example) to suggest there were ten million environmental migrants at 
the time of writing (Jacobson, 1988). Thus, initially the empirical evidence was based on 
current situations that potentially involved environmental migrants. However, the growing 
credence given to climate change, and its potential impact, put a greater emphasis on 
estimates and predictions of climate change and subsequent literature on environmental 
migration focused on this (c.f. Myers, 2005). 
 
Norman Myers (1993; 1997; 2002; 2005) fuses both the climate change discourse and 
the previous Malthusian logic to set out several current estimates and predictions. He uses 
predictions of climate change and population growth to suggest that large numbers of 
resource-stressed populations will be forced to move. He predicts there will be as many as 
200 million environmental refugees when ‘global warming takes hold’ (Myers, 2005: 1). There 
were others that also predicted large amounts of migration, including Stern (2007), who also 
suggested there would be 200 million by 2050.  Similar to Jacobson (1988), these large 
estimates are based solely on common sense models (the numbers of those living in risk 
prone areas) and not on empirical analysis (Black, 2001). They assume migration is the only 
response to environmental change and have been critiqued for this simplistic view and the 
inadequate evidence on which it is based (Findlay, 2011, Gemenne, 2011, Piguet, 2010, Black, 
2001). As previously suggested, they were primarily generated by those like Jacobson (1988) 
pushing for greater attention to conservation, with the emphasis on raising concern and 
awareness over the environment. They have thus been critiqued by migration scholars as 
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being too one-dimensional in suggesting that environmental change is the sole driver to 
migration (Bilsborrow, 1992). A polarised debate surrounding environmental migration 
consequently emerged. 
 
Suhrke (1994) outlines two separate schools in the environmental migration debate. 
Those, like Myers (2005), who propose vast predictions are maximalists and those, like Black 
et al. (2011a), who provide a more complex understanding are minimalist (Suhrke, 1994). The 
maximalist school’s focus on prediction fits with the crisis rhetoric surrounding popular 
debates over climate change and migration. As mentioned, they are interested in raising 
awareness about the impact of climate change and a key method they use is to suggest large 
numbers of people will be forced to migrate because of it (Morrissey and House, 2009). This 
polarised debate in the scholarship was prevalent in the 1990s, but, in the current scholarship, 
the ‘minimalist’ perspective is dominant and the maximalist perspective is mainly taken up by 
those who are wary of international migration, such as far-right nationalist political groups. 
This is especially the case in a post 2015 ‘migration crisis’ era, which has included calls for 
tighter borders (Morrissey and House, 2009). 
 
The minimalists counter the maximalist perspective to stress how a multitude of 
factors, such as economic, political, or social, work together in different ways to influence 
migration and the environment is only one of these factors (Black, 2001, Black et al., 2011a, 
Findlay, 2011). I expand on this in Figure 2.1 below. The two different schools of thought, 
prevalent in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to a call for greater empirical evidence, to 
solidify opinion (Suhrke, 1994). However, environmental change is difficult to quantify and 
proxies of it can be misleading (Suhrke, 1994). The next subsection will explore further the 
current understandings of environmental migration and the empirical studies that have 
informed these understandings. 
 
2.2.2 Current State of Environmental Migration Research – Migration as Adaptation 
 
The multi-causal nature of migration has become key in environmental migration 
research. Black et al. (2011a) notably illustrate this with their diagram (Figure 2.1), which sets 
out the five main drivers that influence migration decisions: environmental, political, 
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demographic, social and economic. This diagram is part of a framework they develop to bring 
the environment back into the study of migration, as well as incorporating the factors 
developed in previous migration theories, such as the economic, political and social. They 
highlight how often these factors have been viewed in isolation and stress that it is vital to 
explore how these aspects work together to influence migration to make progress in this area 
of study (Black et al., 2011a). This better appreciates the complexity of reality and is a useful 
grounding for subsequent research. However, it is very difficult to incorporate this complexity 
within research, due to the multitude of factors that need to be considered, ranging from 
social networks to rainfall patterns. Furthermore, this approach only incorporates movers and 
stayers in the analysis and does not include the multidimensional or circular forms of 
migration that may also occur (Safra de Campos, 2015). Thus, whilst the multi-causal nature 
of migration is influential in discussion of environmental migration, it is difficult to measure 
empirically.  
 
The UK government’s landmark Foresight report (2011), of which Black et al.’s (2011a) 
paper, discussed above, is a synthesis, questions whether migration has to be portrayed in a 
negative light. They suggest it could be viewed as adaptation and that the lack of ability to 
migrate, or the occurrence of a ‘trapped’ population, may actually be more problematic than 
 
Figure 2. 1 A conceptual framework for the drivers of migration taken from Black et al. 2011a P.S5 
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the migration. The emphasis on migration as adaptation, the acknowledgement of trapped 
populations and the selectivity of the opportunity to migrate, whilst historically recognised 
(Ravenstein, 1885), were influential developments within the study of environmental 
migration. The fact that it was a government report also illustrates the start of government 
interest in this area.  
 
In environmental migration research, trapped populations are often portrayed as the 
most vulnerable part of the population who are unable to move due to lack of resources 
(Foresight, 2011, Findlay, 2011). It is sometimes referred to as the ‘immobility paradox’, 
where those who most need to move to improve their livelihoods are unable to due to the 
lack of resources or a desire to remain in place (Findlay, 2011). They can enter into a cycle of 
deprivation where the more the environment negatively impacts them, the less likely they 
are to move (Findlay, 2011). It is this part of the population that the Foresight report (2011) 
advocates should receive greater support and research. The idea of being ‘trapped’ suggests 
a lack of agency of the migrant. It does not consider those who do not move out of choice. 
Nevertheless, it is an emotive way of framing the situation, and can be seen as a reason why 
assistance is required with resettlement. The idea of trapped population has been taken 
further in research exploring environmental non-migration: those people who reside in areas 
vulnerable to environmental change but stay through choice or lack of it (Mallick and Siddiqui, 
2015). This definition makes environmental non-migration more inclusive than ‘trapped 
populations’. 
 
Environmental migration as adaptation is another important and recent development 
in the environmental migration literature. This development is important because it has 
introduced a more positive perspective on migration in the face of climate change (Black et 
al., 2011b). The idea of migration as adaptation was initiated by Mcleman and Smit (2006). 
They illustrated how migration had been used as a way to adapt to environmental hardship 
during the 1930s dustbowl in America (McLeman and Smit, 2006). It has subsequently been 
taken up by several scholars in this area (Mortreux and Barnett, 2009, Tacoli, 2009). However, 
there remains a tension within the use of migration as adaptation, between the positive 
contribution of migration as a way to adapt and the negative concern that migration reflects 
a failure of a system to adapt, as a population needs to move away from an area due to their 
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lack of ability to adapt to change (Warner, 2010, Felli and Castree, 2012). Both of these 
perspectives influence the governance approach to environmental migration, as will be 
explored further in the governance section. 
  
The perspective of whether migration is either a positive adaptation or a failure to 
adapt often depends on the type of environmental change. If the environmental change is 
fast onset, migration it is more likely to be seen as positive adaptation, as there are seen to 
be fewer options. In contrast, if the change is more slow onset then the migration may be 
recognised as a failure to adapt (Warner, 2010). As outlined in the Introduction chapter, 
flooding incorporates both fast onset and slow onset environmental change. The occurrence 
of a flood is fast onset, but the gradual increasing severity of flooding in an area is slow onset 
environmental change. Currently, however, much of the research attributes permanent 
moves with slow-onset environmental change, like drought leading to crop-failure, and 
temporary moves with flooding and other occurrences of fast-onset environmental change 
(Gray and Mueller, 2012). This may be because the experience of flooding up to date has been 
as a fast onset phenomenon and not much attention has been paid to its gradual increasing 
severity, which may make places uninhabitable in the future (Stal, 2011). My research 
nuances this relationship to show the impact that the mixture of fast and slow onset 
environmental change has on how resettlement is perceived and managed. 
 
The fact that flooding is viewed as both fast and slow onset environmental change 
makes the governance of flooding particularly interesting to examine. Following the argument 
above, this suggests that movements related to flooding incorporate both a positive and 
negative perspective on migration as adaptation, potentially complicating the motivations for 
government involvement. The perspective of migration caused by flooding as adaptive is a 
bottom up governance approach. However, there is critique of this: some suggest it produces 
too neoliberal an agenda. For example, Baldwin (2014) suggests that the framing of migration 
as a form of adaptation is part of a neoliberal logic. The notion of adaptation puts pressure 
on the individual to move in times of environmental stress in order to find more appropriate 
work (Baldwin, 2014). The current popularity within academia to promote environmental 
migration as adaptation (Black et al., 2011a) is influencing government policy and NGO 
programmes. Bee et al. (2015) reiterates this by suggesting that the shift in climate policy 
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towards climate governance indicates a neoliberal agenda, as responsibility for the climate is 
transferred to non-state actors and the individual. Thus, the desire by the Malawian 
government for flooding-vulnerable communities to resettle, could be seen to represent this 
shift. This research will explore this possibility. 
 
A final emerging issue within current environmental migration research, touched on 
at the start of this section, is the uneven geography of research. There is critique that 
environmental migration is researched by Western academics and is mainly focused on 
environmental migration occurring in the Global South (Piguet et al., 2018). Through 
reviewing several hundred papers Piguet et al. (2018) are able to compare the geography of 
research on environmental migration and climate science research. They show that both are 
predominantly undertaken by Western researchers and that environmental migration 
research is focused on the Global South, whereas climate science research is focused on the 
Global North. This illustrates the hegemony that the West has over understandings of climate 
change and its impacts. Piguet et al. (2018) suggest that it reiterates the post-colonial control 
that the West wishes to maintain over the Global South, particularly through the opportunity 
to securitise the issue of environmental migrants. It highlights the importance of unpacking 
the knowledge involved within environmental migration governance. For example, this 
research argues that the creation of discourse on migration as adaptation to environmental 
change outlined above, has led to growing interest in governing environmental migration 
(UNHCR, 2014). There are several implications over governing migration, which will be 
explored in the governance section. However, first I will explore the literature on 
resettlement, as the specific form of environmental migration governance that is also 
discussed as climate change adaptation (Arnall, 2018).  
 
2.2.3 Resettlement 
 
 The focus on migration as adaptation has led to a growing interest in resettlement as 
a way to manage and adapt to climate change, particularly in the Global South (Tadgell et al., 
2018, Johnson, 2012, Arnall, 2018, Draper and McKinnon, 2018). This research views 
resettlement as the movement of a community out of their previous home area to create a 
new home area either permanently or temporarily, as part of an established annual routine. 
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Resettlement is not a new concept, particularly within development and the resettlement 
associated with the installation of large development projects, such as dams (Arnall, 2018). 
Moreover, there is a long history of nomadic societies, and communities that move regularly 
as a way of life, without any form of external involvement (Khazanov, 1994). However, the 
use of government resettlement to adapt to climate change is novel (Tadgell et al., 2018, 
Arnall, 2018). Thus, there is sparse literature on it and consequently confusion over the best 
approach for governments to take, or if it should be used at all (Draper and McKinnon, 2018). 
This research will add further literature to this area.  
 
Much of the existing advice on resettlement comes from international organisation 
guidelines, or experience from previous forced resettlement related either with development 
or post disaster response (Tadgell et al., 2018). However, as Tadgell et al. (2018) set out in 
their review of the existing literature on climate related resettlement, climate resettlement 
endeavours to be voluntary and proactive. However, as will be explored below, this is not 
always the case. Similar to the opposing views on migration as adaptation outlined above 
(Warner, 2010), there are critiques on resettlement as adaptation. For example, Miller and 
Dun (2019) have queried whether resettlement is adaptive or constitutes ‘loss and damage’. 
This research views loss and damage as the ‘negative effects of climate variability and climate 
change that people have not been able to cope with or adapt to ’ (Warner and Van der Geest, 
2013: 369). In their research exploring resettlement in Vietnam, Miller and Dun (2019) 
suggest that most resettlement contains some form of loss and damage, and that, if not 
properly managed, can lead to greater vulnerability than before the move. This sentiment 
was echoed in Wimsen and Rogers (2019) research exploring resettlement in China. Similarly, 
McNamara et al. (2018) draw on their research in Alaska and Kiribati to suggest that 
resettlement can be adaptive but can also involve loss and damage, if mismanaged. In this 
research I view resettlement as attempting to be adaptation to climate change, as the 
government aims to reduce the vulnerability of the resettling population, a key criteria for 
adaptation (Miller and Dun, 2019, McNamara et al., 2018). However, I also acknowledge, from 
the previous research discussed here, that there is a potential for the resettlement to be mal-
adaptive in Malawi and my research partly examines whether that is the case through its 
focus on participation. According to Miller and Dun (2019) and McNamara et al. (2018) 
resettlement needs to be completely voluntary to be adaptive, I will explore the complications 
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involved with making resettlement voluntary throughout this research by exploring the 
participation involved. 
 
Additionally, there is confusion over the terms used. Some relevant stakeholders use 
resettlement, planned relocation and displacement interchangeably (McAdam and Ferris, 
2015). These terms can have different connotations, with resettlement and planned 
relocation suggesting a more permanent move than displacement, and planned relocation 
suggesting a more proactive approach than the other two. In this research, resettlement is 
used, as this is associated with the re-establishment of communities rather than just their 
movement (McAdam and Ferris, 2015). However, in my data, resettlement also encompasses 
behaviour that could be defined as relocation and displacement, as this was how it was 
spoken about by participants. This will be discussed further in the Methodology.  
 
 In a recent paper exploring the critical geographies of resettlement, Rogers and 
Wilmsen (2019) highlight how much of the literature on resettlement is focused on what 
resettlement entails, in terms of compensation provided and reconstruction of livelihoods. 
However, they suggest that to make the literature on resettlement more critical, more focus 
should be on examining the how and why behind the resettlement process (Rogers and 
Wilmsen, 2019). They call on a political economy and Foucauldian lens to do this, indicating 
that a Foucauldian lens, with its emphasis on government techniques, will help uncover the 
how of resettlement and a political economy lens will help uncover the logic of resettlement, 
the why (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). They particularly use the example of resettlement in 
China to illustrate how the Chinese government utilises resettlement as a tool to facilitate 
easier management of their citizens (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). Indeed, they highlight how 
China is developing a method of academy, ‘resettlement science’, in which they aim to 
develop the ‘perfect’ form of resettlement (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019: 10). They critique the 
idea of obtaining the perfect resettlement, as they suggest that all resettlement recreates 
power dynamics that have a multitude of consequences, intended and unintended (Rogers 
and Wilmsen, 2019). Whilst, Rogers and Wilmsen (2019) focus on all forms of resettlement 
and not just resettlement as adaptation to climate change, they have also focused more 
specifically on resettlement as a way to manage climatic hazards in China (Wilmsen and 
Rogers, 2019). In this paper they emphasise the potential for resettlement to increase 
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vulnerability and be used to promote other developmental agendas of the government 
(Wilmsen and Rogers, 2019). This, as well as their call for greater emphasis on the how and 
why of resettlement (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019), is influential for this research, in which I 
examine these issues by focusing on the different knowledges involved, and which, if any, 
knowledge takes precedence.  
 
The remaining review of resettlement will focus further on the areas of tension and 
consensus currently present within the discourse on resettlement as climate change 
adaptation. First, the key guidelines associated with this form of resettlement are set out. 
This is focusing on the ‘what’ of resettlement, as outlined by Rogers and Wilmsen (2019). Next 
the literature and empirical studies on resettlement as a way to manage flooding specifically 
is explored.  
 
2.3.3.1 Resettlement Guidelines 
 
There are four international organisations that have developed guidelines for 
resettlement as a response to climate change. These guidelines aim to be useful for 
governments, particularly in developing countries where resettlement is most likely to be 
used (Johnson, 2012). Thus, the guidelines provide a good basis on which to review 
resettlement. The use of these guidelines by governments around the world reiterates the 
issue raised by Piguet et al. (2018) of the uneven geography of environmental migration 
research, as these guidelines are all made by institutions with their bases in the Global North, 
and they are chiefly focusing on resettlement situations in the Global South, emphasising the 
global scale involved in resettlement decisions. The implications of this will be discussed in 
the Results. 
 
The key guidelines and principles are most notably set out by: the Norwegian Refugee 
Council, UNHCR, Displacement Solutions and the World Bank (Correa et al., 2011, Norwegian 
Refugee Council, 2011, UNHCR, 2014, Displacement Solutions, 2013). A summary of each of 
these guidelines can be seen in Table 2.1 below.  
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Table 2. 1 Summary of resettlement guidelines 
Name of Organisation Guideline Title and Year of 
Release 
Guideline Summary 
Norwegian Refugee 
Council 
Nansen Principles (2011) 10 principles focused on 
inclusive preparation and 
planning for relocation, with a 
particular interest in multi-
scalar collaboration 
(international institutions and 
law, national governments and 
local/customary governance. 
UNHCR Planned Relocation, Disasters, 
and Climate Change: 
Consolidating good practices 
and preparing for the future 
(2014) 
Focus on unified understanding 
of planned relocation. 
Recognition of the internal 
nature of most planned 
relocation but emphasis on the 
sharing of guidance between 
states and organisations. 
Displacement 
Solutions 
The peninsula principles: on 
climate displacement within 
states (2013) 
18 principles with much focus 
on the rights of displaced: their 
right to stay in the vulnerable 
area and, as climate change is a 
global issue, their right for 
assistance if desired. Again, 
there is emphasis on global 
collaboration. 
World Bank  Populations at risk of disaster: 
A resettlement guide (2011) 
These guidelines highlight the 
need for resettlement and then 
provide detailed practical 
information on how to 
undertake resettlement, little 
post-resettlement advice.  
i. Information for this table extracted from: (Correa et al., 2011, Norwegian Refugee Council, 
2011, UNHCR, 2014, Displacement Solutions, 2013)  
 
Doberstein and Tadgell (2015) reviewed these guidelines and suggested that they 
were too general to be helpful for specific cases. They argued that contextual, area specific 
research is needed to ensure the success of resettlement (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015). This 
is because resettlement is recognised as being personal to those involved and thus it is 
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difficult to provide broad guidance (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015, Tadgell et al., 2018). There 
are, however, some key principles common in the guidelines. I elaborate on these below. 
 
 Firstly, resettlement should only be used as a last resort for adaptation to climate 
change (IPCC., 2014a). This is because of the upheaval that it involves. Several authors have 
commented on the negative impacts associated with resettlement, particularly development-
induced resettlement (Cernea, 1997, Chakrabarti and Dhar, 2010, Wilmsen and Webber, 
2015). These negative impacts include: food insecurity, marginalisation, loss of access to 
common land, community dispersal and higher morbidity. These impacts potentially prevent 
a sustainable livelihood from being achievable (Arnall, 2018, Cernea, 1997).  Additionally, as 
mentioned previously, there is still the general view that leaving an area constitutes a failure 
to adapt in that area (Tadgell et al., 2018). These views are consistent with the view that 
resettlement can cause increased vulnerability and constitute loss and damage, rather than 
adaptation (Miller and Dun, 2019, McNamara et al., 2018). 
 
 Consequently, there is debate in academia and policy over whether resettlement 
should be permanent or not. Some scholars believe that abandonment of an area should be 
avoided (Displacement Solutions, 2013). Displacement Solutions (2013) suggest this could be 
done through enabling access to the previous area or factoring in a return scheme to ensure 
temporary resettlement. However, others suggest that if resettlement is a last resort, and the 
aim is to move vulnerable people out of harm, they should not attempt to return to the 
vulnerable area (Johnson, 2012). Tadgell et al. (2018) propose that the question should not 
be about whether resettlement is permanent but how it could be permanent, with emphases 
on the post-resettlement phase. In answer to this, they advocate for sufficient ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors to be in place to ensure the resettlement is successful (Tadgell et al., 2018). This 
illustrates the variety of understandings of what constitutes resettlement. This research will 
attempt to untangle these understandings for the case of Malawi by researching three 
communities with three different attitudes towards resettlement.  
 
Additionally, the guidelines indicate that resettlement as a form of adaptation should 
be proactive to climate change (Mycoo and Chadwick, 2012, Correa et al., 2011, UNHCR, 
2014). The benefit of the resettlement being proactive, is that a population is moved out of a 
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vulnerable area before the danger arises, potentially saving lives and saving the costs of 
interim shelter (Arnall, 2014, Correa et al., 2011). However, this means that the potentially 
vulnerable population have to be identified beforehand (UNHCR, 2014), which brings in the 
issue over who decides who is vulnerable, and what counts as vulnerability. I will discuss this 
later. Moreover, the vulnerable population have to be adequately informed of the potential 
danger in order to be willing to move (Barnett and Campbell, 2010, Ferris, 2012). This can be 
difficult, as, being proactive, the critical point has yet to happen. Barnett and Campbell’s 
(2010) work, examining vulnerability in the small island developing states in the South Pacific, 
outlines how communication is further complicated by the different levels of power and 
governance involved, particularly when determining vulnerability. These issues are apparent 
in the resettlement process in Malawi, where there is a potential conflict between 
government planned resettlement and the organic forms of movement that happen within 
communities in preparation, and as a response to, flooding. The establishment of official 
resettlement, whilst ensuring maximum safety of a vulnerable population, is time consuming 
and involves extensive negotiation with communities. Many community members appear to 
prefer less reliable, organic forms of resettlement. This will be elaborated on in the Results. 
 
The current literature and guidelines on resettlement highlight the influence of those 
in government in determining the resettlement. Arnall (2018) examines the existing 
guidelines to suggest three key aspects of resettlement: last resort, voluntary and 
developmental. However, he draws on previous examples of resettlement to show how the 
desire for resettlement to be developmental can lead to government exertion of control 
(Arnall, 2018). Arnall (2018) echoes Rogers and Wilmsen (2019) and Wilmsen and Rogers 
(2019) to suggest that resettlement schemes could be framed as resettlement as adaptation 
to climate change but may also include a broader developmental agenda that could 
additionally allow a population to be more controllable, either for developmental or political 
purposes. He illustrates how governments can use climate change to legitimise their desire 
for resettlement (Arnall, 2018). This raises questions about the voluntary nature of 
government resettlement schemes, as it implies there may be hidden agendas within the 
resettlement process that those who are undertaking the resettlement are not aware of. 
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There is recognition in all the guidelines that in order for resettlement to be voluntary 
and successful it is essential that it is participatory (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 
2015). Participatory approaches are explored in the knowledge section below. Throughout 
the resettlement literature, whilst there is agreement that participation is needed, there is 
much diversity over what participation entails. This confusion is present in the resettlement 
process in Malawi, as will be illustrated in the Results. It is evident that some governments 
use coercion in order to facilitate participation, with unfulfilled promises of funding, or the 
cutting off of assistance if communities do not cooperate (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007, Dun, 
2011). This fits with much of the governmentality literature highlighting how a state seeks to 
produce a certain type of citizen through coercion, so that they subconsciously behave in the 
interest of the state (Dean, 1999). This also coincides with some of the critiques of 
participation outlined below (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). 
 
However, some recognise that the most successful resettlement occurs when it is 
community led (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015, Tadgell et al., 2018, Miller and Dun, 2019, 
McNamara et al., 2018). Wilmsen and Wang (2015) examine two resettlement projects in 
China, one perceived as voluntary (the Poverty Alleviation Resettlement project) and one 
perceived as involuntary (the Three Gorges Dam project). They suggest that whether 
resettlement is perceived as voluntary or involuntary is irrelevant, what is important is if it is 
people centred (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). Tadgell et al. (2018) take this further to suggest 
that, in order for adequate participation to occur, people need to feel confident that they will 
receive adequate compensation and livelihood protection with their move, and that the 
enormity of their movement is respected. Indeed, Draper and McKinnon (2018) suggest there 
needs to be more research at the community level, as most environmentally induced 
resettlement occurs at this scale. Arnall et al. (2019) do exactly this in their research exploring 
‘claims-making’ from below in climate displacement and resettlement. They show how, 
through the process of naming, blaming, claiming, and framing, communities are able to have 
agency within climate displacement. They particularly focus on ‘claims-making’ through 
community involvement in protests and activism, as opposed to the traditional participatory 
approaches, which they view as being part of a top-down technocratic approach to 
resettlement, and not being inclusive of community perspectives (Arnall et al., 2019). This 
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research will provide further understanding on the community involvement, agency and 
participation within the resettlement process in Malawi. 
 
Despite their insights, the examination of guidelines and principles is useful only up to 
a point (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015). Whilst this research will examine where the 
resettlement discussed in Malawi is situated within this broader, international context, it is 
also beneficial to review specific analysis of previous flooding resettlement situations. 
Previous research has highlighted the diversity of approaches thus far to resettlement 
(Mortreux et al., 2018). Mortreux et al.’s (2018) study into government action and inaction in 
three localities in West Bengal, India, illuminates the multiple factors that influence 
government involvement beyond the principles and guidelines discussed here. They suggest 
that the diversity of responses is due to the perceived risks of resettlement by the 
government and a lack of government accountability for vulnerable areas (Mortreux et al., 
2018). This reinforces the need for specific examples, which this research will provide by 
exploring the rationale behind the three different attitudes in the three different 
communities under study. Some specific examples from the literature will be explored in 
more detail in the Resettlement for Flooding subsection below. 
 
2.3.3.2 Resettlement for Flooding 
 
Stal (2011) and Dun (2011) have examined the resettlement of communities by 
government in response to flood events in Vietnam and Mozambique. They highlight how 
these resettlements were meant to be permanent moves but were unsuccessful (Stal, 2011, 
Dun, 2011). Stal (2011) examines the reactive resettlement process away from areas around 
the Zambezi River in Mozambique after the severe floods of 2001 and 2007. He used semi-
structured interviews with experts and resettled populations and found that after the 2001 
flood communities were often resettled to areas where there were water scarcity issues and 
so subsequently moved back to the low-lying flood-prone areas (Stal, 2011). However, after 
the 2007 floods the resettlement programme, which involved experts from government and 
international experts from IOM and other UN organisations, focused on choosing better 
locations for resettlement and providing better incentives, mainly in the form of brick houses 
(Stal, 2011). This study found that most people who were resettled after the 2007 floods were 
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happier with their new home and the new lifestyle it incorporated. This lifestyle included 
living in flood-safe areas but growing crops in low-lying areas, which introduces a new form 
of migration not used widely in Mozambique previously (Stal, 2011). This approach addresses 
the need to have adequate compensation and livelihood protection within resettlement 
processes, as stressed by Tadgell et al. (2018), as well as the need for flexible governance. 
 
By contrast, Dun (2011) shows how the resettlement programme installed by the 
government in Vietnam drove households into debt. She used semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaires with migrants and non-migrants to study the resettlement of communities 
along the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. The resettlement process was encouraged and paraded 
as the government helping communities. Nevertheless, it required households to buy the land 
on which they would be resettled, which many could not afford (Dun, 2011). However, unlike 
in Mozambique, this resettlement programme was not instigated because of the increasing 
severity of floods, rather it was a proactive approach to resettlement, and part of the 
government’s strategy to better live with floods (Dun, 2011). This approach could be why a 
payment was required from the migrant as part of the resettlement because the government 
saw the resettlement as a choice and not a necessity. This illustrates some of the implications 
of the difference between forced and voluntary migration discussed above. It shows how 
flooding can potentially incorporate both. Thus, if governance is proactive and taking the 
‘learning to live with floods’ approach, then the migration is potentially more precautionary 
and seen as voluntary. This could lead the migration to involve financial costs for the migrant. 
Whereas, if governance is reactionary, then migration due to flooding is more likely to be 
perceived as forced migration and therefore less likely to involve costs for the migrant.   
 
However, previous literature highlights that, even when there is no monetary cost 
attached to the migration, there are other implications of forced migrations. Stal (2011) 
suggests that whilst the communities along the Zambezi do not have a cost associated with 
their migration, they do depend on humanitarian assistance during flooding, which is an issue 
that Dun (2011) did not encounter in Vietnam. Indeed, forced resettlement is likely to 
produce communities that are less satisfied and adjusted to their new environment overall, 
and therefore likely to be dependent on external assistance for longer (Roizblatt and Pilowsky, 
1996). This research aims to assess how much dependency the communities along the Shire 
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River have on humanitarian assistance during flooding. Interestingly, the Dun (2011) study 
was done as part of the EACH-FOR project, which was a European led study into 
environmental migration, with several papers, including Dun’s (2011), published in 2011. This 
illustrates the dominance of Western knowledge within environmental migration literature 
and reiterates the importance of exploring the genealogy of how resettlement is understood.  
 
Additionally, these previous studies on resettlement due to flooding, do not explore 
how knowledge on resettlement is produced within the resettlement process. Through 
studying three communities with three different attitudes to resettlement, I illustrate the 
different ways in which knowledge on resettlement can be produced and managed on a small 
scale. I will use these findings to explore the participatory nature of resettlement in Malawi. 
This will add further understanding of the resettlement process and how it is taken up as a 
government strategy for climate change adaptation, as called for by scholars such as Arnall 
(2018), who highlight how resettlement can be labelled by governments as for climate change 
adaptation whilst also being used to fulfil other government agendas, such as stronger 
population control. 
 
2.3 The Determinants of Environmental Migration Governance 
 
 This research is interested in how environmental migration is governed. I specifically 
focus on migration due to flooding and the interest in resettlement as a governance tool to 
manage increasingly severe flooding. In the first section of this review, I established how there 
has been a shift in the environmental migration literature to view environmental migration 
as adaptation and how this has led to increasing interest in its governance through processes 
such as resettlement. In this section, I will provide further context on what influences the 
governance of environmental migration. I highlight the place of environmental migration 
governance within broader climate change governance. Following this, I set out issues around 
the practicalities of governing environmental migration. Here, there is a particular focus on 
the difficulty of deciding who is vulnerable, who is responsible for environmental migrants 
and whether the migration is seen as forced or voluntary. In the final subsection I explore the 
techniques of government, as set out by Foucault and his theory of governmentality, and the 
existing use of this theory in exploring climate governance. 
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2.3.1 The Evolution of Environmental Migration Governance 
 
 The policy interest in governing environmental migration is relatively recent, growing 
in the last ten years. This growth in interest corresponds with the growing appreciation and 
discussion of climate change, and its potential impacts, that is present in much academic 
literature and now in policy globally (IPCC., 2014a). This has changed the discourse around 
environmental migration to make it more of a government concern and responsibility, as it is 
now situated within climate change responses. This subsection will set out this progression 
by highlighting how it is situated within the broader climate change governance literature, 
how this influences its policy framing, and the subsequent influence of this on the governance 
of environmental migration.  
 
2.3.1.1 Climate Change Governance 
 
 The most influential aspect of climate change governance of relevance to this research 
is the role of international agreements, most prominently, the 2016 Paris Agreement. This 
has the potential to influence the process of resettlement in Malawi as shall be explored 
below. 
 
The Paris Agreement came out of COP-21 (the conference of the parties) in 2015 and 
enabled a ‘naming and shaming’ approach to climate governance (Falkner, 2016). The 
subsequent COP meetings have not yielded any relevant agreement to supersede the Paris 
Agreement. Signatories of the Paris Agreement publicly set their own, individual, non-binding 
targets, which are available to be shared and compared against the targets of other countries 
(Falkner, 2016). This approach aims to install a more collaborative global effort to combatting 
climate change (Falkner, 2016). Climate change adaptation has become a big part of this 
effort. The Paris Agreement called for more climate adaptation funding (UN, 2015). Thus, 
increasingly, to access large international funding opportunities, such as from the World Bank 
or UN subsidiaries, countries have to include climate change adaptation in government 
documentation and often produce a National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) 
(Weiler et al., 2018). Malawi produced their own NAPA in 2006 (Government of Malawi, 2006) 
and it is referenced to in the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy as clarifying the impact 
of Climate change on disasters (Government of Malawi, 2015b). Whilst Warner (2010) 
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highlights that migration is not yet normally part of a country’s NAPA, and it is not part of 
Malawi’s, the introduction of climate change adaptation into the plans, coupled with the 
growing interest in migration as adaption to environmental change, highlighted in the section 
above, could suggest this is not far away. This highlights the influence of global trends and 
external funding bodies on determining the focus of government, potentially onto 
resettlement (Weiler et al., 2018). The resettlement guidelines highlighted above illustrated 
that they were a response to the need to adapt to climate change (UNHCR, 2014, Tadgell et 
al., 2018). Thus, the international influence that comes from the Paris Agreement and its 
ramifications on available funding highlights the potential different scales involved in the 
governance of resettlement.  
 
Indeed, it is not just the international scale that is considered, but national and local 
scales as well. In their review on environmental governance Ali-khan and Mulvihill (2008) 
highlight how environmental governance has had increasing influence from civil society. They 
suggest this inclusive approach to tackling an issue has previously not occurred as successfully 
(Ali-Khan and Mulvihill, 2008). It is only due to the pervasiveness and the supposedly apolitical 
nature of the environment and climate change that there is a greater openness to, and 
influence from, civil society. This illustrates variety within a national and local scale. 
 
However, there is also literature that highlights how civil society can be an extension 
to government (Choudry, 2010). This is referred to as NGOization, which is the process where 
there is an upsurge in NGOs due to an increase in funding for NGOs from government, or 
international organisations, for projects designed by government and or international 
organisations (Choudry, 2010). Moreover, because civil society is often viewed as holding the 
government accountable, there is less effort in making civil society itself accountable 
(Choudry, 2010). Therefore, scholars such as Choudry (2010) argue that, through the 
NGOization process, civil society becomes an unaccountable arm of the government or 
international organisation. Townsend et al. (2002) highlight how NGOization has been 
particularly detrimental to the African continent, as it acts as an extension of imperialism and 
a gate keeper to determining knowledge, as I discuss further in the indigenous knowledge 
subsection. This is particularly evident in discussion of land reforms within Africa, which have 
been critiqued as being subject to the influence of international organisations but promoted 
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at the national and local scale despite the fact that some suggest they do not adequately 
protect the rights of smallholders in many contexts (Boone, 2007).  
 
At a broader scale, Himley (2008) reviews environmental governance literature to 
suggest that the involvement of large international organisations, such as the World Bank, in 
environmental governance can lead to the neoliberalisation of environmental governance, 
outsourcing it to the responsibility of the communities involved. He indicates that this 
neoliberalisation is a power burdened process, creating new forms of ‘ecogovernmentality’ 
(Himley, 2008: 446). Ecogovernmentality will be explored further in the governmentality 
section.  
 
Thus, this research incorporates many scales: there is a meta scale of the role of 
broader ideologies, predominantly Western neoliberalism; there is an international and 
national scale through the involvement of NGOs, both national and international, and 
government policy; and there is a local scale with the examination of the role of local 
understandings, which I will set out further in the indigenous knowledge subsection. 
However, these local understandings are not limited to the local scale. Indeed, it is very 
interesting to explore how these scales work together. The process of knowledge production 
and mobilisation requires that knowledge jumps scales, the Western neoliberalism appears 
in local understanding of resettlement and vice versa. Moreover there is a time scale with the 
incorporation of memory and the impact of past events on how people prepare and react for 
potential future events (Hall and Endfield, 2016). Through their exploration of memory of 
extreme winters in Cumbria, England, Hall and Endfield (2016) illustrate how memory of 
extreme weather events, and its impact on future actions, is incredibly subjective and often 
related to other circumstances happening at the same time as the extreme weather event. 
Thus, memory can impact how people prepare for future weather events in unpredictable 
ways, adding an additional dimension behind how people may understand the resettlement 
process. Through the exploration of scale, I will be able to unpick further the process of 
knowledge production. Central, in knowledge being able to jump scales, is how it is framed 
and by whom. In the next subsection, I outline the multiple framings of environmental 
migration and their implications for governance. 
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2.3.1.2 Frames in Public Discourse 
 
 In the previous discussion, I highlight how the interest and understanding of climate 
change and environmental migration has developed with time, and how this has affected 
government objectives. There are now several viewpoints on environmental migration, as can 
be seen in Table 2.2 (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). These viewpoints are often associated with 
a particular agenda or concern that the viewer wants to address. Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015: 
106) examine this further by looking at how environmental migrants are framed. Frames are 
viewed as the organisation of ideas on an issue to promote a certain viewpoint, or agenda 
(Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) suggest that the frames in which 
migrants are placed act as ‘filters of sense-making’ and these categories can influence policy 
decisions, as suggested in Table 2.2 below (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015: 106). They take a 
qualitative approach to analyse the language used around environmental migration, and 
establish four frames: migrants as victims, security threats, adaptive agents and political 
subjects. The actors involved in these frames and their time dimension can be seen in Table 
2.2, which gives an indication of where the power may lie in each frame. In reality there is 
much crossover between frames and the timespan with which they are allocated. Despite 
this, it is useful to categorise discourses on environmental migration in this way, to better 
appreciate how the migrants are being perceived and why.  
 
The way in which environmental migration is discussed suggests a lot about the 
perceived agency of the migrant (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). This research views agency as 
‘having the ability to act and be agents of their own development’ (Eversole, 2011: 51), as I 
explore further in the next subsection. The perceived agency of the migrant highlights how 
much influence and power they have over the migration decision. Ransan-cooper et al. (2015) 
suggest that resettlement frames the migrants as political subjects, thus giving the migrants 
agency within the decision. However, this research will show that governed resettlement fits 
better in the cross-over between migrants as adaptive and migrants as political subjects, as 
during the resettlement process under study, government, NGOs and community members 
work together. This reflects the fact that the agency of the different actors in the migration 
decision is a complex matter. Exploring the rationale behind the three different attitudes 
towards resettlement and focusing on the role of different knowledges within this process 
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will enable this research to better appreciate how government, NGOs and community 
members work together.  
 
 
Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015: 106) suggest that greater reflexivity about the ‘over-
arching, macro-cultural frames’ can help to illuminate assumptions about migrants and the 
Table 2. 2 Frames and actors involved in environmental migration suggested by Ranson-
Cooper et al. (2015: 108). Colour coded by timeframe, key included. 
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migration. However, their analysis focused on analysing texts (academic, grey literature and 
policy) about environmental migration. In this research, I will elaborate on this and unpack 
how NGOs and government produce understandings of environmental migration and how 
the migrants themselves understand environmental migration, and resettlement in 
particular. From this, it will be clear whether there is a clarity in understandings between 
those in government and those in communities and if not, why this might be, and whether it 
might be affected by an ulterior government agenda. 
 
2.3.2 Environmental Migration Governance in Practice: Vulnerability and Responsibility 
 
 The type of environmental migration that is most liable to be governed involves 
potential migrants that are seen to be particularly vulnerable to environmental change and 
for which the governing body, whether that be government, international organisation, or 
NGO, feel responsible for (Gemenne et al., 2018). Therefore, to fully appreciate the process 
of governing environmental migration, there needs to be an understanding of who is seen to 
be responsible for the vulnerable population and who those responsible see to be vulnerable 
to environmental change. I explore these issues in the following subsections.  
 
2.3.2.1 Vulnerability and Resilience 
 
  There is much discussion in the climate change and natural disaster literatures on the 
vulnerability and resilience of populations (Blaikie et al., 2014, Mwale et al., 2015, Brouwer 
et al., 2007). Vulnerability to flooding fits broadly into literature on vulnerability to climate 
change more generally and is discussed in that context here. As mentioned, exploring 
discussions over vulnerability is important when examining governance of environmental 
migration, as who is ‘governed’ is determined by who is seen to be vulnerable to 
environmental change.  
 
The first distinction that many authors make about vulnerability to environmental 
change is that it is not directly linked to poverty (Adger et al., 2003, Brouwer et al., 2007, 
Khandker, 2007, Adger, 2006). Khandker (2007) uses his research in Bangladesh to highlight 
the importance of social welfare systems in determining vulnerability. Indeed, Brouwer et al. 
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(2007) go further to suggest vulnerability is a mixture of social, economic, environmental, 
cultural and institutional structures. Furthermore, vulnerability has also been split into 
socioeconomic and biophysical forms (Mwale et al., 2015). Mwale et al. (2015) have 
particularly looked at the connection between these two aspects specifically in relation to 
flooding in the Lower Shire region of Malawi, where this research is also conducted. Their 
research attempted to quantify vulnerability and provide a usable index for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Mwale et al., 2015).  
 
Some scholars split vulnerability into three components. According to Adger et al. 
(2003: 181) vulnerability of a community to environmental change ‘is determined by its 
exposure, by its physical setting, and by its ability and opportunity to adapt to change’. Pelling 
(1999: 250) puts it more succinctly to suggest that vulnerability is dependent on exposure, 
resilience and resistance. Thomalla et al. (2006) suggest it is exposure, sensitivity and 
resilience. However, all papers are essentially stating that vulnerability depends on whether 
a community is in an area where an environmental change will occur: its exposure to it; and 
how well a community is able to cope with or prevent that change: its resilience and 
resistance/sensitivity. This provides an interesting backdrop on which to examine flooding 
and the management of migration caused by flooding, as it suggests that in order to be less 
vulnerable to flooding, if exposed to it, a community needs to improve their resilience and 
resistance. It also highlights the subjective nature of vulnerability, as these components may 
be viewed differently by actors. In this research, I show how these components work in the 
context of flooding along the Shire River in Malawi and I explore the role of external assistance 
provided to communities in determining vulnerability. Of particular interest to this research 
is whether vulnerability is similarly understood by those governing the resettlement and 
those potentially undertaking the resettlement.  
 
These three components of vulnerability also link into the move to Disaster Risk 
Reduction (DRR) present in much natural hazard literature, including flooding (Manda, 2014, 
Thomalla et al., 2006). DRR is focused on the governance of disasters, or rather reducing the 
potential damage of disasters (Paton and Johnston, 2006, Paton et al., 2000). Thomalla et al. 
(2006) suggest that the attention on DRR has been born out of the shift away from response 
and recovery to awareness and preparedness that the assessment of vulnerability can provide 
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(Thomalla et al., 2006, Manda, 2014). However, Thomalla et al. (2006) also suggest that there 
is yet to be a true appreciation of vulnerability and much is underestimated, which leads to 
the development of inadequate DRR policies. Indeed, Manda (2014) links this to strong local 
governance. He highlights the importance of strong local governance in DRR by highlighting 
how the poor local governance in Karonga, Malawi, makes DRR policies ineffective (Manda, 
2014). Manda (2014) suggests that some of these issues are associated with the 
decentralisation process occurring in Malawi. This indicates the importance given in the 
literature to government and NGOs in determining successful responses to flooding.  
 
Additionally, present in the literature on vulnerability and relevant to this research is 
the idea of individual entitlement to assistance. In their research exploring climate change 
adaptation in the developing world, Adger et al. (2003) stress that the entitlement of 
individuals or groups to call on assistance is a crucial component in determining vulnerability, 
for, if a community or individual is able to call on assistance readily and to receive it readily, 
then their vulnerability is lower. This makes up part of the resilience component. However, 
Pelling (1999) goes further to suggest that this entitlement stems from the product of socio-
economic and political structures, which determine an agent’s ability to compete for 
resources and right for the assistance they want. These ideas place agency on an individual 
whilst also recognising that this agency may be influenced by external factors, such as 
resource availability and communication networks (Pelling, 1999, Sen, 1981, Blaikie et al., 
2014). This is interesting for the resettlement situation in Malawi as the government is often 
offering assistance with this process, for example by identifying and negotiating a new place 
to settle and starting to construct amenities there. However, this may not be the assistance 
that the communities desire. They may not want to resettle to the new place identified by 
the government, for example. Therefore, being able to determine the type of assistance 
received is important.  
 
Thus, agency and vulnerability are connected. In this research, I draw on Eversole’s 
(2011: 51) definition of agency as one ‘having the ability to act and be agents of their own 
development’. In this way, agency is often seen as synonymous with choice (Mainwaring, 
2016). However, this research goes beyond examining choice to look at how much different 
actors are involved in determining their situation (Mainwaring, 2016, Harvey, 2002). How 
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much actors can reflect on their situation and act because of that (Bakewell, 2010). Moreover, 
I explore not just individual agency but community agency. By community agency I refer to 
the local relationships that facilitate collective action and from this, the adaptive capacity of 
a community (Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010). Low agency is often 
associated with high vulnerability (Brown and Westaway, 2011). Sometimes, low agency can 
be attributed to a population simply because they are perceived to be vulnerable, even if 
there is a lack of empirical evidence of vulnerability (Anderson, 2008). This has significant 
implications on how that population interacts with other actors, which is relevant to my 
research and also discussed in other work (Li, 2007, Scott, 2008). 
 
The interplay of several elements with regards to vulnerability is discussed in the work 
of Scott (2008) and Li (2007). In Scott’s (2008) seminal work, Weapons of the Weak, he 
highlights how rural communities in Malaysia are able, through everyday activities, to slightly 
resist the hegemony being placed upon them. He highlights the potential agency and power 
of those perceived as ‘vulnerable’, indicating the importance of understanding the 
perspectives involved, which the next section on knowledge will explore further (Scott, 2008). 
Similarly, Li’s (2007) work, The Will to Improve, takes a governmentality approach to examine 
‘expert’ involvement in development in Indonesia. She shows how previous colonial and 
prejudiced views can still be subtly part of the development agenda of ‘improving’ the 
country, and how development for the ‘vulnerable’ can unknowingly be development for the 
‘elite’, which again links into the discussion over different knowledges used and prioritised 
(Li, 2007). This research will take a similar approach to that of Li (2007) and Scott (2008) and 
focus on understanding the nuanced array of knowledges involved in the resettlement 
situation in the Lower Shire. 
 
2.3.2.2 Responsibility 
 
If a population is vulnerable to environmental change such as flooding, then the issue 
of who is responsible for that vulnerable population arises (Dun, 2011). There is a climate 
justice argument that those responsible for increasing the severity of climate change should 
be the ones who bear the burden of adapting and assistance (Sovacool and Linnér, 2016). This 
suggests, for example, that those causing deforestation to occur upstream should be 
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responsible for assisting those affected by the flooding downstream. However, Sovacool and 
Linnér (2016) recognise that, if this argument is followed through, it may not be the people 
cutting down the trees that are responsible, but rather the system that leads them to 
deforestation: the demand for timber for fuel for example. This implies a need to have a broad 
perspective when examining responsibility for vulnerable populations and brings in questions 
over the appropriate governance approach to increasing flooding severity (Sovacool and 
Linnér, 2016).  
 
 There has been much debate over whether environmental change leads to voluntary 
or involuntary migrants. This has implications for the responsibility attached to the migration 
and how it is taken up in policy and governed. Normally, in forced migration the settlement 
process is seen to be the responsibility of a governing state or humanitarian agencies, 
whereas in voluntary migration the process is seen to be the responsibility of the migrant 
(Castles and Miller, 2009). As power tends to be affected by perceptions of responsibility, 
examining responsibility provides insights into who has power in determining the process of 
the migration.  
 
The multicausal nature of migration makes it difficult to ascertain the environment as 
the driver of forced migration. Instead, Hugo (1996) puts a great emphasis on choice to 
suggest that ‘refugee-hood’ depends on the amount of choice and coercion that is involved 
in the decision. For him, the difference between voluntary and forced migration can be seen 
as a continuum of choice (Hugo, 1996). Suhrke (1994) also examines the level of choice, 
proposing that, if the migration is pre-emptive, then the person is a voluntary migrant, 
whereas, if it happens because they can no longer sustain their livelihood, then they are a 
forced migrant. This is particularly interesting for the case of migration due to flooding 
because, as has been established, flooding can be both a fast onset event, during the flood 
itself, and a slow onset event due to the gradually increasing severity. Therefore, depending 
on one’s perspective, resettlement due to flooding could be either forced or voluntary 
migration, which could influence the amount of external involvement in the move.  
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2.3.3 Governmentality: A Tool for Understanding Resettlement Governance 
 
Governmentality is a key framework through which governance practices are 
analysed. It was first developed by Foucault and refers to unpicking the processes of power 
in a state (Walters, 2012, Foucault et al., 2007). However, the analysing process can be 
expanded to explore the power dynamics in global governance issues, such as with climate 
change (Rutherford, 2007, Goldman, 2004). This led to the rise of scholarship on green 
governmentality (Rutherford, 2007) or ecogovernmentality (Goldman, 2004), particularly 
relevant to this research. Before I expand on green governmentality and ecogovernmentality 
I will provide a brief overview of governmentality.  
 
Initially, Foucault developed governmentality to understand how ideas became 
normalised, the genealogy of government and who controlled the dominant understandings 
(Walters, 2012). This is relevant to this research on resettlement, because currently 
resettlement due to flooding is a concept which is in the process of becoming normalised in 
Malawi. Previously, the Malawian government did not consider resettlement as a flood 
management strategy. Thus, I find a governmentality approach useful at points in this 
research to unpack the genealogy of the current understanding, and the implications of this.  
 
Scholars suggest that there are four key foci of governmentality that can be used to 
analyse a regime of government, and that this regime can be at a variety of scales, ranging 
from the local to the international (Rutherford, 2007). These four foci are: the production of 
forms of knowledge, how something comes to be understood as true or normal; the 
production of visible spaces, the formation of the space which requires governing; the 
production of different subjects or subjectivities, ensuring that citizens behave in the way 
desired; and the particular techniques and technologies used to manage the population, the 
audits undertaken (Dean, 1999, Death, 2013).  The analysis of these foci works to enlighten 
the overall form of governance. This research uses these foci to establish the research 
question and the analysis process, particularly to establish the role of different knowledges, 
why these knowledges are given these roles and by whom. This connects to the first focus of 
governmentality and the other foci help explain the agenda behind the governance and the 
reasons for why certain knowledges take precedence (Death, 2013).  
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A governmentality approach has been widely used in the academic analysis of 
development. For example, Watts (2003) suggests that the use of governmentality in 
development studies helps to uncover the mechanisms behind the production of subjects and 
often incorporates a Marxist outlook, as it is highlighting the potential power of the 
marginalised. This is especially the case when it is examining whether the discourse is being 
discussed and taken up in such a way as to perpetuate the hegemony of the Global North 
(Watts, 2003). The work of Tania Murray Li (2007), discussed previously, also follows a similar 
governmentality approach. Thus, in the context of this research, it helps to explore how much 
development ideologies involved in environmental migration could spread the ulterior 
motives of those in power. 
 
As mentioned, a governmentality approach is often used to look more specifically at 
climate change governance. In a chapter exploring the uptake and eventual dominance of 
‘green’ practices in the World Bank, Goldman (2004) highlights how the green movement, 
which has connotations of crossing borders, uniting the world and being bigger than politics, 
can still be used to promote a Western hegemony, as it still involves the funding of certain 
projects that can be designed to fit the World Bank agenda. This suggests that 
‘environmentally’ friendly approaches have become normalised to the extent that they are 
potentially under less critique (Goldman, 2004). Similar to the role of NGOs in the discussions 
of NGOization above, environment related development projects are often viewed as 
apolitical and less accountable. Rutherford (2007) highlights how governmentality is a 
suitable approach for analysing the interaction between humans and nature as it allows for 
the study of multiple scales. This review has already highlighted the scalar nature of this 
research. Rutherford highlights the bottom up nature to governmentality and how resistance 
to dominance should not be viewed as separate but as part of the dominant power 
(Rutherford, 2007).  
 
 Interestingly, there has been recent research by Enroth (2014) that highlights a shift 
in the focus of governing. Enroth (2014) reviews literature from the 1990s to the present, to 
suggest that there has been shift away from focusing on governing a society or a population, 
to governing problems. He indicates this is a global phenomenon with many problems, such 
as climate change, viewed on a global scale requiring a global governance approach (Enroth, 
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2014). He calls for a more flexible way of examining governance that is open to the current 
changes in governance approach (Enroth, 2014). I aim to do this by exploring how government 
and NGOs work together to produce the governance approach to resettlement, representing 
the inclusive nature of environmental governance (Ali-Khan and Mulvihill, 2008), and 
unpicking the agendas behind this approach. The research on NGOization is particularly 
relevant here, as it implies that NGOs have the potential to be a less accountable extension 
of the government (Choudry, 2010), suggesting that their relationship may be one way, with 
the government determining the actions of NGOs. I found some evidence that NGOs involved 
in resettlement were heavily influenced by government, as I set out in the methodology.   
 
Thus, I use the governmentality approach at points in this research as a way of opening 
up potential deeper reasons behind why environmental migration may be understood in a 
certain way by different actors. It can help to illuminate and provide reasons for actors’ 
agendas and why certain understandings may take precedence. This will be important when 
trying to explore how certain knowledges are being used within resettlement. I now explore 
debates around knowledge. 
 
2.4 Allowing for Different Understandings in Resettlement 
 
 In this research, I study three communities with three different attitudes towards 
resettlement: resettled, undecided and unwilling to resettle. Government resettlement is 
novel in Malawi and it is unsurprising that there are multiple perspectives involved. Indeed, 
the novelty of resettlement means it is currently in a negotiation phase to determine a 
dominant understanding and a key part of this research is exploring the reason behind these 
varied opinions on resettlement. As I show in the Results, there is a difference in 
understandings between those in the flooding-vulnerable communities and those in the 
government and NGOs. Often these different understandings of resettlement are associated 
with different forms of knowledge, chiefly indigenous or local knowledge and Western, 
scientific or technocratic knowledge. These three forms of knowledge (Western, scientific and 
technocratic) are put together here as they are seen as complementary in this context. I will 
explore these categories further below before outlining the literature around participatory 
approaches. Participatory approaches attempt to bridge the gap between different 
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knowledges and have been much discussed in development geographies, particularly as part 
of the post-development critique. They are recognised as imperative for resettlement to be 
adaptive (Displacement Solutions, 2013) and in this research, I explore the government use 
of a participatory approach to unify opinions on resettlement and form a common 
understanding of resettlement.  
 
 Scholars have become increasingly interested in the role of knowledge in disaster 
management (Weichselgartner and Pigeon, 2015). Weichselgartner and Pigeon (2015) 
highlight how they view knowledge as the information available on a situation, but that there 
may be different ways in which that information can be received, or in which something can 
be known. However, scholars in disaster management have highlighted that increasing 
knowledge of disasters does not necessarily equate to less damage from disasters, as not 
everyone may have equal access to the increased knowledge (Weichselgartner and Pigeon, 
2015). Instead, Weichselgartner and Pigeon (2015) call for greater attention into how  
knowledge on disaster management is collected and distributed amongst different actors, to 
ensure there is equal understanding, which is evenly distributed. Their research is focused on 
a French context, but a similar scenario could apply in Malawi. The novelty of resettlement as 
adaptation means there is an emphasis on researching how knowledge is gained and formed 
in this process and my research explores whether this knowledge is equally understood and 
distributed.  
 
Before discussing knowledge, it is useful to set out briefly what I mean by 
development, as much of the review below is related to debates within development 
literatures. Within this research, I refer to development as the attempt by government and 
civil society to improve the quality of life of areas viewed as having some level of poverty (Li, 
2007). By civil society, I am referring to NGOs and any collaborative activity that is supposedly 
not driven by the market or by government. However, in the data, as will be set out in the 
Methodology, the NGOs studied are mainly in-country offices of international NGOs, with one 
organisation connected to the World Bank. I make this evident in the Results.  
 
Whilst development may occur spontaneously, in this research I view development as 
being reliant on government and donor funding. Because Malawi is heavily aid-dependent, 
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the development approach is highly influenced by large funding bodies, such as international 
organisations or development banks. The definition I use is purposefully broad, as 
development is often perceived differently depending on the actor involved. Ideally 
development is meant to be altruistic, but there has been much research that highlights how 
it can impose an ideology or practices without adequate consideration of their contextual 
suitability but with the belief that it will improve ‘vulnerable’ lives (Li, 2007, Scott, 2008, 
Ferguson, 1994, Briggs and Sharp, 2004). This has been critiqued for establishing a dichotomy 
between those in need, and those able to help, with those in need often seen as incapable of 
‘improvement’ without external assistance, which implies a lack of agency and power over 
their situation (Li, 2007, Escobar, 2011). Much of these critiques are labelled ‘post-
development’ and focus on the importance of participation and inclusion of the voices of the 
‘vulnerable’ within development (Escobar, 2011). Ultimately, the development literature 
highlights the importance of appreciating how actors and a situation are perceived and 
understood, and the genealogy to these understandings. This is a key reason for exploring 
further the nature of knowledge and its production.    
 
2.4.1 Indigenous/Local Knowledges 
 
Indigenous knowledges, known by some as local knowledges (Pearce, 2018, Šakić 
Trogrlić et al., 2019), have traditionally been posed as belonging to communities in the Global 
South that have an alternative outlook to the perspective of the Global North (Akena, 2012). 
However, today they are recognised to be more nuanced (Sillitoe and Marzano, 2009) and 
less confined by scale (Schulz et al., 2019). In their paper exploring their attempt to integrate 
indigenous knowledge with science, Kalanda-Joshua et al. (2011: 997) suggest that indigenous 
knowledge ‘represents a dynamic information base that has supported most rural 
communities by adapting to constantly changing and varying climates’. However, whilst there 
may currently be an attempt to work with indigenous knowledge, this was not always the 
case. In the brief review below, I set out the change in perception of indigenous knowledge 
to enable an appreciation of how it might be viewed today by those in government and civil 
society, such as those involved in managed resettlement in the Lower Shire. As mentioned in 
section 2.1, I prefer using the term ‘understanding’ rather than knowledge, to allow for the 
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fluidity involved. However, due to the prevalence of the term ‘knowledge’ in the literature, I 
use the term here, to allow for the contributions made by this literature.  
 
At the outset of postcolonial development around the 1960s, indigenous knowledge 
was labelled by development practitioners and scholars as ‘traditional’ knowledge and was 
often seen as backward (Pearce, 2018). It was viewed by the West as a barrier to development 
(Akena, 2012). The increasing focus on environment from the 1960s onwards led to interest 
in Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) (Pearce, 2018). There was subsequently growing 
interest from the scientific community on what light this form of knowledge could shed on 
environmental issues (Pearce, 2018). The term TEK is still in use today but often comes under 
criticism as the word ‘traditional’ can be seen to imply that indigenous knowledge is inferior 
to ‘current’ Western scientific knowledge (Pearce, 2018). Some suggest that it exoticizes this 
form of knowledge, turning it into data that scientific research can extract with little 
collaboration of the holders of the knowledge (Pearce, 2018). Thus, there was a shift from 
viewing this form of knowledge as inferior to exploiting it for the use of the Western scientific 
community (Akena, 2012). More positively, from as early as the 1970s in some situations, 
there has been a turn away from privileging Western scientific knowledge, and towards 
incorporating local understandings (Briggs, 2005).  It is important to remember the previous 
perspectives on indigenous knowledge when exploring how actors treat community 
knowledge and understandings today, such as in the Lower Shire Region, as my Results 
suggests that some of the previous perceptions still pervade. Indeed, scholars such as Escobar 
(2011) have illustrated how a disdain for indigenous knowledge can still persevere despite 
current trends to view it more positively.  
 
Briggs (2013) outlines three key defining aspects of indigenous knowledge: location 
specificity; combination with scientific knowledge; and co-option for neo-liberalism. These 
aspects have been challenged, but still provide a useful grounding in the concept of 
indigenous knowledge and are outlined below. 
Briggs first aspect suggests that indigenous knowledge is context and location specific. 
According to Briggs (2013) indigenous knowledge gained from one area may not fit a similar 
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issue somewhere else. It connects to another related aspect, which is for resettlement: place 
attachment. Place attachment refers to a connection to a place (Raymond et al., 2010a). 
Through their study in rural Australia, Raymond et al. (2010a) highlight how attachment to a 
place is dependent on how much one identifies with a place, depends on a place, connects 
with the nature in the place, and the importance of social ties made within the place. In this 
way a location can be very important to people that live and work within it (Raymond et al., 
2010a).  
 
Shulz et al. (2019) take Brigg’s notion of locations specificity further to illustrate how 
indigenous knowledge may be formed in a specific location but is not necessarily confined by 
scale. Through their exploration of indigenous definitions of ecosystems present in the 
peatlands and wetlands of the Peruvian amazon, Shulz et al. (2019) highlight how knowledge 
is relational. It can be seen as location specific when compared to another community’s 
ecosystem definitions for example. Yet, they also highlight how much of the indigenous 
classifications are similar to the existing scientific classifications. Therefore, once the 
boundary of the knowledge category is removed, it is possible for knowledge to jump scales. 
Thus, with proper study, the indigenous knowledge can work with the scientific, or vice versa, 
to be merge knowledges. This means that it is not necessarily location specific but can be part 
of exploring other scenarios as well.  
 
Briggs’ (2013) second aspect of indigenous knowledge looks at similar issues to Shulz 
et al. (2019), but from a different perspective. He suggests there is a desire in much 
development practice to combine indigenous knowledge with scientific knowledge (Briggs, 
2013). He recognises that this is to make it more relatable to other circumstances and actors. 
However, Briggs (2013) does not draw the conclusions that Shulz et al. (2019) do, about what 
impact, if done respectfully, the combination of indigenous and scientific knowledge can have 
on the scalar properties of knowledge. Kalanda-Joshua et al. (2011) attempted to combine 
knowledges in their research incorporating indigenous knowledge into weather forecasting 
in Malawi. They researched a community in Southern Malawi that had a strong reliance on 
indigenous knowledge to forecast the weather, but which the researchers suggest was 
becoming increasingly difficult due to the increasing volatility of rainfall patterns (Kalanda-
Joshua et al., 2011). They found that this community was reluctant to listen to the 
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government forecasts, which are based on conventional scientific forecasting methods, 
because those forecasts fail to recognise the potential value of their indigenous methods of 
prediction (Kalanda-Joshua et al., 2011). Thus, their research called for greater inclusion of 
indigenous knowledge (Kalanda-Joshua et al., 2011). Kalanda-Joshua et al. (2011) were 
researching in Mulanje, an area close to the Lower Shire in Malawi. Thus, their research could 
suggest that this region may not be open to incorporating different understandings in 
developmental approaches, due to the belief by those in communities that their knowledge 
was not adequately respected. This is similar to the findings of Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2019), as 
described in the next paragraph, and to the findings of this research, as described in my 
Results. 
 
Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2018; 2019) highlight how local knowledges are not adequately 
considered in disaster management in the Lower Shire Region of Malawi and how this is 
consequently causing difficulties. Their 2019 study called for further identification and 
documentation of local understandings for disaster management in this region, very similar 
to the work of Shulz et al. (2019). Whilst this research is not producing a classification of local 
understandings, it does hope to explore and document them further through the focus on 
how knowledges work together in the resettlement process in Malawi. The different attitudes 
to resettlement of the three communities in my research suggest that there is some tension 
between the knowledges involved. 
 
When scientific knowledge is viewed as superior, the mingling of indigenous 
knowledge with scientific knowledge can incorporate unequal power relations. Briggs (2013) 
highlights how, when combining knowledges is attempted, the scientific knowledge can be 
seen as necessary to validate the indigenous knowledge, implying that indigenous knowledge 
is inadequate on its own. In this aspect, Western scholarship views scientific knowledge as 
determining the legitimacy of the indigenous knowledge (Spivak, 1988). It suggests that 
indigenous knowledges can still be seen to be more elusive and to hold less weight in policy 
decisions (Briggs, 2013, Pearce, 2018). In Spivak’s 1988 seminal work ‘Can the Subaltern 
Speak?’, in which she conducts a historiography on subaltern experiences in South Asia, she 
suggests that when Western science attempt to translates non-Western understanding into 
Western scientific data, it constitutes ‘epistemic violence’, because the meaning behind the 
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understanding is lost in the translation. This reiterates the need for respectful inclusion of 
different knowledges, called for by Shulz et al. (2019) and Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2019). 
Participatory approaches are often suggested as a way to do this, I review literature on these 
later. 
Indigenous knowledges are increasingly recognised as important for climate change 
on the global scale. This occurred in 2015, in COP21 (the conference of the parties) in Paris, 
where they became part of the discussion of future options and were included in the 
documentation (Pearce, 2018). However, Pierce (2018) highlights that whilst indigenous 
knowledges were recognized in COP21, key discussions in COP22 and COP23 about how to 
operationalize them still struggled to produce any firm strategies, suggesting there may be 
difficulties in attempting to combine indigenous and scientific knowledges in policy, 
potentially because there is still a prejudice towards scientific knowledges on the 
international climate change network. 
 
The third aspect that Briggs (2013) discusses is the co-option of indigenous knowledge 
into neoliberalism. Indigenous knowledges are associated with being untouched by 
neoliberalism. However, neoliberalism is at the centre of two key Western international 
development organisations, the World Bank and the IMF, whose projects focus on furthering 
a global free market economy (Briggs and Sharp, 2004). Indeed, Briggs and Sharp (2004) 
suggest that a key reason why the World Bank has incorporated indigenous knowledges is 
due to the potential greater capital returns over scientific knowledge it can provide, linking 
back to the extractive use of indigenous knowledge referred to earlier. This also emphasises 
the capitalist focus of the World Bank. 
 
 Ferguson’s seminal 1994 work exploring development in Lesotho highlighted how the 
use of indigenous knowledge by international organisations, such as the IMF, may not be part 
of a desire to reduce poverty, but a desire to feed into a capitalist system, which requires a 
poorer, less powerful group to exploit. Other scholars have also proclaimed a fear that 
indigenous knowledge is being professionalised and commoditised to fulfil capitalist 
objectives and not to fulfil the needs of the local people (Laurie et al., 2009, Briggs and Sharp, 
2004). This shows the potential for more local understandings to be manipulated to fulfil 
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certain agendas in the resettlement process. Similar to the discussion of scale earlier, this 
discussion illustrates that indigenous knowledge can itself become part of technocratic 
knowledge, highlighting how these forms of knowledge are not mutually exclusive. There can 
in fact be a form of hybrid knowledges that incorporates many forms of knowledge (Akena, 
2012). This can also be seen through the professionalisation of indigenous knowledge (Laurie 
et al., 2009). 
 
Laurie et al. (2009) discuss the professionalisation of indigenous knowledge in social 
movements in the Andes. In their discussion they highlight how indigenous communities can 
themselves professionalise indigenous knowledge in a culturally appropriate way, in order to 
give them greater agency and control in the development arena. This process makes the 
indigenous communities the experts in their own development and puts them in a governing 
position (Dean, 1999), which is similar to the ‘claims-making’ from below that Arnall et al. 
(2019) identified, and advocated for, in climate displacement and resettlement scenarios. 
Drawing on findings from this research, it could be said that community members are able to 
re-appropriate their knowledge. This is seen to be different to participatory approaches, 
which are often viewed as initiated by exterior development experts (Kapoor, 2005). This 
reiterates the idea that to perceive these different forms of knowledge as separate is 
misleading (Raymond et al., 2010b). Indeed, many scholars have outlined how categorizing 
knowledge reinforces imaginary binaries (Agrawal, 1995, Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004). 
Scholars, such as Raymond et al. (2010b), recognise that most knowledge is hybrid, a fluid 
mixture of several contextual factors that determine one’s perception. However, important 
to this study, which is focusing on how various actors and their subsequent understandings 
work together to determine the resettlement process, is how different actors’ knowledge is 
perceived by the other actors involved. This impacts the communication between the actors, 
as will be highlighted in the Results. These perceptions of different actors’ knowledge often 
categorises or reifies knowledge and, thus, it is important to explore the scholarship around 
these knowledge categories. 
 
Indeed, focusing on a particular knowledge category, such as indigenous knowledge, 
carries a danger of drawing stereotypes based on the knowledge categories. In his work 
exploring the decolonising of knowledge related to territory in Latin America, Halvorsen 
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(2019) indicates the importance of eradicating previous colonial understandings to allow 
space for current local understandings. To do this he calls for a platform for local activists and 
scholars to spread their knowledge (Halvorsen, 2019). Territory is a particularly interesting 
subject, when considering the decolonisation of knowledge, as acquiring territory or indeed 
owning land in this manner has very strong Western colonial connotations. Halvorsen (2019) 
illustrates how, despite these connotations, through the incorporation of local scholars’ 
perspectives on territory, it can be appropriated to mean something different. 
 
Thus, similar to the discussion of the professionalisation and the perception of 
knowledge, there is debate about the (re)appropriation of indigenous knowledge. Van 
Damme and Neluvhalani (2004) examine the re-appropriation of indigenous knowledge in 
education systems in the Global South. They suggest that a prevalence of ‘scientific’ 
knowledge, spread at the time of colonisation, still persists in much of the education systems 
of the Global South, with indigenous knowledge seen as inferior (Van Damme and 
Neluvhalani, 2004).  They indicate that knowledge is shifting, and education systems should 
represent that (Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004). They suggest that the increasing 
recognition of the importance of local knowledge on the global arena is causing it to gradually 
be re-appropriated by some education systems. The process of re-appropriation is present in 
this research through the community re-appropriation of the resettlement process, as will be 
set out in the Results. It reiterates the fluid and subjective nature of knowledge (Haig-Brown, 
2010, Agrawal, 1995, Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004, Laurie et al., 2009, Briggs and Sharp, 
2004). 
 
2.4.2 Technocratic Knowledges 
 
 Technocratic knowledges are often associated with the act of governing and are of 
increasing interest to political geographers (Kuus, 2016). Technocratic knowledge refers to 
the use of scientific, ‘rational’ knowledge and is most commonly discussed with reference to 
its use in policy and governance (Kuus, 2016). Timothy Mitchell (2002) sets out how, in Egypt, 
this form of knowledge historically developed through the 20th century by a mixture of 
colonialism, poverty, development and democracy. Traditionally technocratic knowledges are 
supposedly used to produce more democratic states (Bangura, 2004, Mitchell, 2002). In this 
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research technocratic knowledges are referred to in conjunction with Western and scientific 
knowledges. This is because these knowledges are associated with government and NGOs, 
which are involved in governing, hence the technocratic focus, but are also associated with 
Western and scientific knowledges used by international donors and, hence, in development 
projects.  
 
Western scientific knowledge prioritises a rational scientific approach to knowledge. 
This is seen to be thorough the examination of data to deduce the best approach for a state 
to take (Agrawal, 1995, Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Akena, 2012). The connection between 
scientific knowledge and its use by the state highlights the interconnection between scientific 
and technocratic knowledges. The aim of the scientific endeavour is to produce knowledge 
for the public good (Agrawal, 1995). Indigenous knowledge can be seen by scholars to 
represent a knowledge that is in ‘harmony’ with nature, which has been seen to be of use to 
scientists for the information it can provide, often without consideration of the accuracy of 
this assumption (Agrawal, 1995). This reiterates the previous discussion outlining how 
scientific knowledge can be extractive of certain aspects from indigenous knowledge 
(Agrawal, 1995).  
 
The democratic aim of technocratic knowledges suggested by Bangura (2004) and 
Mitchell (2002) is debated. Some argue that in modern capital societies, financial investors 
have the highest control, and thus technocrats who work in government and policy-making 
are often connected to these economic institutions and are subsequently insulated from 
public scrutiny, making the process less democratic (Bangura, 2004). This concern is relevant 
for the previous discussion about potential NGOization, particularly for NGOs working for 
government or international organisations and not independently (Choudry, 2010). It 
highlights how understandings and knowledges of different actors are interconnected and 
cannot be viewed separately. It also ties into discussion over the neoliberalisation of 
environment and indigenous knowledge, in order to further a potential global free market 
(Himley, 2008, Briggs and Sharp, 2004). 
 
This democratic dilemma can also be seen in the discussion over statistics, as set out 
by Foucault et al. (2007), but also more specifically for this research in discussions over the 
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use of environmental and migration statistics. Building on the previous governmentality 
section, Foucault et al. (2007) suggest that those in government desire greater knowledge 
about a population in order to best know how to manipulate it to behave in a way that they 
believe will be the most beneficial for the state as a whole. Whilst the intention of those in 
governance may be for the good of the population, this attitude takes away choice from the 
population. The recent interest in governing environmental migration could fit with the 
Foucauldian idea of the state noticing movements happening independently and wanting to 
control them to have greater knowledge and control of the population (Walters, 2012, 
Foucault et al., 2007, Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). 
 
One such technique, that the government and NGOs use to influence community 
understandings, and that was found in my research, is sensitisation. In the context of this 
research, sensitisation refers to the spreading of knowledge on an issue or subject, such as 
providing weather forecasts or advice on how to respond to flooding. However, there is no 
apparent literature discussing its use in this context, despite the term being used prolifically 
by participants in my research. The term appears to have originated in immunology (Cooke 
and Veer, 1916), where it often refers to the production of antibodies that produce an allergic 
reaction (Janeway et al., 2001). Sensitisation is also used in psychology (Cautela, 1967) to 
discuss the continual presence of a stimulus for a certain reaction to get the respondent more 
accustomed to it. This process of sensitisation seems to have been used to eradicate 
undesirable behavioural traits (Cautela, 1967) and also in the exploration of mental disorders 
such as psychosis (Myin-Germeys et al., 2005). It is the psychological use of sensitisation 
which fits most with the findings of this research, which suggest that sensitisation was used 
for the continual provision of knowledge by those in government and NGOs to those in 
communities, as an attempt to produce a different reaction to flooding than was occurring. 
This is discussed indirectly in development anthropology by authors such as Jakimow (2013) 
who highlights how the conceptualisation of development can impact practices without 
proper contextualisation and end up ‘spoiling the situation’. This can be seen in the 
prevalence of an audit culture. 
 
Scholars highlight how the rise in influence of technocratic knowledges has led to an 
audit culture within governance (Kuus, 2016, Townsend et al., 2002, Townsend et al., 2004). 
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They suggest that the increasing necessity to audit, and quantifiably measure performance, 
means that projects and policies are designed in ways that can be measured, regardless of 
whether this is the most appropriate (Kuus, 2016, Townsend et al., 2002, Townsend et al., 
2004). It is implied that the focus on measurement has perpetrated thinking in such a way 
that aspects of society are now understood only in measurable terms (Kuus, 2016). Kuus 
(2016) explores how this has impacted governance in the EU, whereas Townsend et al. (2002) 
illustrate how this impacts the work of NGOs in Ghana, India, Mexico and Europe. This 
research aims to explore how these technocratic knowledges influence understandings of 
environmental migration, looking particularly at the case of resettlement due to flooding. 
Following on from Townsend et al. (2002), it is possible that they could influence the 
understandings of those in government and NGOs, who need to report back to funding bodies 
that usually operate on a technocratic level. This research will then expand this to explore 
how the incorporation of technocratic understanding in this way may affect the involvement 
of local understandings within the resettlement process, and how technocrats attempt to 
include local understandings through participatory approaches. 
 
2.4.3 Bridging the Gap? Participatory Approaches  
 
The previous sections have highlighted that resettlement as a way to manage flooding 
is born out of the move to view migration as adaptation to climate change. Thus, it has 
become in the interest of the global development community and individual states to manage 
environmental migration through projects like resettlement (Arnall, 2018). Resettlement 
therefore fits partly in a development rationale. Participatory approaches to development are 
based on the idea that those who are the subject of the development project should be 
involved with the project design in order for the outcomes to be truly helpful to them 
(Chambers, 1994). It is also used within research projects involving different actors (Kesby, 
2000). However, relevant in this research is its use in development projects, such as 
resettlement as a way to manage flooding. Prior to exploring the nuances involved in a 
participatory approach, such as the present approach to resettlement by the Malawian 
government, it is important to provide some background for this research on how 
participatory approaches came to be central in development practice.  
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Development was critiqued by post development theorists as having an agenda to 
reproduce a hegemony without allowing for other varieties of development or including 
marginalised perspectives (Escobar, 2011, McKinnon, 2007, Ferguson, 1994). Escobar (2011) 
suggests that an interest in homogenising society, which can be dated back to colonial times, 
has led to a perceived hierarchy in the levels of quality of life. From this, a notion of 
‘development’ arose, which set out a developed, advanced world in the Global North and an 
underdeveloped, less progressive world in the Global South (Escobar, 2011). The Western 
institutions of the World Bank and the IMF can be seen to represent and reinforce this 
through their programmes that seek to make countries part of a global free market, the 
preferred doctrine of the West. As stated, these initial development initiatives tended to 
favour technocratic Western knowledge over local knowledge. It is therefore suggested by 
some that development projects help to perpetuate a Western outlook on the approach to 
life and convert countries to this outlook (Escobar, 2011). 
 
A participatory approach is meant to prevent domination of one world view, and 
include an empowering element for marginalised and or vulnerable populations (Kindon et 
al., 2007). The participants decide the terms of success and what they want the outcome of 
the development project to be. It has been heralded as particularly important in 
development, as it is meant to give agency to marginal populations and ensure sustainable 
outcomes (Kindon et al., 2007). However, participatory approaches are criticised for still 
including power dynamics, as the development project is still initiated by the researcher, 
government or NG0, who often favour a Western perspective (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, 
Kapoor, 2005, Jakimow, 2013, Scott-Villiers, 2011). They were effectively critiqued in Cooke 
and Kothari’s (2001) book, titled Participation: The New Tyranny? where they highlighted how 
participatory approaches can actually be more controlling of marginalised populations than 
before. In particular, they highlight how participation can empower participants despite the 
development project being subtly directed by the government, without the knowledge of the 
participants, making it potentially quite manipulative (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). It may also 
fit into Briggs’ (2013) third aspect of indigenous knowledge and be a way of converting 
indigenous knowledge into a Western outlook. This is part of what this research wants to 
establish: do the participatory approaches to resettlement taken by the NGOs and 
government in Malawi allow for the incorporation or dominion of local knowledge? 
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There is also literature which highlights the potential of participatory approaches. 
Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (2008) wrote a follow up book, entitled Participation: From 
Tyranny to Transformation, where they illustrate how participation can be a useful, positive 
and empowering development approach. They particularly highlight how a participatory 
approach to development can facilitate more participatory and inclusive forms of 
government, allowing for sustained benefits of increased inclusivity (Hickey and Mohan, 
2008). They show that governments are often changing their ideas about what they think 
vulnerable populations need and how greater participation allows for these changes to be 
genuinely helpful and transformative (Hickey and Mohan, 2008, Mohan, 2007). 
 
Thus, it has long been recognised that there are many levels of participation available. 
Before participation became relevant in international development it was discussed in urban 
planning (Arnstein, 1969, Cornwall, 2002, Kamruzzaman, 2020, White, 1996). A seminal paper 
from this period was Arnstein’s (1969) A Ladder of Citizen Participation in which she highlights 
eight ‘ladder rungs’ of participation, see Figure 2.2. These levels of participation range from 
non-participation to tokenistic to citizenship power (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein (1969) well 
recognises the oversimplification that this ladder can suggest: it implies a homogenous group 
of powerful and powerless pitted against each other, with eight discreet levels of 
participation. She highlights that in actuality there may be many blurred levels and blurred 
groups of people. However, relevant to Arnstein (1969) and to my research, is that whilst the 
groups of powerful and powerless may be blurry they are often perceived as homogenous by 
the other, and it is the impact of this which is it important when exploring participation (Scott-
Villiers, 2011). This came out strongly in my research, as I will demonstrate in my Results. 
Arnstein (1969) work is dated and looking at a planning context in America, yet it still has 
relevance to development studies today. Kamruzzaman (2020) illustrates how often in 
development the level of participation can be lower down Arnstein’s (1969) ladder, as 
participation has not been fully incorporated into a countries governance structure and its 
implementation is centred on pleasing donors. He indicates that if participation is to be 
empowering it needs to be a political agenda with effort coming from above and below 
(Kamruzzaman, 2020). Kesby (2007) also focused on the potential political nature of 
participation by highlighting one particular aspect that participatory approaches can 
facilitate: resistance. 
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 Kesby (2007) recognizes the role of resistance within participatory approaches. He 
suggests that resistance to power can itself bring power and can be a way to reverse the 
traditional power dynamics of development if the right platform is available. However, for 
this to occur, the intricate relationship between power and empowerment within the 
development project needs to be constantly reflected on throughout the process (Kesby, 
2007). An example of where a marginalised population has been empowered is the 
professionalisation of indigenous knowledge by indigenous communities outlined by Laurie 
et al. (2009), which was discussed above. This is a form of resistance to the state. My research 
Figure 2. 2 A ladder of the different levels of participation, taken from Arnstein (1969: 217) 
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explored the possible resistance to resettlement promoted by government and I expand on 
this in the Results. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
 In this review I have attempted to illustrate the complex nature of environmental 
migration and the consequent difficulties involved in measuring it and determining a process 
for governing it. I set out the shift towards viewing migration as adaptation to environmental 
change and the subsequent increasing interest on governing environmental migration, such 
as through resettlement projects. Also apparent is the potential for environmental migration 
literature to be used to support a variety of potentially contrary agendas, which reinforces 
confusion over what is understood as environmental migration and how it is best governed. 
In this research, I explore how different understandings are used in the governance of 
environmental migration by focusing particularly on resettlement due to flooding in Malawi 
and three communities with three different attitudes towards resettlement. I concentrate on 
the participatory nature of the resettlement. Flooding resettlement is seen as an example of 
environmental migration governance, yet there is little research exploring how participation 
works in this form of governance. Resettlement encompasses the nexus between the 
incorporation of different understandings and governance. This scrutiny of the incorporation 
of different knowledges enables me to explore the motivations and participatory nature of 
the resettlement process in the Malawian context. This will contribute to the growing 
discussion on the governance of environmental migration and the development of 
appropriate policy. I therefore aim to have both a theoretical and practical contribution. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss the research strategy and method used to examine 
resettlement as a government strategy to manage flooding in Malawi. I explain the data 
collection, analysis and interpretation procedures. The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
after a short introduction I set out, in section 3.2, the research strategy, highlighting the 
methodology and data used to answer each research question. Then, in section 3.3, I outline 
the context of Malawi and the specific field areas studied. Next, in section 3.4, I explain the 
process of primary data collection. In section 3.5 I outline the secondary data analysis. Finally, 
in section 3.6, I discuss the field experiences, exploring some of the challenges and insights 
within the fieldwork process. 
 
In the literature review in Chapter 2, I highlighted how research has explored the 
impact of environmental change on migration patterns in recent years, using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Most studies illustrate the non-linear, multifaceted 
nature of migration and have conceptualised the environment as one of many drivers 
(Suhrke, 1994, Tacoli, 2009, Black et al., 2011a). As a result of these studies, a better 
appreciation of the complex entanglement of drivers involved in (im)mobility now exists.  
 
However, there is little research on how environmental migration is governed through 
the process of resettlement and there are even fewer studies exploring the knowledge 
production and participation involved in this process. This is important due to the influence 
knowledge has on practice. The process of knowledge production, and the spreading of 
knowledge, potentially to ensure its dominance, is important to explore, as it illustrates the 
varying degrees to which voices are heard, respected and included. The dominant knowledge 
highlights where the power lies within the resettlement process. Therefore, in this research, 
I hope to bring another dimension to the debate on environmental migration and its 
governance, by focusing on knowledge to explore further how participation works in this 
scenario. To do this, I use a qualitative approach to incorporate the many voices and ways of 
knowing involved. 
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3.2 Research Rationale  
 
 In the introduction I set out the aim and the research questions. The literature review 
in Chapter 2 provided context for these. This section will explain further the rationale behind 
the research questions and aim.  
 
3.2.1 Aim – To Explore the Extent of the Participation of the Relevant Actors Within the 
Resettlement Process in Malawi. 
 
The literature suggests that in order for resettlement to be adaptive it needs to be, 
among other things, participatory. There is sparse literature highlighting how participation 
works within resettlement. I argue that, as resettlement is dealing with notions of home, 
which are highly emotive, it is likely that there will be multiple priorities and understanding 
involved. Therefore, a participatory approach to resettlement is very important but also 
potentially challenging. In this research, I hope to give a further insight into how exactly 
participation can, or cannot, work in a resettlement scenario. I do this by first questioning the 
motives for resettlement, in question 1, to assess whether there is an agenda behind the 
government resettlement process, as found in the literature (Arnall, 2018); and then, in the 
following two questions, exploring the resettlement process from the government and 
community angle.  
 
3.2.2 Research Question 1 – How and Why is Flooding in Malawi Seen as an Increasing 
Threat? 
 
I formed this question because it is necessary to establish the flooding context in 
Malawi in order to understand the motivations behind the proposed resettlement. In 
particular, it is important to ascertain whether flooding is being problematised by those in 
government and NGOs in Malawi. To do this I explore the flooding trends in Malawi, to 
illustrate how interest in resettlement is being legitimised. Thus, in this question I seek to 
establish the situation that has led to the growing interest in resettlement in Malawi. As part 
of this I establish what current flooding related movements occur independent of 
government involvement, and how government mandated resettlement differs from this. As 
I established in the literature review, there is increasing awareness of the potential benefits 
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of managing environmental migration by those in positions of governance (Warner, 2010). 
The external interest and involvement in this process is new (Dun, 2011) and can be seen in 
the interest in resettlement in Malawi. However, due to its novelty there is not much research 
on how this external involvement starts to occur. Thus, this question is an attempt to address 
this. 
 
Additionally, to provide context for the governance of resettlement, in this question, 
I also examine who is seen to be responsible for flooding. Resettlement is caused by flooding, 
however the same actors seen as responsible for the increasingly severe flooding are not 
always seen as responsible for the resettlement. This can accentuate differences and 
hierarchies between actors, particularly between those within the community and those in 
NGOs and government. I establish this to also provide context for the other research 
questions. 
  
3.2.3 Research Question 2 – How and Why is Resettlement Used as a Technique by 
Government and NGOs to Manage the Population and Flooding in Malawi? 
 
 In this question I explore the practicalities of the government process of resettlement. 
Due to the novelty of governing environmental migration, it is important I analyse this process 
in detail, who is involved in it and why. I do this to assess the motivations behind government 
resettlement: whether the government involvement is truly to assist the vulnerable people 
impacted by the increasingly severe flooding, or whether it is for other government objectives 
(Arnall, 2018), such as better control of the population. I wish to determine whether the 
external involvement in this process is beneficial to the vulnerable populations and whether 
it could be participatory, as if resettlement was being used to fulfil an ulterior motive than 
protection from flooding, it is likely there would be little room for community voices.  
 
In this question I examine the existing disaster management structure, to illustrate 
how resettlement is currently managed. I also seek to explore further the varied 
understandings of resettlement, how these impact government decisions and what they 
suggest about government motivations. Additionally, I examine the hopes for the upcoming 
resettlement policy to assess what methods are currently being used, and are proposed, to 
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manage flooding and resettlement. Within this, I question the external influences on the 
policy to highlight if there may be other hidden agendas involved. I take this further to explore 
what these methods imply about how different actors are viewed in this process. I do this to 
further evaluate whether resettlement is participatory and helpful for the most vulnerable 
population. 
 
3.2.4 Question 3 – What Role do Flood-Vulnerable Communities Have in the Government 
Strategy of Resettlement? 
 
 In the final research question, I am interested in highlighting what the process of 
resettlement illustrates about the relationship between those in vulnerable communities and 
those in government and the NGOs, particularly how community members make their voices 
heard. I examine these relationships to give a further insight into the power dynamics of those 
involved in resettlement and the impact they have on the participatory nature of the 
resettlement. I particularly focus on the community response to resettlement. I examine the 
actual and perceived community agency within resettlement processes and the implications 
of these. This focus enables me to evaluate the community participation in the resettlement 
process, who has been involved in it and why. This is part of broadly exploring the top down 
and bottom up approaches of resettlement.  
 
3.3 Study Area 
 
Malawi is a relatively small but densely populated country. It has an area of 
118,480km2 and a population of 18,143,345 in 2018, with a population density of 192.441, 
according to the World Bank (2018) data records. The age dependency ratio is 87%, with 
43.9% of the population younger than 15 and the life expectancy at birth in 2017 was 63.3 
(The World Bank, 2018a). It has a current GDP per capita of 285,168 MKW (roughly $387), 
with 70.3% of the population living on less than $1.90 per day (The World Bank, 2018a). It is 
therefore, a relatively poor country. As touched on in the introduction, I chose Malawi as the 
area of research due to the significant environmental changes it is undergoing and the 
interest from the Malawian government to manage these changes through resettlement. It 
was also chosen due to the strong research links between Malawi and Scotland. These were 
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present either through previous connections with the University of St Andrews, or through 
participants, particularly those in government and civil society, being aware of the University 
of St Andrews, which slightly eased the facilitation of the research.  
 
In the following four subsections I briefly set out an overall government and migration 
context for Malawi before providing more detailed information on the previous use of 
resettlement and flood mitigation approaches. Finally, I explain the flooding experience of 
the specific study sites. 
 
3.3.1 Migration and Governance Context for Malawi 
 
Malawi’s historical mobility patterns provide an intriguing backdrop for this research. 
Settlements were not traditionally nomadic, unlike in much of Western Africa (McCracken, 
2012). This was due to the suitability of the climate for agriculture (McCracken, 2012). 
Therefore, internal mobility and the role of the environment within this is relatively new in 
Malawian culture. During the colonial period (1891-1964), the British tea and tobacco 
industry concentrated itself in the south, where the most fertile land was seen to be, and 
populations focused their movements to this area (Potts, 2006, Lewin et al., 2012). However, 
subsequently the south has become densely populated (Potts, 2006). Research using both 
weather data from a local weather station and indigenous knowledge has illustrate how the 
environment in the Southern region has become harsher, with the maximum annual 
temperature increasing by around 1ºC between 1971-2007, and an increasing variety in 
rainfall during this period (Kalanda-Joshua et al., 2011, Nkomwa et al., 2014). There has been 
growing outmigration to regions in the centre and the north, where more land and labour is 
available and the weather is less extreme (Potts, 2006, Lewin et al., 2012). The map in Figure 
3.3 below shows the districts and geography of Malawi, with the three field areas marked. 
Lilongwe has been the capital since 1974, the previous capital was Zomba. Blantyre is the 
second largest city and the city closest to the communities under study.  
 
Malawi had a significant corruption scandal in 2012 that significantly impacted the 
way that aid is now being delivered to the country. Prior to the scandal aid was delivered 
directly to government for them to use as they saw fit. Aid was withdrawn immediately after 
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the scandal. Aid resumed soon after, but in a different way (The BBC, 2014). Aid was no longer 
delivered directly to government but to projects which donors decided on with government. 
This is the current form of aid in Malawi. Therefore, donors potentially have significant control 
in how the country is run.  
 
However, currently, it appears that there is much communication between 
government and NGOs or international organisations and donors providing funding. From my 
discussions with stakeholders involved in these organisations it appeared that government 
would suggest areas they thought needed attention or assistance and they would work with 
the relevant NGO or international organisation, or mixture of these, to assess what kind of 
assistance each actor should provide. This links into the discussion over NGOization in Chapter 
2 (Choudry, 2010), as it highlights how the NGOs can be an extension of the government. The 
large international organisations and donors provide much of the funding and technical 
expertise used in Malawi, and since the corruption scandal of 2012 have influence on how 
the funding and technical expertise are utilised. Thus, there is much collaboration between 
NGOs, international organisations and government. Within my research all but one of the 
NGOs are part of in-country offices of international NGOs, with the other one being directly 
linked to the World Bank. This leads me to assume in my research that the NGOs and 
government have a similar mentality with regards to development procedures. Therefore, I 
make little distinction between NGOs and government viewpoints, except where they 
obviously occur in the data, particularly related to the NGO connected to the World Bank, and 
then I explore this fully in the Results. I illustrate this further in the outlining of the NGOs 
interviewed in section 3.4.3.  
 
Moreover, Malawi’s government is also impacted by an ongoing decentralisation 
process. The country is split up into 28 districts, which are governed by district councils, local 
forms of governance. These district councils are being given more power in determining how 
they spend their allocated funds. Decentralisation is common in African countries because 
many governments and influencers of government in Africa have viewed decentralisation as 
a way to promote more democratic governance (Ottemoeller et al., 2004). However, there is 
also literature illustrating how decentralisation is a difficult transformation (Ottemoeller et 
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al., 2004). Manda (2014) suggests that decentralisation in Malawi has led to weak disaster 
management. I will elaborate on the implications of this in the following Results chapters.  
 
The local governance has a particular make up. Within each district there are several 
traditional authorities (TA), the exact number varying per district. These TAs have a customary 
form of leadership in the TA chief. Each TA is made up of several villages, which are led by 
village heads, another form of customary governance. Therefore, there are many levels to the 
governance structures in Malawi, which makes it a particularly interesting place to examine 
how the different levels of government work together to manage environmental migration 
through the process of resettlement. Moreover, there is also the existing NGO and external 
donor community. Thus, I take a multi-scalar approach to analysing Malawian governance, 
ranging from the village heads to the international organisations such as the World Bank.  
 
3.3.2 Land Reform and the World Bank Resettlement programme 2004-2011 
 
A new land law was implemented in Malawi in 2016 (Sharp et al., 2018). It is yet to be 
taken up fully throughout the country, but as a pilot of the new land law, between 2004 and 
2011, there was a national resettlement project, sponsored by the World Bank, called the 
Community Based Rural Land Development Programme (CBRLDP) (World Bank, 2013). It was 
suggested by one official in national government to be the largest resettlement project to 
occur in Malawi. The project was to assess the impact of introducing a willing buyer-seller 
model to land transactions by giving the recipients in the land poor areas of Thyolo and 
Mulanje a grant to buy and settle in more land rich areas in Machinga and Mangochi 
(Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). Participants were meant to resettle with 20-30 other 
households and form what the project called a ‘trust’ in the new area (World Bank, 2013, 
Sharp et al., 2018). They then elected a trust representative to negotiate the buying of the 
land of the area, for which they obtained a group title deed for the trust. The representative 
allocated out two hectare plots for each households, and individuals were able to obtain 
individual title deeds when they had a certain income, which Sharp et al. (2018) suggested 
rarely happened. Whilst being discussed as a textbook example of resettlement by the World 
Bank (Tchale, 2014), the pilot illuminated difficulties with implementing participatory 
resettlement in Malawi (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018), which I will highlight below. 
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Despite it being unrelated to flooding, two of those in government and NGOs drew on this 
resettlement project as a key example of the complicated nature of resettlement.  
 
The CBRLDP required participation from members of the project, but studies suggest 
that it failed to appreciate community dynamics and so was not able to be participatory 
(Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). The project aimed to be voluntary. Indeed, the voluntary 
nature was particularly spearheaded by the World Bank to highlight a better way of 
undertaking land reforms (Sharp et al., 2018). A central part of this was the greater 
participation of the communities involved. However, as much of the communication about 
this was done with community leaders and the elected trust representatives, meaning it did 
not include all of the community and did not achieve the participation required (Sharp et al., 
2018). Chisinga (2008) suggest the community power dynamics enabled corruption and 
nepotism of who was able to benefit from the project, and throwbacks of cash, all of which 
were unintended in the project design (Chinsinga, 2008). This meant that the project was 
unable to follow through on certain aspects, such as providing amenities (Chinsinga, 2008). 
Ultimately, around 15% of participants returned and many more were unhappy, stating 
miscommunication about their resettlement area, infertility of the land, lack of other 
opportunities besides farming, hostility from the surrounding area, and misunderstanding 
over the title deeds as the main reasons (Sharp et al., 2018).  Many of these issues are also 
relevant in my research, as will become clear in the Results.  
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3.3.3 Flood Mitigation Approaches in the Lower Shire Region 
 
  
The Lower Shire Region of Malawi is the most flood prone area of Malawi, with the 
relevant District Councils estimating that, in addition to specific flooding events, annually 100 
households in Chikwawa and 500 in Nsanje are significantly impact by flooding (Šakić Trogrlić 
et al., 2018, Chikwawa District Council, 2014, Nsanje District Council, 2015). This was made 
evident in my fieldwork through the graffiti in a meeting hut in Nsanje, illustrated in Figure 
3.1, where HAZARD was scraped out on the wall. One of the only legible words on the wall, 
which suggests to me the prevalence of hazards, such as flooding. The earliest recorded 
severe flood event in the Lower Shire was in 1942, with more recent events occurring in 1997, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2012, 2015 and 2019 (Lumumba Mijoni and Izadkhah Yasamin, 2009, 
Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018). There has consequently been much focus on how best to mitigate 
the impact of flooding in this region.   
 
 In reality flood mitigation touches on many government sectors and many policies are 
relevant. For example, Mwale et al. (2015) draw on the high levels of poverty in the Lower 
Shire region to highlight how vulnerability to flooding in this region is most related to socio-
economic factors. Thus, general development policies are also related to flood mitigation in 
this area. Additionally, a holistic approach to flood mitigation is not just necessary in terms of 
the government sectors it crosses, but also the geographical area considered in the flood 
Figure 3. 1 A meeting hut in Nsanje where HAZARD was scraped out on the wall 
Photo taken during fieldwork in September 2017. 
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mitigation. For example, the flooding in the Lower Shire is not solely due to the actions of 
those in the region but also those in other districts. The issue of deforestation in the upper 
lands of Mulanje district, which in turn impacts the water retention of the soil and leads to 
greater runoff and increased flooding, shows this clearly (Lumumba Mijoni and Izadkhah 
Yasamin, 2009). The most specific policy related to flood mitigation is the National Disaster 
Risk Management (DRM) Policy. 
 
 The Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) have 6 policy priority 
areas, as set out in the National DRM Policy. These are: 
1. Mainstreaming disaster risk management into sustainable development. 
2. Establishment of a comprehensive system for disaster risk identification, assessment 
and monitoring. 
3. Development and strengthening of a people-centred early warning system. 
4. Promotion of a culture of safety, and adoption of resilience-enhancing interventions 
5. Reduction of underlying risks. 
6. Strengthening preparedness capacity and recovery (Government of Malawi, 2015b).  
This policy follows on the Disaster Relief Act of 1991, which is currently under renewal, and 
which focuses mainly on relief, rather than preparedness (Chiusiwa, 2015, Šakić Trogrlić et 
al., 2018). The recent severe flooding, of which the 2015 was the most significant trigger, 
indicated a need for focus on mitigation and preparedness for disasters, which the 2015 DRM 
Policy aims at fulfilling (Government of Malawi, 2015b). DoDMA is in charge of coordinating 
disaster management at a national level, but as Malawi has a decentralised government 
system, there is the potential for variation in disaster management for different areas 
(Government of Malawi, 2015b). Disaster Risk Management Plans and Contingency Plans are 
created at the village, area and district level, with the idea being that the village plans inform 
the area plans, which in turn inform the plans at the district level (Government of Malawi, 
2015b). However, the lack of government funding for disaster management means that it is 
difficult to do these plans every year, with most available contingency plan for Chikwawa and 
Nsanje coming from the 2014/2015 season (Chiusiwa, 2015, Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018).  
 
The severe flooding of 2015 highlighted specific areas of focus for disaster risk 
management. For example, a key area of government focus nationally has been on improving 
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the early warning system (EWS) in Malawi, as many ignored the warnings prior to the 2015 
flooding (Mwale et al., 2015). Whilst EWS are specifically mentioned in policy priority 3, they 
are also relevant for policy priority 2,4,5 and 6. This improvement in EWS has included 
awareness raising of the official Met office forecasts, the implementation of river gauges 
throughout the Lower Shire, and a greater attempt to incorporate indigenous knowledge 
within EWS (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019, Mwale et al., 2015). Also, particularly since 2015, there 
has been growing interest in resettlement, especially as a way to address policy priority 
number 5, reduction of underlying risks, as resettlement is viewed as taking people out of the 
vulnerable area. I explore the exact motivations for the government interest in resettlement 
in the Results. 
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3.3.4 Field Sites 
 
 
Figure 3. 2 Two views of the Lower Shire Region from the M1.  
Photo taken during fieldwork in September 2017. 
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Area 2 – Jombo Resettlement Site 
Area 1 – Village Mwalija 
Area 3 – TA Nyachikadza 
Lilongwe - Capital 
Second city – Blantyre  
N 
Figure 3.4 expansion 
Figure 3. 3 Map of Malawi with districts and field site location.  
Taken from http://www.d-maps.com/pays.php?num_pay=36&lang=en    3 
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The field sites are situated within the two southern districts of Malawi, Chikwawa and 
Nsanje. They make up the Lower Shire region of Malawi, two photos of which can be seen in 
Figure 3.2. These photos show the start of the Lower Shire Region taken from the escarpment 
on the way down from Blantyre going from around 400 metres above sea level to 90 metres 
in Chikwawa and down to 60 metres in Nsanje (Malawi Department of Surveys, 2015). The 
field site locations can be seen in Figure 3.3 and 3.4 above. I chose to focus the research in 
Chikwawa and Nsanje districts as I was informed by the literature (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018) 
20km N 
Area 1 
Area 2 
Area 3 
National borders 
Roads 
The area expanded in the maps below 
Figure 3. 4 Satellite map of the Lower Shire Region where the sites are located 
Taken from Google maps 
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and by a DoDMA official that they are the areas most impacted by flooding in Malawi. They 
are exceptionally poor, in 2012 (the most recent data publicly available) around 80% of those 
living in these districts live below the poverty line, much higher than the country average of 
50.7% (National Statistics Office, 2012). Much of this poverty is due to the reliance on 
subsistence agriculture in these areas, which is becoming tougher to maintain due to the 
hotter dry seasons and more unpredictable rainy seasons, according to the district council 
officials in Chikwawa and Nsanje. Due to the research being focused on government 
resettlement, all sites were identified by both national and local government disaster officers 
as areas of interest for resettlement. As mentioned in the introduction, I chose these sites to 
portray three different perspectives on resettlement: undecided, resettled and unwilling. The 
resettled and unwilling community were outlined to me by the national government DoDMA 
official and the undecided community was identified by the local government disaster officer 
at Chikwawa.  
 
The three case studies provide an in-depth view of the knowledge involved in each of 
these contexts. I shall explain them in more detail below. Two (Jombo resettlement site and 
village Mwalija) are villages, or part of them, and one is a traditional authority (TA). These are 
different scales: a village contains around 250 households on average and a TA consists of 
around 1000 households. There is much debate in the literature over what constitutes a 
community (Rogers et al., 2013), within the research I view community as being place and 
culture based. This is similar to other studies analysing resettlement processes, where 
community refers to the people from the geographical area who will be resettling. In this 
research, I loosely use community as synonymous to a village customary in Malawi: around 
250 households within a similar location and with a leader, the village head. I also use the 
term ‘community’ to represent TA Nyachikadza more generally, when I am discussing it as a 
community that is unwilling to resettle, for example. However, in the more detailed analysis 
I appreciate further its difference in scale. Moreover, the difference in scale between TA 
Nyachikadza and the other two communities studied, whilst important to remember, was not 
seen as an issue for the fieldwork or findings. Indeed, it allowed for some variety in rural 
perspectives, including both village and TA contexts. 
 
 
 
71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 500m 
Village 
Mwalija 
Land for cultivation 
Meeting point 
for interviews 
Temporary 
resettling 
area in 2015 
Follow T416 50km north 
to Majete Wildlife 
reserve and Kapichira 
hydroelectric power 
station 
Land for cultivation 
Figure 3. 5 Area 1 - satellite map of the area surrounding Village Mwalija, indicating the 
cultivation lands, interview meeting point, the temporary resettling area in 2015 and 
background information. 
Taken from Google maps 
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As can be seen in Figure 3.5, Village Mwalija is located close to the Shire river and also 
close to a large nature reserve, which is a popular safari location for tourists. Some of the 
participants can be seen in Figure 3.6. They have two areas of farming, as can be seen in Figure 
3.5, one area is close to and reliant on the river and one is closer to the main road, roughly an 
hour’s walk away, which can still be impacted by flooding. There is no data from the 
Department of Surveys on the extent of the 2015 flooding in this area (there is for the other 
two) but the interviews suggest that the community was impacted varyingly by the severe 
flooding in 2015, and the two different areas of cultivation accentuated this, as property was 
more spread out. The district council identified this community to me as a community that 
has the opportunity to resettle. This is through the assistance of an NGO, called Bongo, which 
has allocated an area of land for the resettlement and drilled a borehole there. The NGO also 
promised to help with the construction of 160 houses in the resettled area for the most 
vulnerable in the community. However, the community has not yet resettled, and it appears 
that not all in the community are in favour of this resettlement. Thus, this community shows 
the negotiation phase of resettlement. 
Figure 3. 6 Village Mwalija participants. Photo taken during one fieldwork 
visit in October 2017 
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Figure 3. 8 Area 2a - satellite map of the area surrounding Jombo resettlement area, indicating 
where interviews took place and the area of temporary shelter after the 2015 floods. Taken 
from Google maps.   
200m N 
Meeting point 
for interviews 
Jombo 
resettlement 
area 
School area where they 
first found temporary 
shelter in 2015 
1km N 
Jombo village 
Champanda - Land for 
cultivation roughly 20km 
walking from the 
resettlement area 
Follow the M1 north 
10km to Nchalo and 
Illovo sugar plantation 
Figure 3. 7 Area 2 - satellite map of the area surrounding Jombo, indicating the cultivation 
lands, 2015 flood extent, background information and area 2a. Taken from Google maps. 
Area 2a 
Rough flood extent for 
2015 flooding from 
Shire River 
Shire River 
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Jombo resettlement site hosts a community that resettled from the flooding-
vulnerable area of Champanda after the severe flooding of 2015. They still use this previous 
area for cultivation. This can be seen set out in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, which show the area 
allocated to the resettling community on the outskirts on the village, the distance this is from 
their area of cultivation, the extent of the 2015 flooding (everything up to the white line was 
underwater) and the area where they temporarily resettled after the severe flooding in 2015 
(Malawi Department of Surveys, 2015). Some of the participants can be seen in Figure 3.9. 
The village of Jombo was not impacted by the severe flooding in 2015. The resettled 
community organised the resettlement themselves: through negotiating with the district 
council and area chiefs they were able to find an area of land where they were able to resettle, 
shown as area 2a in Figure 3.7. The land was seen as unusable by the host community, who 
admittedly gave it for resettlement for the two new boreholes that were drilled by the district 
council to aid with the resettlement, and for the increasing aid into the area that the 
resettlement generated. The site is close to the main road, which is desirable, and also to a 
large sugar plantation, Illovo, which provides additional labour opportunities. However, the 
resettled community face hostility from the host community, particularly over aid and 
Figure 3. 9 Jombo Resettlement site participants.  
Photo taken during one fieldwork visit in October 2017  
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leadership, as I will expand on in the Results. Despite the difficulties faced in this resettlement, 
those in government suggested to me that this community illustrates an example of 
successful resettlement, particularly because they initiated the resettlement process 
themselves. Thus, this community illustrates a resettled community and the intricacies 
involved in the resettlement and post-resettlement process. 
 
1km N 
TA Ndamera Marsh land for cultivation  
Follow the 
M1 south to 
Mozambique 
Area 3a 
TA Nyachikadza 
Figure 3. 10 Area 3 - satellite map of the area surrounding TA Nyachikadza and TA 
Ndamera indicating the land suitable for cultivation, rough flood extent from the 
2015 flooding and background information. Taken from Google maps. 
Rough flood 
extent for 
2015 
flooding 
Shire River 
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Figure 3. 12 TA Nyachikadza participants. Photo taken 
during one fieldwork visit in October 2017 
200m N 
Figure 3. 11 Area 3a - satellite map of the area surrounding TA Ndamera 
indicating the meeting point for interviews and the land suitable for cultivation. 
Taken from Google maps.  
TA Ndamera – the 
destination for 
temporary 
resettlement from TA 
Nyachikadza  
Meeting point 
for interviews Marsh land for 
cultivation  
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TA Nyachikadza is located in the marshland close to the main river in Malawi, the Shire 
River. The marshland is often surrounded by water, making it an island. This area is a 
traditional authority, which means it is significantly larger than the other communities 
studied: each TA contains around four villages. It can be seen in Figure 3.10 in relation to TA 
Ndamera, where residents go in times of flooding and to access government and NGO 
services, and which can be seen more clearly in Figure 3.11. Figure 3.10 also demarcates 
roughly the boundary of the flood extent from the 2015 flooding (Malawi Department of 
Surveys, 2015), which indicates how TA Nyachikadza was impacted but TA Ndamera was not. 
Three of the participants from this area can be seen in Figure 3.12. TA Nyachikadza has 
frequent flooding and is subsequently a very fertile area. In 2012 the government declared 
this area as not fit for habitation, due to the potential risk of flooding to the area. Thus, there 
are no government or NGO facilities, or services. It is commonly known by government and 
NGO officials, as well as community members, as a ‘no-go zone’. There are no schools past 
the age of eight and no health facilities. To access these facilities, residents need to cross a 
river inhabited by crocodiles and hippos and travel several kilometres, most often by foot to 
TA Ndamera. Yet, most of the residents of Nyachikadza do not want to resettle, as I will 
explore further in the Results. Thus, this community illustrates a situation of a community 
unwilling to resettle.  
  
Figure 3. 13 Photo of the Shire River in Nsanje. Taken during fieldwork in October 2017. 
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Additionally, due to this TA being located on an island, I was not able to visit the island 
itself, because the river crossing can be dangerous. A photo of the river further upstream in 
Nsanje can be seen in Figure 3.13. The river is large and inhabited by crocodiles and hippos, 
which makes it unpredictable. The local government officials were not comfortable arranging 
a boat for me to use. Therefore, I conducted all my interviews with this community in the 
neighbouring TA, TA Ndamera, on the mainland, as can be seen in Figure 3.11. I am aware 
that this may have caused selective sampling and impacted the discussion in the analysis. I 
try to allow for the potential bias this could create by being aware of the position of these 
community members when considering the implications of their interview data. 
 
3.4 Primary Data Collection – Fieldwork Strategy and Interview Process 
 
The fieldwork was conducted during two visits to Malawi. The first was a preparatory 
visit of 3 weeks in May 2017. In this trip, I spoke to key stakeholders in NGOs and government 
and established the focus of the research: on flooding related movements. After, I returned 
to St Andrews for two months to reassess the methodology and then returned to Malawi for 
4 months (August 2017 – November 2017) to conduct the main data collection and focus 
further on resettlement. 
 
 This research consisted of 69 interviews and six focus groups with members of the 
three communities studied and with stakeholders in NGOs and Government who were 
involved in these communities. All those interviewed were Malawian nationals. In this section 
I first set out the ethical procedure for the fieldwork in section 3.4.1. Next I outline the 
interview process for first the community interviews in section 3.4.2 and then the government 
and NGO interviews in 3.4.3. Finally, I explain how the interview data was analysed through 
the coding process in section 3.4.4. 
 
3.4.1 Ethical Issues  
 
 The first step of the fieldwork was considering the ethical implications involved. This 
was formalised through the obtaining of ethical approval both from the university of St 
Andrews and from the government of Malawi. The ethical approval letters are presented in 
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Appendix 1 and 2. The preparation of two ethical applications focused my mind on potential 
ethical issues. The key issues that arose were related to conducting research in another 
culture: specifically, the use of a translator and attempting to represent the voices of the 
marginalised as a Western academic. Moreover, there were issues related to protecting 
confidentiality, which was impossible to ensure for those in government and NGOs. 
 
The University of St Andrew’s ethical application particularly enabled me to think 
through issues related to participant confidentiality. This cannot be guaranteed for those in 
government and NGOs because, in order to give context to their quotes, I need to provide 
some information about their position. Most simply, within the analysis, I state whether the 
quote is from a government official, NGO employee or community member. However, 
occasionally it is necessary for more information to be provided, for example, which 
community they are working with. Additionally, within this chapter I set out exactly which 
NGOs I interviewed. This is necessary to further understand the context and potential 
positioning of participants, yet it provides further ways to reduce anonymity. Thus, to ensure 
as much anonymity as possible, pseudonyms are used for all participants. This makes it likely 
for those in the communities to stay anonymous, but still cannot guarantee it for those in 
NGOs and government, whose position may jeopardise their anonymity. This was explained 
to the participants beforehand and is set out in the participant information sheet and consent 
form, which were available in English and the local language, Chichewa. These can be seen in 
Appendix 3. 
 
The ethical application procedure for the University of St Andrews involved stating 
any potential ethical risk, confidentiality was discussed at length, and included all official 
documentation (participant consent forms and information sheets, which can be seen in 
Appendix 3). It was processed and passed by the university before the first trip to Malawi. An 
update was processed before the second trip to Malawi.  
 
The process of undertaking a national ethical application is particularly common when 
medical research is being conducted and increasingly common for social science research. It 
enables the country to ensure their citizens are being fairly considered in the research and 
that the research is relevant and useful to the country.  
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The national ethical application to the government of Malawi involved a similar 
procedure to that of the University of St Andrews, but with slight differences that highlight 
the international nature of the research. It included a research proposal, translated official 
documentation and the payment of a processing fee (150 US$) and a research fee, which was 
10% of the cost of the research. The application was processed on arrival to Malawi. It was 
straightforward and took one week to process. The difference between the two applications 
is the addition of translated documents and the payment of fees. This highlights two potential 
ethical issues of doing research in another culture: translation and potentially extractive 
research (Sidaway, 1992). I discuss both these aspects further in section 3.6 exploring the field 
experiences.   
 
 Additionally, there was a danger that the research would cause some distress to the 
participants as it was asking them to relive particularly traumatising moments, when they had 
encountered severe flooding. However, whilst the previous experience of community 
members was important to gauge for context, it was not the focus of the interview. The focus 
was to establish how they understood and viewed the resettlement process present in their 
community. Therefore, when considering the ethical implications, I thought that if questions 
around experience of flooding proved too distressing, I could move the interview swiftly on 
to further questions and minimise the distress. I discuss further how this happened in practice 
in the following section. 
 
3.4.2 Community Interviews and Focus Groups 
 
Within each community, I conducted 16 interviews, eight with men and eight with 
women. Additionally, I conducted two focus groups in each community, one with eight 
women and one with eight men. I chose participants opportunistically: the local disaster 
officer contacted their contact within the community, this could be the village head or 
somebody on a village level committee, this contact would then pass this information onto 
whoever they could and whoever chose to attend was a participant. I provided lunch money 
of 2000 Malawi Kwacha (approximately £2) to all participants from the communities. 
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I conducted the focus groups first, lasting for around one hour, to assess if any changes 
needed to be made to the interview schedule, to see if any questions did not gain traction, or 
were inappropriate, and to get some background information before the one on one 
interviews commenced. There was around one week between the focus group discussions 
and the commencement of the interviews within each community. For each community, I 
made no changes to the interview schedule post focus groups. The unwilling and undecided 
communities had similar interview schedules and the resettled community had a slightly 
different interview schedule. They can be seen in Appendix 4 but briefly contained themes 
surrounding: 
- Experience of flooding and flooding related movements.  
- Experience of government led resettlement.  
- Relationship with the government and NGO community.  
The interviews were semi-structured interviews and were purposefully open, to let aspects 
of importance develop naturally and without prompting, meaning even small similarities 
between interviews were significant. Therefore, there was flexibility with the questions on 
the schedule.  
 
In each community I conducted the interviews with the help of a translator. The 
translator was a local government official who was well acquainted with the research and the 
communities under study. In total, three translators were used on separate occasions. I 
discuss the issues associated with using a translator in the field experience section later in the 
chapter. 
 
 For each community the interviews took place in various public areas, such as under 
a tree or within a meeting hut in the communities. These can be seen in Figures 3.5, 3.8 and 
3.11. For those at Jombo and village Mwalija, the interviews occurred at their community. 
However, as mentioned, for those from Nyachikadza the interviews were required to occur 
in the neighbouring mainland TA, TA Ndamera. This meant that I was only able to interview 
Nyachikadza residents who were over in TA Ndamera.  I am aware that this may have caused 
some bias in the interview, as I only interviewed community members of TA Nyachikadza that 
are mobile and use movement as a way to manage flooding. However, as I was unable to visit 
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Nyachikadza itself, this is the best primary data available and I endeavoured in the questions 
to ask about the community as a whole and not just the participant’s personal experience. 
 
I visited each community five times for around four to five hours each time. First to 
make initial introductions and conduct the focus group discussion and then another four 
times to conduct the interviews. Each time I was accompanied by a district council official, 
which is likely to have influenced my data, as I expand on the field experiences section. The 
district council official, as mentioned, arranged the interviews by calling their contact the 
previous day to inform them I would be coming and to organise eight female and eight male 
volunteers for me. The district council contact was told the topic of my research and that I 
would be providing 2000 MKW lunch allowance to participants. I was informed that they 
would find participants that would most fit the topic and most needed the extra money. 
Whilst, I was not directly involved in the recruitment and cannot be sure this was the criteria 
used for selection, I was assured that this selection process was regularly used for much of 
the communication, particularly involving NGOs, with village members. The district council 
official also acted as the translator for the interviews.  
 
I conducted the interviews in the morning and each day would consist of four 
interviews, allowing for 16 interviews to be conducted in each community. The four days were 
often spread over two weeks but occasionally occurred all in one week. As mentioned, I 
interviewed an equal number of men and women. For sensitivity reasons, exact ages were 
not asked, but there appeared to be a mixture of ages from late teens/early twenties to 
elderly participants, with most participants middle age with established families. Each 
interview lasted between 30 minutes to an hour depending on how talkative the participant 
was. Some participants got slightly distressed in the interviews whilst reliving previous 
traumatic flooding experiences. As touched on in the previous section, for the most part when 
this occurred, I moved swiftly on to the next question, to avoid dwelling on the distress. 
However, there were a couple of incidences where the participants actively wanted to share 
that traumatic experience and in these cases I let them talk for as long as they wanted.  
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3.4.3 Government and NGO Interviews 
 
 Additionally, I undertook 21 interviews with stakeholders in NGOs and government 
who were involved in these communities. As mentioned, these actors were viewed as being 
part of the same governance structure and so I asked the same questions to those in NGOs 
as I did to those in government. These interviews took place at government and NGO offices, 
as well as in informal settings such as hotel lobbies and restaurants. All these interviews lasted 
around one hour and were conducted in English with no translator required. The interview 
schedule can be seen in Appendix 5. It briefly covered: 
- Their role in government or the NGO, their view of flooding in Malawi and 
resettlement. 
- Their relationship to the relevant communities and to resettlement.  
- What methods they use in resettlement and to communicate with communities.  
Similar to the community interviews these were semi-structured interviews with an aim at 
keeping things open, to let aspects of importance to the respondent come out naturally. Thus, 
as with the community interviews, this meant that I viewed even a small amount of 
agreement between participants as worthy of mention, as it came about without prompting. 
Whilst I followed the questions set out, I did not hesitate to pursue any relevant tangents that 
arose. 
 
 10 of the 21 government and NGO interviews were with government officials. Two of 
these officials were at the national level. One was at DoDMA, who acted as the gate keeper 
for the data collection. He was a contact passed on from a colleague at the University of St 
Andrews and was contacted prior to arrival in Malawi. I interviewed the DoDMA employee 
twice, once at the beginning of the data collection process and once at the end, to get their 
opinion on initial thoughts from the data collection. They facilitated the contact with the local 
government disaster officers in Chikwawa and Nsanje, who in turn facilitated the interviews 
with the local communities and relevant NGO officials involved in them and the process of 
resettlement in the area. The DoDMA official also enabled the interview with their colleague 
in the Ministry of Land and Housing in the national government. The Ministry of Land and 
Housing is formulating the resettlement policy and provided useful practical information on 
this process. The DoDMA official also outlined the resettled community at Jombo 
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resettlement site and the unwilling community at TA Nyachikadza. Village Mwalija was 
identified by the Chikwawa Disaster officer. Only one of the government participants was 
female, illustrating the immense gender disparity in this sector. 
 
 11 of the 21 government and NGOs interviewed were from civil society, two from the 
same organisation: The Red Cross, the rest from different NGOs. These civil society 
interviewees were found through the suggestion of those in national and local government, 
as NGOs or individuals that were directly involved in either these communities or 
resettlement more broadly. The details were either obtained by a government official or 
through going to relevant offices. Similar to the government participants, only two of the NGO 
participants were female, reiterating the gender disparity apparent in this sector. Table 3.1 
below sets out the NGOs who had employees that I interviewed. For each NGO their activities 
and outreach are set out. This information is obtained from the respective NGO or project 
websites or from information obtained in the interviews. This provides some information on 
the types of NGOs that were part of the research. It illustrates their priorities and gives an 
insight into the narrative they produce. This is important to consider when examining the 
knowledges involved in the resettlement process, as it highlights what may be influencing the 
NGOs knowledge agenda.  
 
Much of the activities present highlight the focus on general development priorities, 
with a particular emphasis on flooding, and disaster risk reduction. These development 
priorities are echoed by the government. This may be because all these NGOs were identified 
to me by government officials as NGOs working on resettlement or related issues with these 
communities or in this region more generally. Thus, they are likely to be aligned with 
government priorities. This reiterates the NGOization occurring with the NGOs I encountered 
(Choudry, 2010), how they have similar mandates as the government and how these actors 
work closely together. As previously mentioned, this is the reason why NGOs and government 
are mostly spoken about collectively in this research. My research cannot comment on how 
civil society as a sector works in Malawi, as, due to my methodology and opportunistic 
participant selection, the NGOs encountered are connected to the government. This means 
that not all of my Results may be relevant at a national level, as they do not allow for a variety 
in civil society. However, other research suggests that my Results are likely to be relevant for 
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similar scenarios where resettlement is closely controlled by the government (Arnall, 2018, 
Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). Moreover, my interviews with community members suggest that 
the NGOs interviewed were the main NGOs involved in their communities, and indeed that 
no national or local NGOs were involved in their communities. Thus, for the purpose of 
examining the resettlement process in these communities, interviewing these NGOs is 
sufficient, especially with adequate reflection.  
 
Table 3.1 illustrates how all but one of the NGOs (boNGO) are International NGOs 
(INGOs) with international headquarters, and boNGO has sister organisations in other 
countries, thus there is an international influence on the activities of the NGOs. However, all 
the employees interviewed were Malawian. All but two of the officials interviewed in NGOs 
and government were not local to the Lower Shire Region. The two officials that were from 
this region were the health officer in Chikwawa and the Goal employee in Nsanje. However, 
it seemed more common for Government officers and NGO employees to move where there 
jobs took them. Therefore, most of the participants from NGOs and government did 
themselves live a resettled life, not residing in their area of origin. This may have impacted 
their view of resettlement in this research, as all but one participant from these sectors were 
favourable to resettlement.  
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Table 3. 1 List of NGOs in the research, their activities and outreach.  
NGO Activities Outreach (national / 
international) 
CARE Malawi Focuses particularly on women, projects focus on 
food security, agriculture, health, education, and 
social and economic empowerment. 
International, headquarters in 
America. 
Goal Malawi Focuses particularly on building resilient 
communities, projects focus on emergency 
response, water and sanitation, community health 
and nutrition, climate change adaptation and climate 
smart agriculture, alternative livelihoods and 
disaster risk reduction. 
International, headquarters in 
Ireland. 
Concern Worldwide Projects focus on emergency response, livelihoods, 
healthcare, nutrition, and education programmes. 
International, headquarters in 
the UK. 
CADECOM (Catholic 
development commission 
in Malawi) 
Focuses particularly on empowerment, projects focus 
on disaster risk reduction, food security, and water 
and sanitation. 
Malawi, but part of Caritas, 
which is a confederation of 160 
members inspired by the 
catholic faith, headquarters in 
Rome. 
EAM (Evangelical 
Association of Malawi) 
Key focus on evangelism and spreading the word of 
God. Also have projects on advocacy, education, 
gender equality, child rights, crisis response, food 
security, livelihood, health and family planning.  
Malawi, but part of larger 
Association of Evangelicals for 
Africa (AEA), with its 
headquarters in Nairobi, which 
is part of the World Evangelical 
Alliance (WEA), with its 
headquarters in the USA. 
World Vision Focuses particularly on children and families, projects 
focused on food and security resilience, health and 
nutrition, literacy and water, sanitation and hygiene. 
International, headquarters in 
the UK and USA. 
Red Cross Focus is on providing relief and aid to people affected 
by conflict and disasters. 
Technically not an NGO but a society, independent 
but part of the government. For the sake of this 
research it is grouped with the NGOs. 
International, headquarters in 
Switzerland. 
boNGO Worldwide (based 
on Need-driven Grassroot 
Ownership) 
Particular focus on education and community-based 
development. 
National, with sister 
organisations in the Czech 
Republic, Switzerland and USA. 
Habitat for Humanity Particular focus on housing, with projects focused on 
providing shelter for vulnerable populations, water, 
sanitation and hygiene, and disaster risk reduction. 
International, headquarters in 
Slovakia and South Africa. 
MFERP (Malawi Flood 
Emergency Recovery 
Project – funded by the 
World Bank) 
Particular focus on flooding – reduction and 
adaptation, with projects in agriculture, irrigation, 
food security, water and sanitation, and disaster risk 
reduction. 
National but funding from 
international organisation (The 
Wold Bank) with headquarters 
in USA. 
 
 
Sources for each NGO respectively: https://www.care.org/country/malawi https://www.goalglobal.org/countries/malawi 
https://www.concern.net/where-we-work/malawi http://www.ecmmw.org/new/commissions/cadecom/  
https://www.eamalawi.org/   https://www.wvi.org/malawi https://www.redcross.mw/ http://bongoworldwide.org/ 
https://www.habitat.org/where-we-build/malawi www.mferp.mw 
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3.4.4 Coding and Analysis 
 
Soon after I conducted each interview, I transcribed it. No more than three days 
elapsed between the interview and the transcription. This was to ensure that I recorded any 
relevant side notes as well. On return to the UK I uploaded all interviews into NVivo and 
thematically coded and analysed the interviews. Following established social research 
methods, the coding process occurred inductively (Bryman, 2012). I established a set of codes 
before the coding started and then added more as the coding process progressed. The coding 
tree can be seen in Appendix 6. 
 
 I established the initial codes based on notes and impressions from the interview and 
transcribing process. These were key themes that stuck out from this process. As I went 
through the transcripts these themes were developed further, several sub-codes were added, 
and new codes were established. Ultimately, there were three major themes: pro-
resettlement, anti-resettlement and relationships. Within the pro and anti-resettlement 
sections there were several sub-codes related to reasons for this view, government and NGO 
view, community view, and particularly forms of resettlement being discussed. Within the 
relationships code, there were several sub-codes related to the different actors 
(NGO/government or community), mistrust and international influences. These themes and 
their relationship to the literature provided the basis for which the research questions were 
developed, and the Result chapters were structured.  
 
Within the text I have noted the pseudonym, year and either the name of the 
community the participant belongs to, or whether the participant was from and NGO or 
government background. I note these in brackets before the quote. I separate the pseudonym 
and quote from the text to allow it to stand out. All the pseudonyms used are names that I 
encountered in Malawi. Thus, while they may appear a strange mix, they are consistent with 
Malawian names. As mentioned, most of the community interviews were translated, meaning 
the respondents were referred to in the third person. However, for clarity, I have presented 
all interview quotes in the first person. I have edited the quotes somewhat but have left in 
repeated words and long sentences to give a flavour of the conversation at the times. I 
attempt to contextualise the quotes by, when possible, illustrating how representative the 
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view is within the interviews by either stating the number of interviewees, or the proportion 
of interviewees, who were in agreement of the aspect under discussion. However, it is 
important to note here, that due to my interview schedule being purposefully open to allow 
for diversity in opinion to arise, a seemingly low proportion in agreement does not equate a 
low agreement or significance. Where there are disagreements to a statement, I acknowledge 
them, otherwise the low representation just means it was not commented on by the other 
respondents. This means that I view even a small number of respondents’ agreement as 
significant, as this agreement was formed naturally, without prompting or specific 
questioning. Many factors were mentioned in the interviews and I could not address all of 
them within this thesis, therefore I focus only on those that came out most strongly from the 
interviews and observations. In terms of the total number of quotes used by each sector, I 
quote from community members 58 times, and government and NGO officials 59 times, with 
25 of those quotes coming from government and 34 from NGO officials. This suggests I include 
similar amounts of community perspectives and government and NGO perspectives.  
 
3.5 Secondary Data Analysis 
 
 This research also incorporates a small amount of secondary data analysis. Whilst in 
Malawi, I obtained secondary disaster data from DoDMA. This disaster data provided 
information about flooding events going back to the 1970s. It came in MS Excel spreadsheets 
reporting on all disasters within this time frame. There is data from 1970 – 2014, there is 
another spread sheet for 2015 and then for 2016-17. As could be expected, the reporting of 
the data changes over time, which brings in questions over consistency and reliability. Overall, 
more information is provided as the time progresses. For the flood events occurring in the 
2016-17 spread sheet, the exact date of occurrence, the area where the flood occurred, the 
number of households effected and how, type of assistance provided and by who, and other 
general notes are provided. This illustrates the growing interest from the government into 
the impacts of flooding. The purpose of this data in the research is not for using it as an 
accurate representation of how flooding has increased in the area, as it is not accurate to 
show this in detail, rather I use it to highlight the growing attention placed on flooding by the 
government. 
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 Indeed, due to the inconsistency in the data I use only the simplest factors that it 
provides throughout: year and number of households effected by the flooding. From this I 
constructed a graph to show the perceived trend in flooding impact since the 1970s until 
2015. I set out the Results for this in Chapter 4. 
 
3.6 Field Experiences: Challenges and Insights 
 
This research is cross-cultural research and, as it has for researchers before me, 
conducting research in an unfamiliar culture brought up several challenges. The key 
challenges with cross-cultural research are associated with language, general customs and 
interpretations, and the perceived difference felt in race, status and, occasionally, gender, 
between the researcher and the participants. Taking inspiration from previous scholars’ 
experience with this, this section shall elaborate on each in turn and also highlight more 
specific practical challenges. 
 
 The use of a translator is necessary when conducting research within an unknown 
language. However, it requires a certain amount of control and trust to be given over to the 
translator. This is particularly the case in this research, which is focused on knowledge and 
where language use is important. Language and the way a sentence is formed inform on how 
something is understood and to get this translated means that some of that information on 
knowledge formation is lost (Derrida and Kamuf, 1991). This leads to the danger of 
misrepresentation (Spivak and Harasym, 1990) and can accentuate the power imbalance 
between researcher and researched, as the researcher is one step further away from the 
researched and without the possibility of direct communication (Smith, 1996).   
 
Throughout this research I have tried to appreciate the translation process within the 
data. All the translators used were local government officials: two male translator were used 
at TA Nyachikadza and one female translator was used for village Mwalija and Jombo 
resettlement site. Therefore, all the interviews have a governance lens to them as they have 
all passed through somebody involved in local governance, either directly, through interviews 
with those in government and NGOs, or indirectly through the use of a translator. Thus, I have 
tried to contextualise the data twice, as recommended by Frenk (1995) and Bassnett and 
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Lefevere (1990), by reflecting on how the proximity of government and me, as a white, 
Western, female researcher, may be influencing responses. This is to better allow for the data 
passing through two cultures. This has particularly enabled me to appreciate why, in 
community interviews particular terms may be used, such as ‘relief items’ which was often 
used to lump together the many things the community felt they needed. These terms were 
part of the government vocabulary, and once I became more familiar it was easier to navigate 
what they may mean for the community.  
 
Moreover, I became aware that certain words did not translate directly into English or 
vice versa. For example, several Chichewa words are used to make up the word ‘livelihood’ 
crudely translating in English to ‘ways to earn money’, which is roughly what livelihood 
means. However, in this translation, the focus is solely on money, which is not all of what 
livelihood entails, as it is also related to how one lives. Another example arose around areas 
of cultivation, most community members interviewed referred to ‘dambo’ when talking about 
the land they cultivated. However, this also translates to ‘river’ in English, yet they were using 
it to refer to the cultivation land close to the river. They used a different word, ‘munda’, when 
referring to their areas of cultivation in the upper lands. Therefore, it is clear that there is a 
distinction in the different areas of farmland, which is not accounted for in English. These are 
two examples of nuances that can be lost in translation that I became aware of. They are 
important concepts, especially in my research exploring how communities live with floods, 
how they view the resettlement process and how it impacts their sense of identity. My 
awareness came through paying attention to the words used in the interviews with the 
community members and discussions with the government translator in the car to and from 
the communities. This was particularly the case with ‘dambo’ which I heard discussed a lot in 
the interviews, signifying its importance. I became curious as to what it meant and discussed 
this further with the translator. My focus on knowledge, means that I pay great attention to 
language within the interviews. However, the use of a translator and my limited knowledge 
of Chichewa means that some of the nuance of the language and therefore the knowledge is 
lost. 
 
I have tried to incorporate into my consideration of community interviews how the 
involvement of a local government official may have impacted on the interview, attempting 
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to read between the lines of what is translated. Sometimes, this is obvious, for example, when 
a statement started with a placating sentiment towards the local government, it was clear 
that the participant might feel uncomfortable about what they were about to say or had just 
said. Other times, the nuances were incredibly subtle, and I only detected it from also keeping 
a close eye on the translator. There was particularly one translator where this was an evident 
problem. The translator was senior in the local government and this impacted the 
respondents. This impacted four interviews with those in TA Nyachikadza. Two of these 
participants made reference to the translator’s position in government and seemed to answer 
questions related to their relationship with government and NGOs with the translator and his 
position in mind. Due to the impact the senior local government translator was having on the 
respondents, I used another translator in the subsequent interviews and have been 
particularly careful to reflect on the government influence on the four interviews where this 
translator was used. As mentioned, it is likely that there are nuances I missed, and whilst it 
would have been illuminating and insightful to be able to learn the language and get a sense 
of what participants from the communities were really trying to say, this was beyond the 
scope of my research. 
 
With this sensitivity to the government translator, the difference in understandings 
between those in government and those in communities, came through. Some community 
members, even with the translation, made very poetical metaphors about their connection 
to land and community. This enabled me to appreciate aspects of their language and their 
understandings of their world. Participants made these connections without prompting, 
which also enabled me to get a sense of where resettlement and the issues surrounding it sat 
within Malawian government and development more generally. Thus, translation did not 
prevent the diversity of opinions from being apparent.  
 
 Additionally, the lack of knowledge of certain customs can accentuate the ‘outsider’ 
persona of the researcher (Herod, 1999). This is particularly prevalent in cross-cultural 
research, which can amplify differences felt between researcher and researched, due to the 
existing difference in culture and often language, even before the power dynamics of 
researcher/researched are considered (Sidaway, 1992). In the 1990s there was much 
influential research done in geography, and feminist geography in particular, about the power 
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dynamics involved in research, especially between the researcher and the researched  
(England, 1994, Haraway, 1988, Katz, 1994, Kobayashi, 2003, Rose, 1997). This work 
recognized the influence that researchers can unknowingly have in determining their 
research, especially if they were unaware of their power (Haraway, 1988). Drawing on the 
literature on the fluidity of knowledge (Raymond et al., 2010b), outlined in Chapter 2, I view 
that my research will inevitably be influenced by my perspective of the world, as well as the 
perspectives that my participants had of the world and of me. As a result, much scholarship 
addressed the importance of appreciating context in research, particularly in order to attempt 
readdressing potential power imbalances between researcher and researched (Haraway, 
1988, Katz, 1994, Kobayashi, 2003, Rose, 1997, Hopkins, 2007). Hopkins (2007) highlighted 
that people have different positionalities depending on the context and it is subsequently 
difficult to determine one’s positionality until after the fieldwork. Thus, constant reflection is 
required throughout the research process. 
 
During the fieldwork, general customs and practices were referred to, that I, as the 
researcher, had no local knowledge of. For example, what a funeral entailed or how to 
respectfully shake someone’s hand. Some of these customs I could pick up quickly, and there 
was often someone available to ask for a further explanation. Whilst, as mentioned above, 
this accentuated the difference felt by me as the researcher, it also directly impacted my 
interviews. Most of these confrontations with unknown customs occurred during community 
interviews, and though I could ask for a full explanation post interview, it was difficult to 
procure during the interview. This meant that I learnt for future interviews but could not take 
the point further in specific interviews. 
 
 Moreover, the power dynamics in this research were further complicated by the 
previous colonial history of Malawi and my positionality within this. I was a white, British, 
female researcher, who had come from the former colonial power to ask questions. It is 
difficult to know how much this impacted participants’ response to me. If anything, it aided 
the research. My whiteness appeared to give me more power and respect than a Malawian 
woman of my age would most likely receive in this situation. This privilege was presumably a 
legacy of the colonial era, and whilst I did not want to perpetuate colonialism, there was little 
on a personal level I could do to address this apart from being very respectful and appreciative 
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of the people who were involved in the research. Thus, my white and Western position was 
always there in every interaction. This may have eased the facilitation of some of my research, 
but its presence made me uncomfortable, which may have had a knock-on effect on the 
naturalness and ease of my participants.  
 
The literature suggests that cross-cultural research at its worst can cause 
misrepresentation, and extractive findings (Sidaway, 1992). I have tried to avoid this by 
incorporating reflexivity in my research (Haraway, 1988, Nast, 1994, Rose, 1997). I have 
reflected at every stage of the interview process on what the impact of cross-cultural relations 
may be having on my research. It impacted my interview schedule, it is a key reason why I 
conducted focus group discussion before entering into one on one interviews with 
community members, to allow me to get a better appreciation of the community before I 
embarked on individual interviews. It effected how I behaved and interacted within the 
interviews with community members in particular, being watchful of the words used and the 
dynamics between the translator and the participant. Finally, it impacted my analysis of the 
interview data, I reflected on the potential reasons why an individual may be focusing on a 
certain aspect and this is evident in my Results. At its best cross-cultural research can provide 
innovative results due to the new perspectives it can foster (Smith, 1996). It can enable the 
researcher to see things blind to those from that culture, as well as enable them to view their 
own culture differently (Smith, 1996). Thus, it can create areas of betweenness, which can 
potentially challenge hegemonic ideas (Smith, 1996) and break down perceived barriers 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or researcher and researched (Sidaway, 1992). Indeed, there is a lot 
of potential with cross-cultural research when there is awareness of the possible pitfalls. 
 
 Most of the participants showed an insightful overview of the whole Malawian 
situation. Therefore, all discussions, especially those with NGO and government employees, 
due to the lack of language barriers, often left me with much to ponder, particularly as my 
knowledge of Malawi started with my PhD process and there was much to learn in a short 
time.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter highlights how this research was developed and carried out. It is based 
on interview data with varying actors involved in three different resettlement situations. This 
variety of situations and actors involved provides the diversity and nuance needed to 
adequately answer the research questions. It includes multiple perspectives and priorities of 
understandings. However, research examining multiple understandings and within another 
culture brings challenges that have limited this research. Drawing on other research that 
encounters these issues, I hope that with awareness and reflexivity throughout the research, 
these limitations will not hinder my findings. 
 
 The next three chapters will set out the results and discussion. They are ordered 
roughly in answer to each research questions. The first, looking at the changing perception of 
flooding focuses on question 1. The second, exploring the governance of resettlement, 
answers question 2. And the third, looking at the community response, speaks to question 3.  
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4. THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF FLOODING 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I illustrate how flooding has been problematised in Malawi, to the 
extent that it is now a government issue. The literature (Lumumba Mijoni and Izadkhah 
Yasamin, 2009, Mwale et al., 2015, Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019) along with government 
statistical data and interview data suggest that flooding is becoming more severe in Malawi. 
This is leading to the legitimisation of government involvement. Legitimisation of government 
involvement in resettlement is commented on in the literature as an example of how 
governments can work to justifiably formalise their control of a population (Arnall, 2018). 
Thus, in this chapter I explore the legitimisation of government involvement to gain further 
insights into the motives behind resettlement. Additionally, I illuminate in this chapter the 
flooding situation for each community under study, and their flooding related movements 
that occur without mention of government resettlement. Finally, I explore the perceived 
responsibility for the increasing severity of flooding. Flooding is the reason for resettlement 
and this section nuances the legitimisation of government intervention, highlighted in the 
first section of the chapter. It shows how government can formulate reasons to get involved 
in managed resettlement despite not feeling responsible for the causes of it: the increasing 
flooding. It also provides context for further exploration of the relationship between those in 
flooding-vulnerable communities and government. This relationship highlights the 
perspectives involved and the importance of exploring the different knowledges in the 
resettlement process. Overall, the chapter provides context for the future chapters and helps 
to answer the first research question – How and why is flooding in Malawi seen as an 
increasing threat? This will provide the grounding to look further at the resettlement process 
in Malawi. 
 
I structure this chapter as follows: section 4.2 outlines the trend in flooding with the 
help of secondary quantitative data and government interview data. Section 4.3 explores the 
flooding related movement context for each community. Finally, section 4.4 examines who, 
or what, is seen as responsible for the increasingly severe flooding. 
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4.2 The Changing Severity of Flooding 
 
 In this section I provide context on the flooding situation in Malawi using two forms 
of data: secondary data provided from the Department of Disaster Management Affairs 
(DoDMA) and interview data. First, I will provide a brief overview of the trend of flooding in 
Malawi, as set out by the government data. Next, I analyse how flooding is discussed by those 
in government. This will illustrate the change in importance attached to flooding, which the 
subsequent interest in resettlement has grown out of. Increasing flooding severity is explicitly 
suggested by 12 of the 21 government and NGO officials interviewed, as a reason for their 
increasing interest. However, it is only referred to by two of the community interviews, who 
draw more on specific flooding events and their impacts rather than trend, 40 out of 48 
community interviews discussed specific events. Moreover, 46 out of the total 69 participants 
interviewed specifically stated that 2015 was the worst flooding in living memory. This 
indicates that it may be the specific event of the severe 2015 flooding rather than a gradual 
increase in severity over time that led to a greater interest in flooding and, consequently, 
resettlement. Thus, in this section, I am not analysing whether or not flooding is becoming 
more severe in Malawi, rather I am interested in how the government justifies their interest 
in flooding and resettlement. A particularly important part of this is their use of recorded 
data.  
  
DoDMA have compiled disaster occurrence and impact data from 1970-2017. This 
data shows the severity of flooding increasing, particularly that the floods of the past 20 years 
have impacted more households than ever previously recorded in Malawi. This can be seen 
from Figure 4.1 below. 
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The graph shows that from the mid-1990s there have been several flood events that 
have impacted more than 50,000 households, something that had not previously been 
reported. The largest disruptive event in this time frame was in 2015, which impacted 220,117 
households, according to the DoDMA data. The data suggests that the number of households 
impacted are increasing with time. Most of the recordings prior to 1995 are barely visible on 
the graph because they are so small in comparison to the later recordings. Prior to the 1996 
event, no event reportedly impacted more than 2,000 households. However, also during this 
earlier period there are fewer recordings. Between 1970 and 1996 there are 16 unreported 
years. This could be because no flood event occurred, or that the impact of a flood event was 
not recorded. This suggests the data may not be reliable. However, after 1995, it is only 2009 
and 2013 that are without a recorded flooding event, which implies that flooding either 
dramatically increased or was increasingly acknowledged and reported. Despite the potential 
inaccuracy of this data, it does suggest that flooding was increasingly recognised as important 
Figure 4. 1 Number of households impacted by flooding per year, 1970-2017.                     
Created through MS Excel, using the flooding data provided by DoDMA 
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by government. The graph does not include data on the 2019 flooding, but DoDMA’s Post 
Disaster Needs Assessment (2019) suggested it impacted around 195,000 households.  
  
The graph suggests that the biggest flooding event prior to 2015 was 1997. This is 
corroborated by 11 of the 48 community interviews. 11 community members specifically 
spoke of the 1997 flooding event, for example Jombo community member, Michael, explains:  
 
Michael (Jombo, 2017): ‘I remember the 1997 flooding, and the 2015 flooding, but for 
me the 1997 [flood] was worse because the level of water was higher, but for the 2015 
[flood] the houses on the higher land were safe, but in 1997 all houses were destroyed’.  
 
This is Michael’s experience of the flooding. Two thirds of community members interviewed 
suggested that the flooding of 2015 was worse, as can be seen in this quote by Matthew: 
 
Matthew (Jombo, 2017): ‘I remember that in 1997 there was flooding but the rains were 
coming slowly each and every day. So, it took some time for the situation to go back to 
normal. And during that time, we moved to another area in the upper lands but in 
Champanda [their previous area]. But the 2015 flooding came much faster, property 
was lost, so that is when we decided to move from within Champanda to another area.’ 
 
Matthew and Michael come from the same community, but Matthew suggests that the 2015 
flooding was more devastating than the 1997 flooding, chiefly due to the speed of the 
flooding. Whereas, Michael suggests more damage was caused in 1997. Michael’s perspective 
was the minority, of the 48 community interviews, 40 mentioned the 2015 flooding, and 30 
suggested that it was the worst flooding event they had experience, with only Michael 
specifically stating that another flooding event was significantly worse. Whilst there appears 
to be a majority of opinion that the 2015 flooding was the worse, the fact that this is not 
universal illustrates a key aspect of flooding: that it impacts people differently and thus there 
are multiple perspectives involved in one flooding event, even within the same community. 
It is important to establish this at the beginning of the analysis because the implications of 
different understandings of the same event run through all the Results chapters. This 
indicates the importance of a wide variety of data and viewpoints on flooding. It also echoes 
what Hall and Endfield (2016) found in their study exploring how extreme weather events are 
remembered. They suggest that often memory of events is related to personal events 
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occurring at the same time, which can impact the significance placed on an event (Hall and 
Endfield, 2016). This highlights the subjectivity of memory (Hall and Endfield, 2016). 
 
 DoDMA government official, Mtafu, reiterates the prevalence of flooding in Malawi 
and his perceived impact of the previous severe flooding in 2015: 
 
Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘Flooding is one of the common hazards or disasters in the 
country. We have been having flash floods or localised floods for some time and recently 
we had the massive floods in 2015. Those floods effected 1.1 million people and we had 
106 deaths, and we still have some figures that we are still quoting that are still missing. 
And there was a lot of displacement.’ 
 
Here Mtafu illustrates how flooding has always caused disasters in Malawi. However, his focus 
on the ‘massive floods’ of 2015 implies that this severity of flooding is new for Malawi. This is 
suggested in the breakdown of the interview day and in the DoDMA data explored above, 
which fits with Mtafu’s figures. He suggests 1.1 million people are impacted. The data 
suggests 220,117 households are impacted, each household in these calculations contains 
roughly 5 people, therefore the data and Mtafu both suggest 1.1 million people are impacted. 
This, unsurprisingly, implies that the government viewpoint is coming from the DoDMA data 
set out in the graph above, which indicates a vast increase in impact of flooding from the 
1990s, as explained above. This is also corroborated by the 2015 flood post disaster needs 
assessment report (Government of Malawi, 2015a). The government data used to create the 
graph was volunteered to me by the government official after the interview to illustrate the 
increase in flooding impact he was discussing, which suggests that he viewed it as a form of 
legitimising his statements.  
 
As previously mentioned, 12 of the 21 participants in government and NGOs believe 
that the prevalence overall of flooding is increasing and three of these stated that it is also 
increasing in areas which were previously considered as not vulnerable to flooding. Therefore, 
there is seen to be a growing national vulnerability to flooding. Thus, the main government 
perspective is that the increasing severity of flooding has led to increasing attention to the 
issue, as illustrated by DoDMA official, Mtafu: 
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Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘We are seeing more, in terms of the numbers, in terms of 
the frequency as well as the numbers being affected and the like. A number of years 
ago, even before I joined the department, maybe Nsanje and Chikwawa [were seen as 
flooding impacted areas], but now you talk of almost everywhere … the occurrence of 
the disaster… we are coming at this point to say, maybe it [resettlement] is something 
we should go for.’ 
 
Mtafu indicates that there is a greater awareness and discussion over flooding than previously 
and refers to it as ‘the disaster’. This suggests flooding is having an increasing impact on 
livelihoods in Malawi. He also highlights how this greater awareness is leading to discussion 
over new ways of managing it that were not previously thought of, and how resettlement is 
one of these ways. Mtafu’s discussion of flooding shows how the focus of government has 
shifted from society and policy to focusing on problems, particularly global problems, as was 
set out by Enroth (2014). The discussion also highlight the importance of extreme weather 
events on impacting knowledge formation of flooding. This reiterates the work of Hall and 
Endfield (2016) on memory and extreme events, particularly how even after many years 
people can still be influenced by the memory of extreme weather. It suggests one reason why 
the government data provided by DoDMA starts with sparse amount of varying data with five 
columns in excel from the 1970s and evolves to 20 columns in the 2010s. Significant previous 
flooding events have heightened government interest in flooding, which has led to greater 
effort put into recording data around flooding. This data is drawn on by government when 
discussing their interest in flooding and its management, to legitimize it.  
 
 In this brief section I have set out how the trend in flooding by government and 
community members in Malawi is viewed and discussed. I have focused mostly on the 
government perspective on the severity of flooding, as it is the change in this, and the 
subsequent move to consider resettlement, that is of particular interest to this research. The 
data and interviews suggest that there has been severe flooding in recent years. More and 
more people are seen as being impacted by flooding, which is of interest and importance to 
the government. This has problematised the issue of flooding and given the government of 
Malawi greater legitimacy to consider further strategies to manage flooding, such as 
resettlement. Through a governmentality lens, the problematisation of flooding is part of the 
knowledge formulation of a subject and the production of a visible space for the government 
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to control, through resettlement (Dean, 1999). However, from this data the motivation of 
government within the resettlement is not yet clear and I will come back to this later on in 
the Results. The novelty of resettlement as a government strategy highlighted here, means it 
is currently in the ‘negotiation’ phase, which makes it a particularly interesting time to 
investigate this process.  
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4.3 The Impact of Increasing Flood Severity on the Vulnerable Communities’ Mobility Patterns 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 2  Maps showing location of each site, formed from Google maps 
N 
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Figure 4. 3 Maps showing the situation at each site, formed from google maps 
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In this section I show how flooding is currently impacting the movements of those in 
the communities under study. I highlight how movements are already occurring and accepted 
in all these communities. These communities and their movements between flooding safe 
and flooding-vulnerable areas, as well as the area for government proposed resettlement, 
can be seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. These figures build on the maps presented in the previous 
chapter. There is evident overlap of the government resettlement and the flood safe area for 
the community at Jombo resettlement site. This highlights the potential relevance of these 
movements to the flooding safe area for the discussions on government resettlement in the 
following chapters. For two of the communities studied, TA Nyachikadza and village Mwalija, 
government resettlement has not yet occurred but is pushed for to varying degrees by 
government and NGOs. Thus, I illustrate the informal moves undertaken by communities to 
highlight what is not seen as sufficient by the government and NGOs.  
 
Each community provides a different context. As mentioned, those at village Mwalija 
have formal resettlement advocated to them by a specific NGO, boNGO, a small education 
focused NGO, for more information see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. This community particularly 
illustrates the nuances within community decision making, as I will elaborate on in Chapter 6. 
Those at TA Nyachikadza have resettlement forcefully advocated to them by the government 
and illustrate the strength and importance of place attached identity. The community at 
Jombo, have resettled but flooding still influences their movements, as I will illustrate in this 
section. The flooding related movements at Jombo provide an interesting contrast with those 
at TA Nyachikadza, as in some senses they are very similar but are viewed as opposites by the 
government. This specific contrast, along with this section more generally, provides the 
foundations for exploring the perceived difference between Resettlement advocated for by 
government and NGOs and resettlement already occurring and understood in the vulnerable 
communities studied. Table 4.1 summarising these differences is available at the end of the 
section.  
 
In this section I also illustrate the differences in the type of movements discussed by 
community members between communities, and sometimes within each community. Thus, I 
highlight how movements related to flooding can occur in many different ways. They may 
appear similar yet have different meanings to those undertaking the movement. I therefore 
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reiterate the multiple understandings that may be present within the resettlement process. 
The variety of movements is echoed in other environmental migration research (Findlay, 
2011, Piguet, 2010, Morrissey and House, 2009, Gill, 2010, Gemenne, 2011) and reiterates 
how the environment works with many other drivers to determine the migration decision. 
The differences in movement were mainly in distance travelled, preparation, and time spent 
in the area where they move to. In what follows, I will go through each community in turn 
and discuss the forms of movement occurring, their similarities and differences, and the 
potential reasons for this. I will discuss, where relevant, how different communities receive 
and process information about flooding, including indigenous knowledges on flooding, and 
how this influences their subsequent movements. 
 
As mentioned, Figure 4.2 and 4.3 build on the maps in Chapter 3, to show the location 
of each community in the Lower Shire region. It classifies which areas are vulnerable to 
flooding and which are seen as the flooding safe areas by the government and the 
communities, and how sometimes these differ. The diagram also highlights the key flooding 
movement pathway for each community. Village Mwalija (Mwalija), Champanda and Jombo 
Resettlement Area (Jombo) are specific communities, whereas TA Nyachikadza and TA 
Ndamera are whole traditional authorities, comprising of many communities, as explained in 
Chapter 3.  
 
4.3.1 Nyachikadza  
 
The interviews I conducted with those in Nyachikadza show that movement to the 
upper land during periods of flooding was a common, accepted practice in their community. 
The movement was usually to TA Ndamera, as shown in Figure 4.3. Whilst three of those 
interviewed from Nyachikadza have their sole house in Ndamera, and three have their sole 
house in Nyachikadza, the remaining two thirds of Nyachikadza participants interviewed have 
two forms of settlement to facilitate the movement between the areas, as discussed by 
longstanding Nyachikadza resident, Isaac: 
 
Isaac (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘We have a multiple number of people that live here 
[Ndamera, upper land] then afterwards they are going there [Nyachikadza] for farming. 
But they have here, like this house [points to a nearby house] this one is coming from 
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Nyachikadza but they have decided to build their house here, but right now the man is 
there [Nyachikadza] doing farming but during floods they move to the upper land.’ 
 
Isaac suggests it is an accepted occurrence for members of his community to live between 
two settlements: one in Nyachikadza and one in the upper lands. Nyachikadza is for farming 
and the upper land is for security from flooding. He implies that this movement does not 
impact their role in the community. Isaac particularly says that they ‘live’ in the upper land 
and are only in Nyachikadza for ‘farming’, which places more permanency on their upper land 
residence. However, later, Isaac proclaims this is only ‘during floods’, which implies that most 
of the year they are based in Nyachikadza. Despite residing between two places, the identity 
of being from Nyachikadza, and not Ndamera, is very important for some residents. This can 
be seen in Chris’s quote below. 
 
The amount of time spent in two separate areas has implications on one’s place 
attachment (Raymond et al., 2010a): what leads one to identify to one area over another, 
who is involved in altering a person’s connection to a place and its subsequent impact on their 
identity? Three quarters of those I interviewed from Nyachikadza explicitly illustrated a strong 
sense of identity attached to Nyachikadza over the upper land. Nyachikadza resident, Chris 
describes this connection: 
 
Chris (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘[Nyachikadza is] our motherland, all the resources, all our 
needs, they are there.’  
 
His use of the word ‘motherland’ highlights the immense connection that many fellow 
community members feel to this area, it is part of their family. The metaphor of family is used 
by other flooding-vulnerable community members in later quotes. It implies a permanency to 
the connection. Additionally, as suggested by Chris, the provision that the land gives the 
community through its fertility, building on the gendered reference of it as a ‘Mother’, also 
provides a strong sense of community for many of the residents. Yosef elaborates:  
 
Yosef (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘I don’t want to lose the status of being a person from 
Nyachikadza because there my parents own good land for cultivation’.  
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The area of Nyachikadza is competitively and desirably fertile, so much so that Yosef suggests 
its fertility provides a certain ‘status’ to its residence, has even been suggested to cause 
tensions, as I will elaborate on further below. Indeed, the fertility of the land in Nyachikadza 
was also commented on in informal conversations with the government translator, which 
suggested to me that the area was renowned for this. 
 
My interviews with those from Nyachikadza suggested that the time spent in the 
upper land varied from weeks to months every year. As mentioned, there were three 
interviewed that were permanently based in TA Ndamera, despite identifying Nyachikadza as 
their home. These participants stated they would go to their cultivation area in Nyachikadza 
every day. The remaining 13 interviewed suggested they came to Nyachikadza for the period 
of flooding, which can range from weeks to months. Three specifically moved prior to the 
flooding, but most did not specify. Local Nyachikadza resident, Peter, explains his household’s 
routine: 
 
Peter (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘So early January is when the area floods so that is when we 
evacuate from Nyachikadza and come to the upper lands and it depends on the 
magnitude of the floods. Sometime mid-January we go back, sometime late January we 
go back to do the cultivation.’ 
 
The way Peter discusses it, using ‘sometime’ to describe the different scenarios, indicates that 
it can vary annually and that this is an established routine for their community. Indeed, the 
use of two settlements implies that this movement is a customary annual pattern. Every rainy 
season people move to the upper area, but the timing of this is not set. The flexibility of the 
timing suggests that people move based on when they expect flooding, highlighting the 
organic, unregimented nature of the move. Peter’s laissez-faire attitude towards the 
movement is exemplary of how it was discussed by almost two thirds of the Nyachikadza 
residents. The organic forms of movement suggested link to the different discussions of 
resettlement highlighted in the literature, particularly with the suggestion by Displacement 
Solutions (2013), an international organisation focusing on resettlement as climate change 
adaptation, that temporary resettlement is the best option. However, as already highlighted 
in the literature and as I will expand on in Chapter 5, there is much debate about whether 
resettlement should be temporary or permanent. Peter’s comment also highlights the 
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importance of local early warning systems, in order to know when to move. These were 
discussed in the interviews with those from Nyachikadza.  
 
 Local methods to forecast floods were more favoured by the Nyachikadza participants 
than those from the other communities, who did not directly refer to them. However, of the 
16 Nyachikadza participants, seven highlighted indigenous forecasting methods as the key 
way they predicted flooding. Of the remaining 16 interviewed from Nyachikadza, seven 
suggested flooding information came from the radio or the village civil protection committee, 
and two did not comment. An example of indigenous prediction methods are highlighted by 
Yosef: 
 
Yosef (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘We use indigenous early warning signs. Firstly, there are 
some white birds, I don’t know what you call them, they love to be around water. So, 
when we see those birds migrating from those waters to the upper land, there are those 
big baobab trees, the birds migrate there and build nests in that tree, we know that this 
year we will have flooding there. Secondly, is the abundance of ants. We know that the 
water level now is coming up, so those ants are running away from that water.’ 
 
The fact that Yosef, does not know the proper name for the birds but just recognises them 
through their actions, highlights the importance of experience over official nomenclature. It 
suggests that there may be local ways of categorising these early warning signals, such as 
those found by Shulz et al. (2019). This indicates the significance placed on local knowledge 
over scientific, technocratic understandings (Schulz et al., 2019), which also came out from 
informal conversations with the government translator who commented on some of the 
difficulties in spreading Met office forecasts, especially for the 2015 flooding. Additionally, 
Yosef provides insights of the on the ground environment. In this instance, Yosef illustrates 
to us the importance of animals in their daily lives. The fact that he mentions multiple local 
methods of predicting floods suggests that community members are very aware of flooding. 
It signifies the abundance of local knowledge on this issue in this region, and the commonality 
of flooding. Moreover, this community could favour local forecasting methods due to the ‘no-
go zone’ in this area and the lack of communication with government, encouraging them to 
be more independent.  
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However, whilst several participants use indigenous early warning systems, not all 
follow them as meticulously. Indeed, some prefer to wait until they see the water coming, as 
indicated by Sofia: 
 
Sofia (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘There is no where I get warning information, I don’t know. 
What happens is I just see the water coming and the water normally comes, little by 
little. And I am able to put the reed as a gauge.’ 
 
Sofia illustrates the normality of this procedure, there does not appear to be any anxiety or 
fear involved, which is different to other communities. Sofia suggests that she is confident 
with this method of prediction. Official metal and wooden gauges have been installed by 
various NGOs to assist with the prediction of floods. They enable communities to be aware of 
the level of the river, which incorporates technocratic knowledge. However, the fact that here 
Sofia is referring to the use of a reed and her sight to judge the water level, rather than a pre-
installed gauge with water measurements already listed, suggests that this is a more local 
form of prediction. The crossover of different forms of knowledge in this prediction method 
illustrates the fluidity of knowledge, it is always evolving, learning from the current context. 
This is similar to the findings of Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2019) who explore the use of local 
knowledge in the flood risk management cycle in the Lower Shire region of Malawi. They 
highlight the dynamism of local knowledge, particularly with its interaction with scientific 
early warning systems (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). They stress that local knowledge and its 
possessors are active in its formation (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). However, they take this 
further to emphasise that just because someone has the knowledge does not mean they act 
on it (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). These findings fit with one of the priorities of the 2015 DRM 
policy, outlined in Chapter 3, illustrating how the government view this as an area that needed 
improvement in 2015 (Government of Malawi, 2015b).  
 
As mentioned, two Nyachikadza residents I interviewed indicated how they face 
hostility from those in the upper land due to them being from Nyachikadza. Peter highlights 
this:  
 
Peter (Nyachikadza, 2017): “my house here in TA Ndamera, when we are in our house 
people can be drunk and throw stones at us and say ‘Nchowa’s [derogatory name for 
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someone from Nyachikadza] go away’. So that is why we think we are not safe in TA 
Ndamera”.  
 
Here Peter highlights how being the ‘migrant’ in the upper area makes them marginalised. 
The fact that there is a derogatory word particularly for someone from Nyachikadza suggests 
that it is not merely someone being new to the area that leads to hostility, but that they are 
specifically from Nyachikadza. I was made aware in informal discussion with district 
government officials at Nsanje District Council that those in Ndamera had a reputation of 
being jealous of the fertility of land in Nyachikadza and that this accentuated negative feelings 
between the two areas. Ley’s (1995), research suggests that  how one is perceived in the host 
area as a migrant impacts identity formation. Belonging is crucial in resettlement, as discussed 
further in the following chapters. This situation highlighted by Peter above illustrates that 
hostility develops from organic movements, which suggests that without proper 
management it could likely also develop in resettlement induced moves, which may impact 
the wellbeing of those resettling as well as the overall success of the resettlement. This can 
be seen at Jombo resettlement area. 
 
4.3.2 Jombo Resettlement Area 
 
 The flooding related movements at Jombo are the reverse of those at Nyachikadza. 
Flooding impacted their movements most dramatically through their decision to permanently 
resettle in 2015. This was a permanent movement from their previous homes at Champanda, 
to their new area at Jombo, initiated by them due to the severe flooding of 2015, and 
supported by government and NGOs where possible. Since the resettlement some 
community members have to travel several kilometres to do their cultivation on the land 
where they were previously settled. It means that instead of migrating to the upper land only 
in times of flooding, as with those at Nyachikadza, they stay permanently in the upper land 
and move to the lowland to do their cultivation. This situation, illustrated in Figure 4.3, 
provides slightly different rhythms of movement. It is unclear whether this would count as 
permanent resettlement for some of the understandings of resettlement outlined in the 
literature review (Johnson, 2012), as there still is a movement to the previous vulnerable area, 
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which Johnson (2012) advocates against. Although most interviewed from the community 
identified with having permanently resettled to Jombo. 
 
Those at Jombo spend much of their time at Champanda. The exact pattern of how 
often people go there and how long they spend there, varies individually. Alfred explains his 
movements: 
 
Alfred (Jombo, 2017): ‘I go there [Champanda] twice a week but I do not stay the night’.  
 
Whereas, Daphne and her husband go to Champanda twice a month. Daphne explains how 
this works:  
 
Daphne (Jombo, 2017): ‘we go to Champanda, we go for one week and then stay here 
for two weeks and then go for one week’.  
 
These are just two examples of variation in routine, but each participants was slightly 
different. Some variation is due to opportunities that arise. For example, Eric’s situation:  
 
Eric (Jombo, 2017): ‘I can stay there for 3 nights and then come back. But when I am not 
maybe finding piecework I can stay there for a week or so’.  
 
Here, Eric highlights the impact of the availability of work on people’s movements. This 
reiterates that the movements are based on cultivation in the previous area of settlement. 
  
There is some variation around family circumstance. Seven respondents stated that 
family had influence over their movements one way or another and two of these particularly 
stated that due to their children they spent more continuous time spent at Jombo with regular 
visits to Champanda, as there is a school very close to Jombo. Local government officials at 
the district council, along with participants at Jombo highlight how the school was central in 
the resettlement, providing a temporary form as shelter as well as being a key attractions of 
the resettlement. For some households, like Eric’s, it impacts his households’ movements: 
 
Eric (Jombo, 2017): ‘[I go to Champanda] twice a week … My wife and children stay here, 
and the children go to jombo school’ 
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Here Eric highlights the other factors and amenities that can influence the movement, such 
as education. However, if like Daphne above, there are no children and only a two-person 
household, then there is greater flexibility to spend longer amounts of time in Champanda. 
 
The movement to their area of cultivation is complicated by the length of the journey. 
This can vary between two to six hours depending on when and where exactly they are going. 
In the evening it can take longer due to the heat and the labour they have just undertaken. 
Daphne and her husband, and Edward explain their routines:  
 
Daphne (Jombo, 2017): ‘we leave at four am and we arrive at nine or ten am’.  
 
Edward (Jombo, 2017): ‘I start at six am and reach there at eight am. When returning I 
start at one pm and reach here at six, seven pm. It is a lot longer coming back because 
of the sun.’  
 
There is variation between the two quotes, but in both the journey appears to be long and 
sometimes a struggle. The process of permanently resettling has left the resettled community 
further away from their area of cultivation. This distance impacts the resettled community’s 
daily lives and creates different patterns of movement from before the resettlement. 
However, despite this apparent hardship most interviewed were happy to be permanently 
resettled out of their previous area. A key reason for this that came out from the interviews, 
was the fear of flooding and trauma attached to the previous area. 
 
Prevalent in the resettled community at Jombo is a great fear of flooding. This came 
out of the focus group discussions as well as being specifically stated in six of the 16 Jombo 
interviews, three of which mentioned it several times. This fear seems to have been caused 
by the devastating 2015 flood. Fairness explains how the 2015 flooding impacted her: 
 
Fairness (Jombo, 2017): ‘I have been experiencing flooding each and every year. But 
usually what would happen is the water would come and then the water would go. But 
in 2015 the water came, and it was the worst flooding. So, we were afraid that we might 
be staying at Champanda and the water might come in the night hours when we are 
sleeping and all of us will be swept away by the water. At Champanda we didn’t have a 
canoe and we saw all our property being lost in the water. So, we thought each and 
every time we are losing our property, we might lose our life in future.’ 
 113 
 
The trauma of water coming during ‘the night hours’ was present in three quarters of the 
Jombo interviews as well as the focus group discussions, with respondents highlighting how 
they lost everything during these floods and some going further to give detailed descriptions 
of their rescue from the flooding. The impression from the interviews was that many in this 
resettled community watched their possessions washed away from them as they awaited 
rescue. It appears that this tortuous experience has stayed with them and still influences their 
decisions today. Indeed, half of the respondents expressed the sense of security they feel in 
their resettled site, as exemplified in Daphne’s quote: 
 
Daphne (Jombo, 2017): ‘we are happy we are here because we are protected from 
flooding’.  
 
There has been research on the impact of a severe event on people’s behaviour (Paton et al., 
2000, Paton and Johnston, 2006, Hall and Endfield, 2016). Often however, the effect of this 
event wears off with time. This was suggested to me by my translator on one journey back 
from Jombo resettlement site, she was convinced that one of the respondents in particular 
would permanently move back to Champanda. It is arguable then, that with time, some of 
those at Jombo may return to Champanda, if it is mainly the fear of flooding that is keeping 
them at Jombo. 
 
The contrast of the movement of the resettled community at Jombo, with that of the 
unwilling to resettle community at Nyachikadza is interesting. From the outside, the 
movement appears quite similar. Both move between two areas in order to undertake 
cultivation and avoid flooding. However, they spend varying times in the different places, with 
more continuous movement occurring at Jombo than at Nyachikadza. They also have very 
different attitudes towards the movement. Many at Jombo are driven by a fear of flooding, 
whilst those at Nyachikadza have little fear of flooding but a great attachment to their area. 
Additionally, the movements are seen very differently by the government, which uses the 
resettlement at Jombo as an exemplar of resettlement, and those at Nyachikadza as an 
example of those who are resisting resettlement, stigmatising them by declaring the area a 
no-go zone in order to persuade them to resettle. 
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However, in both the communities discussed so far, the key motivation for the 
movements is to enable the communities to continue to undergo their cultivation in the most 
fertile areas. Much migration research focuses on economic causes as the key driver in 
migration (Boyle et al., 1998). Here, economic reasons are prevalent in the drivers of 
migration. However, they seem to be inhibiting the government desired migration: the 
economic reasons, particularly associated with cultivation, appear to be preventing full 
permanent resettlement with no interaction with their previous area. If the environment 
allowed them to be full time in the fertile area, they would be. However, the land would not 
be as fertile if there were no floods. These contradictions highlight the complexities involved 
in determining the different drivers and causes of migration, and which migration is seen as 
desirable by whom and why (Black et al., 2011a). Village Mwalija provides a different 
perspective. 
 
4.3.3 Village Mwalija 
 
At the time of interviews in 2017, village Mwalija was less impacted by flooding than 
the other two communities under study. Flooding did not impact this community annually 
and did not affect the community homogenously. This led to a variety of subsequent flooding 
related movements and views on flooding and resettlement. This is why in Figure 4.3 there is 
an area which is estimated, based on interviews, as the area in which people move. Whilst 
there is a set place, the ‘new place’ as shown in Figure 4.3, for their potential resettlement, 
and there was a particular place they went during the 2015 flooding, as shown in Figure 3.5, 
there is no routine place where they relocate to at times of flooding, as with those at TA 
Nyachikadza.  
 
There is a variety of flooding related movements occurring in this community. I 
illustrate these below. This variety could be due to the diversity of impact felt from flooding 
as well as the diversity of everyday movements that occur in this community. Half the 
respondents from village Mwalija rely on two areas for cultivation, one in the upper land and 
one in the marsh land. This has always occurred and is not due to the increasing severity of 
flooding. They live relatively close to both areas of cultivation. Justin discusses his farming 
situation:  
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Justin (Mwalija, 2017): ‘it is 30 minutes, this side to dambo [marsh] land where I cross 
the Shire river and the other side it takes me two hours, from four in the morning to six 
o’clock. While this side is from six to half six’.  
 
There is quite a difference in distance between the two areas of farming ranging from 30 
minutes to two hours, but for some, such as Gina, it is equidistant: 
 
Gina (Mwalija, 2017): ‘[it is] almost 30 minutes, six to six thirty and the same to the 
upper side, almost 30 minutes walking’. 
 
It is clear that in this community, residents’ cultivated land may be quite spread out, which 
leads to the varied impact from flooding on this community. 
 
Flooding impacts the residence of village Mwalija differently. For many their crops are 
washed away but there appears to be a lot of variation as to whether residents’ houses are 
affected. Arnold explains his experience:  
 
Arnold (Mwalija, 2017): ‘some houses do collapse but I have never been affected in that 
way, but my field is near Shire River, so it gets flooded and my crops get washed away 
whenever the area floods where my field is’.  
 
However, some do not even get their crops impacted. Dorothy explains the flooding impact 
on her: 
  
Dorothy (Mwalija, 2017): ‘mostly it is the displacement. For my maize fields they are 
intact when there is flooding, even the livestock and the house. So, we relocate’.  
 
Despite the fact that her house and fields are unaffected by flooding, Dorothy still relocates. 
A sense of community is apparent in the interviews with the residents of Mwalija, with 11 of 
the 16 respondents referring to some aspect of the community impacting the resettlement. 
If there is going to be a relocation due to flooding, most participate, and they go as a whole 
community.  
 
The sense of community means that if there is a decision to evacuate others will follow 
even if they are not impacted or do not want to. Six respondents refer, similarly to Dina below, 
to the influence of the community as a whole on the decision to move and five refer 
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specifically to the influence of the village head. Dina highlights her situation in times of 
flooding:  
 
Dina (Mwalija, 2017): ‘I can go because it would be like the whole village, community, 
or group of people are moving, but it won’t be what I wish’.  
 
Whilst it is clear this movement is not what Dina wishes, she still follows her community. This 
suggests a sense of community cohesion, or potentially peer pressure. In this context, village 
Mwalija makes a particularly interesting community to study further the community process 
of decision making and community agency, as will be made evident in Chapter 6. 
 
Additionally, flooding can impact the freedom of movement for those in the 
community. Three community members commented on the inhibiting nature that flooding in 
the area places on their livelihood by preventing them from moving. Sonia highlights the 
constraining impact of flooding on her movements: 
 
Sonia (Mwalija, 2017): ‘[flooding] affects our travelling. My husband has to go and do 
some casual labour, but we are surrounded by water because the rivers that surround 
them become flooded, so it becomes difficult for us to travel’.  
 
Here Sonia illustrates how they can potentially become trapped due to the flooding. This 
suggests that they may be experiencing a form of the immobility paradox (Findlay, 2011), 
outlined in the literature review, where people want to move but are unable to do so. It is 
usually referring to the lack of resources as the inhibitor of the movement (Findlay, 2011),  
but in this case it appears to be the flooding. It may instead relate better to the literature on 
environmental non-mobility (Mallick and Siddiqui, 2015). The potential to be trapped by the 
flooding can be very dangerous and problematic, resulting in temporary relocation. 
 
During severe flooding there is often a short evacuation period. It is not as extreme as 
with the previous two communities: half the respondents highlighted how they relocate a 
mile or two away from their area, and stay between a few hours to a few days, as in Sonia’s 
situation for example: 
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Sonia (Mwalija, 2017): ‘When we relocate from that area to the new one, we stay 
just one day. We may come [to the evacuation area] but we still go there just to check 
what the situation is like and, if we feel like it is going down, I go back to my home.’ 
 
In this situation, flooding is discussed less seriously than the previous examples in the other 
two communities. Sonia does not show as much fear over the impact that flooding could have 
on her livelihood. Indeed, she suggests they can move to and from the evacuation area and 
their home, indicating the way is passable and there is little fear in the movement. However, 
two respondents did suggest more serious relocation periods of a month, which emphasises 
the potential variety in this community, as touched on earlier. The lower severity of this 
community was also implied by the local government officials in the district council, when 
discussing the road to Mwalija, it was made clear that this area does not experience as severe 
flooding. Moreover, on the 2015 flooding extent maps provided by the Department of Surveys 
(Malawi Department of Surveys, 2015) this area was not included on the map, suggesting it 
did not undergo severe flooding. Building on the previous discussion on the behavioural 
impact of one event at Jombo, and the supporting literature (Paton et al., 2000, Paton and 
Johnston, 2006), the lack of fear of flooding implies that they have little experience of flooding 
disastrously impacting livelihoods.  
 
However, this lack of fear of flooding is not felt universally in the community. Indeed, 
seven of the 16 respondents suggested some form of fear of flooding, as exemplified by Gina, 
who illustrates how the 2015 floods caused her to be more aware of flood forecasting:  
 
Gina (Mwalija, 2017): in the past, like in 2015, I did nothing, I knew that the area would 
receive heavy rains, but I just stayed to see what would happen but after that incident I 
now know the importance of getting prepared for the rains. Like when we get the 
messages we can go and relocate.’ 
 
Gina implies that prior to the 2015 floods she had not had experience of severe flooding, but 
that this event did impact her enough to make her want to be ‘prepared for the rains’, and 
that part of this preparedness included relocating. This illustrates the impact that one event 
can have on behavioural patterns (Hall and Endfield, 2016). However, compared to the rest 
of those from Mwalija interviewed, Gina was a rarity.  
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Half of the community members from Mwalija interviewed either do not seek any 
information of flooding, or receive, but do not act on, flooding forecasts from the Met Office 
heard through the radio or other official channels. For example, Agnes explains:  
 
Agnes (Mwalija, 2017): ‘I get information through radio that maybe the area will flood, 
but I don’t do anything I just wait to see what happens’.  
 
This resonates with the discussion over indigenous and technocratic knowledge in the 
Nyachikadza section (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). It also links in with the discussion of the 
attention on early warning systems in the 2015 DRM policy. Indeed, the government seem 
aware that community members may not know what action to take after hearing the 
forecasts, and state this as a specific example within the government policy (Government of 
Malawi, 2015b: 7). In the case of Mwalija, three of the 16 respondents highlight how the lack 
of authority placed on official forecasts is connected to a belief that it will not affect them. 
Indeed, Dina reiterates this:  
 
Dina (Mwalija, 2017): ‘I don’t even know the flooding forecast for this year, whenever 
the water comes, we just see. But I am happy living an unworried life about flooding’.  
 
She reinforces the fact that flooding is not an issue for everyone in the community. Indeed, 
she later reiterates this: 
 
 Dina (Mwalija, 2017): ‘it is not the whole area which is flooded’. 
 
This suggests that the varying levels of flooding makes them less cautious of the phenomenon 
than in other areas. Yet, most will still follow others if they evacuate.  
 
One NGO official from the MFERP, noted that the form of evacuation present at village 
Mwalija could be the start of a more permanent resettlement process. This is important when 
considering how these existing forms of flooding related movements can impact more official 
forms of resettlement, or how they are seen by those in government and NGOs. International 
organisation worker William illustrates how he sees this: 
 
William (NGO, 2017): ‘So, what we are promoting in this case is mainly the identification 
of possible sites, sites for possible evacuation. These sites may be considered later by the 
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government as resettlement sites. So, it is up to the government to reconsider some of 
these sites that we are identifying as resettlement sites. So, we are not facilitating the 
actual resettlement, but we are facilitating identification of something like this, safe 
havens … where maybe people settle.’ 
 
Here, William highlights how identifying a safe area can be the start of resettling more 
permanently to this area. It portrays it as a gradual process. This is something that has long 
been recognised in the literature as how much migration gradually occurs, a temporary move 
paving the way for a permanent relocation (Boyle et al., 1998, Ravenstein, 1885, Bell and 
Ward, 2000). It attempts to merge the community movement with the government’s idea of 
resettlement. It also brings in issues around definitions discussed briefly previously and in the 
literature review. Here William refers to resettlement and evacuation, which have different 
connotations. In Chapter 5 I will explore further what is meant by resettlement. Additionally, 
it is interesting that in William’s opinion it is important that the government is involved in the 
process to make it happen. The quote implies William believes the responsibility for the 
resettlement lies with the government. I will develop the topic of responsibility in the section 
below and in the following chapters. 
 
 The movements in each community illustrated in this section highlight the extensive 
variability involved. Flooding impacts each community’s movements in numerous ways 
depending on a multitude of factors. This reiterates what Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2019) found in 
their research on local knowledge and disaster management in the Lower Shire Region. They 
highlighted that the impact of disasters was influenced by the social and political contexts, as 
well as the unequal access to local knowledge and resources (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). My 
research also suggests that the severity of flooding is different for each community, as is 
expected. However, movements in all communities are impacted in one form or another by 
flooding. These forms of movement are organic and occur irrespective of NGO or government 
involvement. They are therefore viewed as being separate to formal resettlement or are 
resettlement rather than Resettlement, where resettlement refers to the organic form of 
movements that occur without external involvement from government and civil society and 
Resettlement is the official change of residence desired by government and many interviewed 
in civil society. A summary of these movements is set out in Table 4.1 below, which compares 
the resettlement and Resettlement situation in each community.  
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Table 4. 1 Summary of the difference between government/NGO desired Resettlement and 
community flooding related movements (resettlement) 
Community Resettlement  resettlement 
Jombo 
Resettlement 
Site 
This community has already undertaken 
Resettlement: they have permanently 
moved to a safer area upland. This move 
was initiated by them but assisted by 
government.  
 
This community still cultivates in their 
previous area, this means regular 
trips, sometimes lasting several days, 
to the previous area, which is 
vulnerable to floods. 
Village 
Mwalija 
This community is currently negotiation 
Resettlement with the assistance of an 
NGO. An area of land within the same TA 
and with a drilled borehole has been 
allocated to them. Yet, still they hesitate.  
 
resettlement occurs at times of 
flooding, but it is not routine: there is 
no set place they go to at times of 
flooding, and they are always checking 
on when they will return. It is spoken 
about as often only requiring a move 
away for a few hours. 
TA 
Nyachikadza 
The government very much wants this 
community to Resettle, but they are 
unwilling. The government has declared 
it as unfit for human habitation and 
made the area a ‘no-go zone’ but still the 
community do not want to Resettle.  
This community speaks of annual 
moves up to TA Ndamera at times of 
flooding. It appears to be an 
established coping mechanism for 
residents of TA Nyachikadza but is not 
recognised by the government.  
 
Table 4.1 illustrates the variability and flexibility within the resettlement movements, 
which could suggest that it may be difficult to impose a more rigid traditional form of 
government Resettlement in their place. However, as has briefly been touched on in the 
quote from William, and as the next chapter will illustrate, this separation is indistinct. Many 
of these flooding related movements constitute in one way or another an aspect of 
Resettlement. Thus, the distinction for Resettlement is the external involvement and 
management of the movement. This is what constitutes Resettlement and is of interest for 
this research. The comparison between Resettlement and resettlement is useful to show the 
similarities and confusion in the definition of resettlement, however, from now on the 
resettlement referred to in the thesis is Resettlement.  Following a governmentality rationale 
(Dean, 1999) the rise in people moving could be a reason why government wants to manage 
these movements, to ensure control of their increasingly mobile population. To explore the 
rationale behind resettlement further, the responsibility for the increasing severity of 
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flooding is explored, as this provides context for who is seen as being responsible for 
resettlement. 
 
4.4 Increasing Severity of Flooding: Attributing Blame and Responsibility? 
 
In this section, I explore the perceived responsibility for the increasingly severe 
flooding in Malawi. This opens up discussions over the responsibility for resettlement, as it is 
due to the flooding. In this section, I want to establish how there is a difference between who 
is seen to be responsible for causing the problem of flooding, and who is seen to be 
responsible for solving the problem of flooding. This difference is important to appreciate the 
relationship between the actors involved.  
 
The responsibility for the increasingly severe flooding was mostly discussed by those 
in NGOs and government. There are some comments from community members, but much 
of the interview data I discuss in this section is from NGO and government workers. I believe 
this could be because those in NGOs and government view themselves as having to manage 
the consequences of flooding and therefore, there may be an emphasis on understanding the 
causes of the flooding in order to suggest solutions. This reiterates what Enroth (2014) 
suggested, that governance is now focused less on society and more on global problems, as I 
highlighted in the first section of this chapter by illustrating how government was 
problematising flooding and legitimising their intervention. The process of finding ‘solutions’ 
to flooding, also connects with discussions of technocratic knowledge and audit culture, as 
the ‘solutions’ need to be measurable (Kuus, 2016). This perspective is part of NGOization 
discussed in the literature review and did not seem apparent in the communities. Most 
community members focus on their response to, and method of prediction of flooding, as 
well as its impact, rather than why the flooding may be getting more severe. This may be due 
to the interview schedule but may also in part be due to different priorities and context within 
the communities, which have always lived with flooding and thus focus on dealing with its 
everyday impacts. Therefore, in this section, I focus on the government and NGO perspective 
of responsibility to flooding. 
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Moreover, I introduce the difference between community members’ perspective and 
the perspective of those in government and NGOs. I will explore the reasons for this 
difference below and in subsequent sections. It may in part be due to differing priorities, as 
suggested above, it may also be due to the materials available to them. Community members 
often do not have access to data that highlights the increasing flooding severity and may rely 
on institutional memory. Thus, they may be less aware that government data suggests 
flooding is becoming more severe, as flooding events have always occurred. If the 
government data is not visible, for example in a graph like Figure 4.1, then the trend suggested 
there may not be obvious. This shows how knowledge on flooding may be formed, and the 
apparatus involved in this. It is part of the explanation as to why there may be a disconnect 
between Resettlement and resettlement, as will become apparent throughout the Results.  
 
In what follows, I explore the four key interconnected perceived reasons for flooding 
as suggested by the research participants. These are centred around deforestation and 
overpopulation. The environment runs through these reasons, but in various different guises 
due to the varying attitudes towards it.  
 
4.4.1 Deforestation 
 
 Deforestation was discussed by half the respondents from government and NGOs as 
a key driver of flooding, particularly in relation to climate change. I will discuss further the 
implications of its relation to climate change in the climate change section below. 
Deforestation is a prominent issue in Malawi, so much so that the government has publicly 
declared it will protect existing forest and reforest 500,000 hectares of degraded woodland 
by 2030 (Chimenya, 2019). There was much focus in the interviews, on the physical process 
and implications of deforestation. This is present in a third of the interviews that discussed 
deforestation and means that there is no specific group or actor who is seen as responsible 
for the deforestation practices that are occurring. For example, William discusses how he 
views the increasing deforestation as a key cause of flooding. 
 
William (NGO, 2017): ‘If you look at the 70s to now, the landscape has changed. Most 
of the areas that were forests then are mainly cultivated or they are now built, so that 
means, the way we are collecting rainfall is different to how we were collecting it in the 
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past. So, in the past maybe it [rain] was falling to the ground, most of it and was 
obstructed by the vegetation and all that. This time it is like we are physically collecting 
it and directing it into our water channels, and our water channels have become small, 
because of these construction dynamics, or cultivation dynamics. So, the water channels 
have become small and as a result we are experiencing these floods.’ 
 
William focuses on the impacts to the physical running of the water and how this has affected 
the flooding regime. It is interesting that he does not specifically say deforestation, which 
would envision the act of cutting down a tree, but instead, discusses it in a more abstract way 
by focusing on the change in the landscape. Thus, the change of landscape is discussed as 
responsible for the increased flooding, but there is little detail into why the landscape has 
changed. Construction or cultivation dynamics are referred to, but more as a general societal 
aspect and not towards a specific group of people. Similar to the other three respondents 
that took an equally neutral view, William suggests that it is the environment that has caused 
the increasing flooding, but really that it is the societal impact that has led to this and created 
this ‘landscape’. This type of view is straightforward, stating the situation. Others, however, 
take a more analytical approach, which does involve an element of blame and responsibility. 
 
A third of NGO and government respondents that discuss deforestation imply that it 
was the people in the communities vulnerable to flooding that were responsible for the 
deforestation, and subsequently the worsening flooding. Anthony’s opinion, for example:  
 
Anthony (NGO, 2017): ‘I think you could more or less connect it [increasing severity in 
flooding] to climate change and things like that, and the people that live in those areas 
as well, they are cutting down trees, they are staying just near the riverbeds and all 
that.’ 
 
Anthony highlights that climate change is important, but he does not elaborate, which makes 
it a broad, inconclusive statement. However, he does elaborate on those involved in 
increasing flooding severity by identifying ‘the people that live in those areas … they are 
cutting down trees’, and that they place themselves in positions of danger by ‘staying just 
near the riverbeds’. The fact that this is the point he particularises on suggests that he views 
the people vulnerable to flooding as partly responsible for this fact. However, one respondent 
takes this further to produce a more cynical view. 
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 The complications of aid within deforestation was also brought into the responsibility 
dynamics of flooding by one participants, Arthur: 
 
Arthur (NGO, 2017): ‘For us to curb flooding, I think we need to ensure that the 
communities within those areas, are truly involved. The interventions that we do, saying 
we want to plant trees, we want to do river embankment and whatever, we have to 
ensure that the community is involved, but the challenge is that projects of such nature 
come with incentives to the same community. We are trying to protect them from the 
effects of flooding and then we bring incentives. So, what happens is, some 
communities, may even not nurture those kind of projects, because they know if they 
nurture those projects NGOs will not come back to give them another incentive. So, they 
would rather not take care of that, till next year, they also come again. It is like every 
year, trees are planted, every year river embankments are done, but the following year 
those are actually not there.’ 
 
Here Arthur is blaming the people in the communities receiving assistance for causing the 
flooding, through their manipulation of environmental management projects. He is 
suggesting that community members need to take some responsibility for the success of 
development projects. This implies that the Lower Shire may have a problem with aid 
dependency, something which other scholars have identified stakeholders as suggesting 
(Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018). The fact that Arthur focuses on the necessity of incorporating the 
communities suggests that he believes they are currently undertaking harmful cultivation 
practices. The use of ‘protect’ sets up a dynamic between those in the NGOs and those in the 
communities by suggesting they need the assistance of the NGOs. This actually reinforces the 
dependency scenario, which he is suggesting the communities should resist. It is the first clear 
inclination that those who see themselves in positions as responsible for solving the problem 
of flooding (the NGOs and government) view those as responsible for causing the problem 
(community members) as potentially purposefully dependent on them. 
 
Malawi depends heavily on receiving aid (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018) but this aid does 
not necessarily instate the problematic power dynamics suggested by some critics of 
development (Escobar, 2011). In a post-development context, there is growing awareness of 
the potential damage of power dynamics within aid (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Kapoor, 2005). 
Yet, in the quote above, Arthur seems to be suggesting they do not understand the situation, 
by implying that they use these projects to obtain the ‘incentives’ and only see them in this 
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way, not for their intended purpose. Arthur’s focus on involving the community implies that 
he puts the responsibility for ensuring the understanding of the purpose of the project mainly 
onto the implementer and not those in the community. This sets up another dynamic, as it 
implies that the communities themselves do not have the capacity to have adequate 
knowledge about it on their own. If the communities are viewed as having little capacity 
within the situation, it could suggest that they have little agency in the process, which hinders 
their ability to take responsibility for it, as Arthur is advocating for.  
 
The difference between those in NGOs and government doing the assisting, and those 
in vulnerable communities requiring assistance is exacerbated by the perspective that those 
in the vulnerable communities are responsible for causing the issue that requires assistance. 
This reiterates the disconnect in understandings between those in government and NGOs and 
those in flooding-vulnerable communities suggested in the earlier section. I explore the 
implications of this in the ensuing Results chapters. Relevant further to this current 
discussion, is the appreciation, apparent in the remaining third of respondents that discuss 
deforestation, that it is not only those directly impacted by flooding that need to be part of 
the solution, but rather the whole watershed. This creates a more interconnected perspective 
on the responsibility of flooding. 
 
 Four NGO and government workers interviewed highlighted how the drivers of 
flooding include not only those who were immediately impacted by the flooding but also 
other indirect actors. Eliyasi illustrates this well: 
 
Eliyasi (NGO, 2017): ‘So, for me there should be stakeholders from not just Nsanje but 
even districts surrounding Nsanje and Thyolo, Mulanje, Blantyre, where you have 
actually trees being cut, a lot of erosion coming in you know, even in the hills there.’ 
 
Eliyasi spreads the responsibility, not just concentrating on the people who are impacted but 
also highlighting how those further upland are influential in increasing the severity of 
flooding.  The fact that it is ‘even in the hills’ implies that this may not be a well appreciated 
viewpoint. However, he was not the only interviewee to discuss the interconnected nature of 
flooding, Keith also reiterates this. 
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Keith (Government, 2017): ‘You know most of the upland areas have been greatly 
deforested. That is why we are coming in to join hands with our colleagues from the 
Department of Forestry to link up with the neighbouring districts. Maybe to work on 
afforestation programmes. Because even if you look at most of the rivers coming down, 
there is a lot of siltation, and as a result the riverbed is very shallow. So, the time the 
catchment area up there receives a lot of water, the water just comes in and spreads all 
over, hence the issue of flooding. So, the issue of partnership with neighbouring district 
as a long-term issue to do with deforestation is important.’ 
 
Keith echoes that collaboration with those upland is necessary to reduce flooding. He also 
focuses on the physical aspects that cause flooding, as in William’s previous quote. Similar to 
William, his focus on the impact of areas being deforested in general takes the responsibility 
away from specific individuals or groups. However, he goes further than William by 
highlighting the partnership with neighbouring districts to combat deforestation. This again 
spreads the responsibility. The spreading of responsibility could be a result of decentralisation 
(Jagero et al., 2014), and the neoliberalising of climate change (Bee et al., 2015) and 
environmental governance (Himley, 2008). According to Jagero et al. (2014) central to 
decentralisation is the spreading of responsibility out to the district councils. This could be a 
reason, why Keith, a local government official has a viewpoint that implies the spreading of 
responsibility. However, following the concerns raised by Himley (2008) and Bee et al (2015) 
around the neoliberalisation, they would suggest that this spreading of responsibility takes 
the responsibility away from the national government, which have the most power to alter 
the situation. 
 
Additionally, it is interesting that Keith, like half the other NGO and government 
workers interviewed, suggests that the management of the environment is of key importance 
to reducing the severity of flooding. Indeed, many suggest the mistreatment of the 
environment, through acts such as deforestation, is a key driver of flooding. However, this 
viewpoint can put the control of flooding onto those who manage the environment, and not 
on the environment itself. As Keith is a local government disaster officer, part of his job is to 
manage the environment, which makes this perspective unsurprising. However, this 
perspective does make the environment dependent on others’ actions and in no way 
autonomous. Scholars have illustrated that some cultures view the environment differently, 
as having its own form of agency (Cruikshank, 2007, Berkes, 2012). Instead Keith’s perspective 
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appears to be focused on the impact that humans have on the environment, such as 
deforestation leading to decreased water retention in the soil and subsequently greater 
flooding, and not on the diverse way the environment can act. There is a more nuanced 
understanding of the societal drivers of deforestation in the discussions of charcoal burning. 
 
4.4.2 Charcoal Burning 
 
 Burning wood to form charcoal is frequent within Malawi and is referred to as 
‘charcoal burning’. Charcoal burning is illegal in Malawi, yet in 2017 97% of Malawians rely on 
firewood or charcoal for fuel or heating (Government of Malawi, 2017). It is such an issue that 
there is a National Charcoal Strategy put in place in 2017 (Government of Malawi, 2017).  One 
reason it is so significant is because it is recognised as a key reason for deforestation 
(Government of Malawi, 2017).  Charcoal burning was only mentioned by three of the 21 
government and NGO interviewees, however, the line of argument that charcoal burning 
highlights adds further nuance to the dynamics of responsibility involved in flooding.   
 
 The issue of charcoal burning illustrates an example of the ‘cycle of deprivation’ 
discussed in the literature review (Findlay, 2011). The three respondents that discuss charcoal 
burning cite poverty as the main reason for charcoal burning, which requires wood and, thus, 
deforestation occurs. Deforestation perpetuates environmental degradation and flooding, 
which accentuates poverty. This is also set out in the National Charcoal Strategy (Government 
of Malawi, 2017).  Keith and Eliyasi elaborate: 
 
Keith (Government, 2017): ‘[it is a] cyclical process, looking at issues of poverty, people 
cut down trees as one way of burning charcoal, so they can sell and get a little 
something’.  
 
Eliyasi (NGO, 2017): ‘people cut trees to sell for charcoal because of poverty’.  
 
Both of these simplify the situation: people cut trees to burn charcoal to sell because they’re 
poor. Under this reasoning, the responsibility for deforestation still lies with those 
undertaking the deforestation: the poor.  
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However, NGO worker, Kenneth, elaborates further into the structures behind 
charcoal burning: 
 
Kenneth (NGO, 2017): ‘People [are] cutting trees, they are burning charcoal just because 
there is a high demand of charcoal, here in Malawi. I think electricity is a problem, we 
may have black out for the whole day and people with no electricity cannot live hungry, 
so they buy charcoal. So, it means if there is a high demand for charcoal, people will 
continue making charcoal.’ 
 
Kenneth’s focus on the interconnected nature of the situation, going so far as to mention the 
electricity shortage and the need to have something to cook on, indicates how aspects such 
as the national infrastructure are also an important factor in deforestation. This is also 
recognised in the National Charcoal Strategy, which has seven cross-cutting pillars of focus 
(Government of Malawi, 2017). The interconnectivity highlighted here means the 
responsibility and reasons for deforestation, and consequently flooding, cannot easily be 
placed on one thing. Rural populations do cut trees, and many do this to burn charcoal to sell, 
but the reason they do this is not simply because they are poor and they need money. There 
is a demand for it because people often need a power source. This echoes the results of 
Sovacool and Linnér (2016) who recognise that deforestation can be the result of a higher 
system of demand in a country. 
 
An additional, somewhat connected, reason for flooding that was cited in the 
interviews is overpopulation and population pressure. This connects to the fears of 
overpopulation influential in the 1970s in initiating the environmental movement (Meadows 
et al., 1972). 
 
4.4.3 Overpopulation 
 
 Overpopulation is a contested issue in development discourse (Escobar, 2011). Often 
discussed as a key inhibitor to development, yet, from a traditional Western perspective, it is 
also seen as a signifier that a country is going through a ‘modernisation process’ (Kirk, 1996). 
However, much current discussion about overpopulation is suggested to be an 
oversimplification that is often used as a ‘scapegoat’ to distract from systemic issues (Fletcher 
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the population of Malawi has increased at a significant rate, 
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doubling in the past 30 years from around 9 million in 1988 to 18 million in 2018 (The World 
Bank, 2018b). It had an annual growth rate in 2018 of 2.6% compared to the UK’s 0.6% for 
the same year (The World Bank, 2018b). Thus, it is unsurprising that eight of the 21 NGO and 
government officials interviewed showed significant concern about overpopulation and cited 
it as a key driver in practices that increased flood vulnerability. However, there are differences 
in the way this concern was expressed. 
 
 Overpopulation is discussed by all those who mention it, as a reason for the increase 
in other drivers of flooding, such as deforestation. Kenneth illustrates this: 
 
Kenneth (NGO, 2017): ‘Increased population has some other results, for instance, now 
people are cutting down trees in order to have some areas to settle, just because they 
need somewhere to settle. At the same time there are some areas where we are 
building, initially people knew these are flood prone areas, just because of population 
pressure they are still building in these areas. So even though we say maybe people, in 
the future, they will be moving out of flood prone areas, just because population is 
increasing, people don’t have areas to construct their houses, so instead of maybe 
people moving from flood prone areas to safe areas they will be moving from safe areas 
to flood prone places just because they have that pressure, they don’t have somewhere 
to construct.’ 
 
Kenneth highlights how the mere settlement of people in their ‘overpopulated’ country can 
increase severity and vulnerability to flooding. Again, the focus is on society’s impact on the 
environment with little discussion or agency given to the environment. However, the way in 
which Kenneth discusses this situation, outlining how people may move into vulnerable areas 
‘just because they have that pressure’ implies he does not view them as responsible for this, 
they have no choice. Nor does he view Malawi’s population as a whole responsible for it. 
Similar to when the physical aspects of deforestation are discussed it is stated as just the 
situation, without blame attached. Four other respondents discussed overpopulation in this 
way. Anthony for example, shows a comparable sentiment: 
 
Anthony (NGO, 2017): ‘I think another thing you should consider is that the population 
is growing, because in the end it is all about the numbers, so how many were affected 
and all that. So, might be same magnitude of flooding, but more people affected. At 
same time, more people means more people encroaching on forest reserves and living 
near the rivers and all that.’ 
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Again, the situation is discussed in a straightforward manner, saying that ‘it is all about the 
numbers’ not necessarily the individual specific practices. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this subsection, the numbers do illustrate a growing population but Anthony and Kenneth 
place the responsibility for this, and its consequences with regards to flooding, on the 
population as a whole. However, not all discussions about overpopulation were equally 
blameless. 
 
 There were three other NGO and government participants that discussed population 
growth in a more accusatory manner, implying responsibility on the growing population. For 
example, Daniel: 
 
Daniel (Government, 2017): ‘However, because of the population growth, much of the 
land, or the areas which were forested, the trees have been cut down and some have 
been turned into cultivation lands, so that has increased the volume of flooding that is 
affecting the downstream. That is becoming a big issue now.’ 
 
Much of what Daniel is saying here is the same as the previous two quotes. However, he more 
clearly connects population growth to the disruption of lands that causes flooding. Whereas 
the other two quotes focus on situations that appear out of the vulnerable populations’ 
control, here Daniel is directly blaming population growth, particularly in vulnerable areas, 
for the degradation of areas and increased flooding. Since the start of this research in 2016, 
the population of Malawi has grown by around 1 million, with an annual population growth 
in 2018 of 2.6% (The World Bank, 2018b). The fact that Daniel highlights how this ‘is becoming 
a big issue now’ reiterates the impact of the growing population. He thus places responsibility 
for increasing flooding severity on this growing population. This could be because Daniel is 
the local government Health officer, and so is more directly involved in family planning within 
the population.   
 
Thus, there are a variety of perspectives on responsibility. When blame is ascribed it 
is mostly to the flooding-vulnerable communities, suggesting a neoliberal outlook, as it is the 
individual’s responsibility (Himley, 2008, Bee et al., 2015), but it is not always attributed. 
Despite the variety in perspectives, all involved highlighted an interesting viewpoint towards 
climate change. 
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4.4.4 Climate Change 
 
 Eight of 21 government and NGO officials discuss climate change as contributing to 
flooding. However, as can be seen in some of the previous quotes in this section, climate 
change is often discussed as a driver of increasingly severe flooding in an abstract way. Two 
of the respondent elaborate and mention a specific aspect of climate change, such as 
changing rainfall patterns. William’s opinion for example: 
 
William (NGO, 2017): ‘with the change in climate, we will be experiencing a lot of climate 
variability in southern Africa and Malawi is one of the countries that will generally be 
affected by such variability, or climate change’.  
 
This does give more detail into what climate change will entail, rather than simply stating 
‘climate change’ as a reason. However, it is still vague, particularly as it discusses all of 
southern Africa. This could be partly due to the fact that William is an employee of the World 
Bank, which is a large international organisation and thus would take a broad perspective of 
climate change. Therefore, he could just be reflecting the general World Bank consensus.  
 
However, similar vagueness can be observed in the discussion with community 
members. For example, a focus group discussion in Mwalija highlights the following: 
 
Shadreck (focus group Mwalija 2017): ‘Climate change is the cause of all this [increasing 
flooding] and I can foresee the situation getting worse and worse because we have not 
worked on improving the environment’.  
 
Here Shadreck is explicitly blaming climate change for the increasing flooding and also linking 
it to the lack of focus on improving the environment. This suggests that Shadreck’s view of 
climate change is centred on his interaction with the environment, his cultivation practices 
for example. He views it as their responsibility to improve the environment, and that this will 
combat climate change and the subsequent increase in flooding. This localised view of climate 
change was also present in three of the government and NGO interviews. It is slightly different 
from the Western scientific view on climate change (Arnall et al., 2014). 
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 Much of the academic discourse and literature around climate change focuses on 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They are a key driver of climate change (IPCC., 2014a), 
however, it is not discussed by any interviewee. Climate change is discussed as a reason for 
increasing flooding, but all the strategies to combat climate change and reduce flooding focus 
on very local methods: afforestation, resettlement, better housing infrastructure for example. 
This also was very apparent in informal discussions at the district council over some of the 
projects they had ongoing at the time of fieldwork, such as the Shire River Irrigation project, 
which has a large focus on afforestation to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Thus, for 
climate change, the perspective of those interviewed does not appear to go to a global level. 
This could be because much effort and discussion associated with climate change in Malawi 
is focused on mitigation and adaptation rather than prevention. Therefore, the concentration 
of climate change projects is mostly on a local level that does not necessarily provide a global 
perspective of the phenomenon. Moreover, the responses I received may also have been in 
relation to how I was perceived by the interviewees. They may have felt that I was more 
interested in specific actions of their respective NGO or government department, rather than 
overall perspectives on climate change. Nevertheless, this still suggests something about the 
dominant knowledge in place. It could highlight that the Western scientific knowledge, often 
seen as being hegemonic, may not pervade in the way expected, or, indeed, may not be as 
relevant. Climate change is discussed, but the understanding of climate change is more local 
than the Western scientific understanding. I believe this is due to the interaction that those 
in Malawi have with the concept of climate change.  
 
A common scientific view of climate change, which is associated to greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, may be less relevant in Malawi because the idea of a lifestyle that produces 
a significant amount of greenhouse gases is unattainable for the majority of the population, 
as is the luxury to worry about one’s carbon footprint. This is interesting when discussing 
responsibility, as from a climate justice perspective this would seem an ample opportunity to 
blame the West for mass industrialisation and emission of GHGs (Chatterton et al., 2013). For 
example, in 2012 (the most recent World Bank data available) the UK’s GHG emission is over 
25 times that of Malawi’s (The World Bank, 2012), to say nothing of the many previous years 
of burning fossil fuels. However, the Government of Malawi did produce in 2016 a National 
Climate Change Management Policy that does discuss Malawi’s GHG emission (Government 
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of Malawi, 2016). Indeed, this policy fits with how climate change is discussed in large 
international organisations, such as the UN and World Bank. There is reference to key 
conventions and protocols such as the Kyoto protocol (Government of Malawi, 2016: v). In 
this way the government is ensuring that Malawi is part of the global conversation on climate 
change. However, this policy and this international outlook was not present in the interviews, 
bar one exception. 
 
Climate justice was not part of the approach of any of the interviewees, apart from in 
a non-direct way. It is recognised by one respondent that development projects related to 
climate change will receive more funding. Anthony highlights this  
 
Anthony (NGO, 2017): ‘when I was working in habitat, they wanted to be linking this 
with climate change, so we can get more funding and intervene in that sense’.  
 
This suggests that the donor or international aid community may incorporate climate justice, 
but actually some of those who climate justice is for: those most vulnerable to climate change, 
do not feel the same sentiment. It is ironic that the concept of climate justice is not relevant 
in this section. It raises questions as to whether the concept of climate justice is more for the 
‘emitters’ and their consciences rather than the vulnerable people bearing the brunt of 
climate change. However, climate activists were not specifically consulted in this research and 
the participants may not have been taking this focus. This reiterates the (ir)relevance of 
certain forms of knowledge in certain contexts. However, again, the lack of climate justice 
arguments present in my data, may be due to how the interviewees responded to me. They 
may not have felt I was the right audience to voice these concerns, as I was a young female 
PhD student, without connection to the organizations integral in climate justice. 
 
This section has highlighted the varying levels of perspectives on reasons and 
responsibility for flooding. This is linked to responsibility and reasons for resettlement, as 
flooding is the cause of resettlement. The section has mainly focused on who or what those 
in NGOs and government view as responsible for the increasingly severe flooding. These views 
highlight how there are different levels of responsibility. Some in NGOs and government view 
those most vulnerable to flooding as those most responsible. This sets up a source of 
difference between the NGO and government representative and the members of the 
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vulnerable community. It is possible that disrespect may develop if the NGO or government 
worker believes they are responsible to provide solutions for a problem caused by community 
members. I explore the implications of this on resettlement in the following Results chapters. 
There were also those who viewed rural communities more generally as responsible, or the 
various systems and poverty in Malawi as responsible, which is a slightly less personal 
perspective, but does generalise the characteristics of those in flooding-vulnerable 
communities and removes agency from the individual. I focus heavily in this section and in 
the following chapter on the government and NGO perspective on flooding and resettlement. 
However, in Chapter 6 I will show a community perspective to resettlement and illustrate the 
power of local practices. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides context on which I will develop the following Results chapters. 
It sets the scene of increasing concern over flooding occurring in Malawi. This is due to the 
trend of increasing severity of flooding, which has led to the problematisation of flooding by 
the government and caused flooding to be viewed as a growing threat. This provides the 
visible space for government involvement in this area (Dean, 1999), thus legitimising 
government resettlement. This helps to answer the first research question by outlining the 
perceived trend in flooding in Malawi, and the impact of this perceived trend on patterns of 
movement and the growing desire to manage the movement.  
 
The flooding related movements illustrate a further incentive for government 
involvement as well as the disconnect between government and NGOs and flooding-
vulnerable communities. The community flooding related movements incurred, or 
resettlement, are discussed as habitual, a routine part of each community’s behaviour. This 
implies that they were present before the flooding started to increase in severity but are ever 
more important now. Consequently, there is a desire by government to manage these 
flooding movements, to maintain control of the population and to use movement as a flood 
management strategy, through the process of Resettlement. However, the great variety 
within the existing movements could make this challenging and the lack of appreciation of 
this by government also opens up discussion about the disconnect between those in 
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government and NGOs, and those in flooding-vulnerable communities. This introduces the 
difference between resettlement and Resettlement, a key contribution of my research. 
 
The chapter finally explores the perceived dynamics of responsibility involved in the 
increasingly severe flooding. There are varied appreciations of responsibility, highlighting the 
multiple viewpoints involved. However, there is a view that those in flooding-vulnerable 
communities are responsible for the increasingly severe flooding, even though those in 
government and NGOs view themselves as responsible for providing solutions for this. This 
further reiterates the disconnect in understandings and difference between those in 
government and NGOs and those in flooding-vulnerable communities. It also acts to legitimise 
government involvement in managing the movement, as it suggests that government does 
not view those in the flooding-vulnerable communities as capable. Therefore, this provides 
context for exploring the responsibility involved in resettlement, important for examining the 
governance of resettlement. With these factors in mind, I now turn, in Chapter 5, to focus on 
the government procedure and understanding of resettlement.  
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5. RESETTLEMENT: A TOP-DOWN SOLUTION TO FLOODING? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter, I set the context of the problematisation of flooding in 
Malawi, leading to a growing government interest in resettlement. In this chapter, I will 
examine further the government approach to resettlement and the stated motivations 
behind it. I focus on answering research question 2: exploring how and why resettlement is 
used as a technique by the government and NGOs to manage the population and flooding in 
Malawi, with particular interest on the understandings of, and motivations for, resettlement; 
the methods used; and the influences on the government approach.  
 
My research suggests that the Malawian government is attempting to manage 
flooding related movements through resettlement programs. However, due to the literature 
outlining the potential for resettlement to have ulterior motives (Arnall, 2018, Rogers and 
Wilmsen, 2019), I am interested in exploring further the motivations for this approach. There 
is existing literature exploring the changing attitude towards environmental hazards 
governance that suggests a change of approach to flooding, with a shift in focus away from 
the physical hazard, flooding, towards the people that are potentially impacted (Butler and 
Pidgeon, 2011). Butler and Pidgeon (2011) take a governmentality approach and suggest that 
this change in flood management in the UK context is part of a change in governance, which 
aims to make the citizens govern themselves. This shifts the responsibility to the individual, 
forming a neoliberal outlook. However, it is unclear whether this change in governance style 
is echoed in governance in Malawi, especially when there is a perception that those in the 
communities have limited capabilities, as set out in the previous chapter. Thus, as I also 
suggested in the previous chapter, there are several potential rationales for government 
resettlement, some of which I will explore in this chapter. 
  
The novelty of resettlement means there is confusion over what it entails. Currently 
there is no official policy on resettlement but there is a draft in progress, see section 5.4. In 
order to better understand the current government approach to resettlement, I outline in 
section 5.2 the multiple understandings of resettlement that exist in Malawi and explore who 
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holds which understanding and why. This provides some further context for the governance 
of resettlement, as it explores the various motivations behind the interest in resettlement in 
Malawi. In section 5.3 I set out the disaster governance structure into which the resettlement 
process falls. I analyse the current tensions within this structure and its difficulty in unifying 
understanding, to further highlight the disconnect, introduced in the previous chapter, 
between government and NGOs and flooding-vulnerable communities. Finally, in section 5.4, 
I examine the attempt to unify these multiple understanding through the upcoming 
resettlement policy. I consider the reasons why the policy is coveted, highlighting the external 
influences and their potential implications.  
 
5.2 Understandings of Resettlement  
 
 There are many ways in which resettlement can be framed and understood. Ransan-
Cooper et al. (2015) highlight how framings are influential in determining how something is 
governed. Therefore, before I explore the current and proposed future ways of governing 
resettlement, I will first outline the multiple understandings of resettlement. These 
understandings of resettlement provide a gateway to exploring the different motivations 
behind resettlement. The literature I set out in Chapter 2, suggests that government interest 
in resettlement is born out of a positive view of environmental migration as an opportunity, 
which comes from the framing of migration as adaptation to environmental change 
(Foresight, 2011). This encourages governments to think more proactively about 
environmental migration and to get involved in managing it (Foresight, 2011). However, this 
is quite an abstract motivation for resettlement. Four more analysable motivations 
highlighted in the literature (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019) are:  
1. To better control a population: the government notices a change in their populations 
movements and wants to control it, resonating with a governmentality perspective. 
2. Altruistic: the chief concern is the safety of a vulnerable population.  
3. Economic: the most efficient option is to resettle the population. 
4. Subject forming: the government would prefer if a population behaved in certain way 
and resettles them to encourage this behaviour. This fits in with the governmentality 
reasoning (Dean, 1999). 
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In this section, I will explore further how these motivations play out for the resettlement due 
to flooding in Malawi by analysing the different framings of resettlement present in this 
research. 
 
To this end, I suggest my own four key framings of resettlement that came out of my 
data and are specific to this research.  These are:  
1. Resettlement as a good way to manage flooding.  
2. Resettlement as either a permanent or temporary movement. 
3. Resettlement as unattainable. 
4. Resettlement as unhelpful in reducing the effects of flooding.  
Each framing represents a different understanding of resettlement that was frequently 
favoured by particular actors in my study. In this section, I will discuss each framing in turn, 
looking at who advocates which framing, why and what this suggests about the motivations 
behind resettlement. As this chapter is focused on governance, I mainly discuss NGO and 
government viewpoints. Thus, the type of resettlement being considered is managed 
Resettlement, and not the organic resettlement set out in Chapter 4. However, I do outline 
when community members show a specific view on the forms of resettlement discussed. 
 
5.2.1 Pro Resettlement 
 
 Two thirds of NGO and government employees interviewed viewed resettlement 
positively. This framing was mostly discussed by those in NGOs and government, as these 
were the actors that could facilitate it. Two thirds of those interviewed from Jombo, the 
resettled community, spoke of resettlement favourably because they had undertaken it, thus 
their discussion of it was retrospective. The other two communities studied were more 
reticent to discuss it favourably, with only three respondents from Mwalija and none from 
Nyachikadza keen to resettle at the time of interview. This was chiefly because they either 
lacked the resources to facilitate the movement, or they did not want to move. Therefore, in 
this subsection I mainly analyse the opinions of those in government and NGOs. Their pro-
resettlement viewpoint links to the growing desire for a resettlement policy, to be discussed 
in section 5.4. 
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There were multiple ways in which those in NGOs and government viewed 
resettlement as helpful. Often it was discussed in relation to other flood management 
strategies. Indeed, four of the 21 government and NGO respondents viewed resettlement as 
one strategy that should work with other strategies to reduce the impact of flooding. This is 
shown by local government employee, Irvine: 
 
Irvine (Government, 2017): ‘It [resettlement] is one of the best options I admit but maybe 
it can work better if other approaches are also used, zoning, maybe we try to zone some 
areas, try to put up some structures that can withstand water, try to do some other 
things. So, it is like a package.’ 
 
The idea of resettlement being one option in a ‘package’ is common in development policy. 
Using multiple strategies to reduce the intricate impact of an event, is part of the move in 
development to be holistic and incorporate the ‘messiness’ of society (Briggs, 2005, Escobar, 
2011). Indeed, within the 2015 Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy, set out in the 
Methodology, there are six priorities that are meant to work together, complement each 
other and mainstream disaster risk management into all sectors of government (Government 
of Malawi, 2015b).  Having several approaches in a development projects allows for certain 
aspects that one viewpoint may not have considered (Escobar, 2011). Therefore, if done 
properly, the use of multiple strategies is viewed as a more inclusive form of development, 
creating an environment for both top down and bottom up approaches (Escobar, 2011). 
Following the motivations analysis outlined earlier, the fact that Irvine’s approach to 
resettlement corresponds with common development policy could suggest economic and 
more altruistic motivations for Irvine’s advocacy for resettlement (Rogers and Wilmsen, 
2019). This is particularly because development has traditionally been economic and is ideally 
altruistic, although post-development literature does question this (Escobar, 2011). It is 
interesting that Irvine admits to resettlement being a good option. This implies that there is 
some reluctance or resistance to viewing resettlement as such. He could also be referring to 
the lack of up-take of resettlement projects in Malawi.  
 
Not everyone agreed that resettlement works best as a ‘package’. Five other 
government and NGO officials, such as local government employee, Keith, believe that it is 
best on its own: 
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Keith (Government, 2017): ‘Now the only solution is for resettlement. I look at it as the 
only solution. These others are saying we are going to construct these houses to 
withstand issues to do with disasters, those might be short term measures, but to me I 
look at resettlement as a permanent solution.’ 
 
For Keith, as for the four others, resettlement is seen as the final goal in managing flooding. 
The argument here is that if there is no one inhabiting the area vulnerable to flooding then 
no one can be impacted. This echoes the argument of Johnson (2012) that advocates for 
permanent resettlement and is also reiterated by NGO employee Arthur:  
 
Arthur (NGO, 2017): ‘I don’t think we can report any death because no one can move 
from the upland and rush to the flooding area because he just wants to see the floods.’  
 
It is a clear-cut perspective: no people, no impact. The abruptness of this approach does not 
fit with the messiness in development suggested above, but does resonate with the desire for 
action and a clear solution, that is found in some governance literature (Manda, 2014). This 
approach has more notable altruistic motivations (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019), as the focus is 
on moving people away from the danger. As mentioned, thus far, the concentration has been 
on a government perspective. However, some in the resettled community held pro-
resettlement views. 
 
Jombo community members interviewed produced more practical motivations for 
their agreement with resettlement. For example, Leila says: 
 
Leila (Jombo, 2017): ‘Resettling is a good idea because it is a way of protecting one’s 
life, because over there when there is flooding you also have maybe snakes coming, 
crocodiles, which can attack people. Whilst here, when it is raining, it is safe.’ 
 
The immediate, everyday benefits of resettlement come out clearly from interviews with 
members of this community. This could be because they are the ones living the situation. 
Moreover, Leila is from the community that has already resettled, which could be why she is 
in favour of resettlement. As mentioned, most interviewed from the other two communities 
studied were less favourable towards resettlements, which I will discuss later. First, I explore 
the type of resettlement preferred, permanent or temporary. 
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5.2.2 Permanent or Temporary? 
 
 Similar to the distinction in the literature outlined in Chapter 2 (Tadgell et al., 2018), 
there is a distinction in the data between permanent and temporary resettlement. Permanent 
resettlement is where one moves out of an area of settlement to settle elsewhere, with no 
intention of returning, and temporary involves a return to settle in the previous area (Bell and 
Ward, 2000). Permanent resettlement is often referred to as resettlement, sometimes 
relocation. Whereas temporary resettlement can be referred to by a wider variety of terms: 
resettlement, relocation, displacement, shifting, and even evacuation. Deliberations over 
whether resettlement needs to be permanent or temporary occurs mostly when assessing 
how resettlement should be managed. This is mainly the concern of those involved in the 
‘management’ of resettlement: those in NGOs and government. Therefore, it is their views 
that I draw on below. 
 
Permanent resettlement is how resettlement has traditionally been discussed and is 
often the first connotation attached to resettlement. Four Government and NGO respondents 
interviewed, such as NGO employee Arthur, view resettlement as permanent: 
 
Arthur (NGO, 2017): ‘resettlement is actually, leaving everything where you were and 
then starting a new life in the other area’.  
 
Arthur illustrates that he views resettlement as constituting a clear break from the previous 
area, which reiterates the view outlined above that there is no risk to a population if there is 
no population at all in a vulnerable area (Johnson, 2012). If government or NGOs are involved, 
resettlement can also be part of a desire to control a populations’ movements as the 
governing organisation is involved in moving a community permanently out of an area. This 
illustrates significant control over their movements. As I highlighted in the previous chapter, 
temporary movements already appear to be used to manage flooding by the communities 
but are often not accepted as sufficient by the government. Amongst other things that I will 
explore later, the fertility of the vulnerable area makes it hard for the members of rural 
communities to consider leaving permanently.  
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Nevertheless, as with the greater flexibility and openness to change apparent in the 
recent development discourse (Kindon et al., 2007), there is a growing flexibility attached to 
resettlement. Temporary forms of resettlement are also being considered by those in 
governance. In fact, temporary resettlement was much more popular with respondents, with 
12 of the 21 government and NGO participants stating temporary resettlement is a good 
solution, and two stating that both temporary and permanent is needed. The following 
discussion with Chikondi illustrates the move to consider temporary resettlement: 
 
Hebe (Researcher, 2017): ‘OK, but is the relocation that you are advocating for, is it a 
permanent resettlement? Or is it a temporary relocation for the flood season’.  
Chikondi (NGO, 2017): ‘It is both ways. There are some people that have settled in some 
areas that are very, very prone to disasters, which permanent relocation is ideal. And 
there are some who are located in areas whereby maybe the disasters can just be 
temporal, yeah, the floods can just be temporal, and those people are the ones that we 
advocate when they see the signs, the early signs. They can temporarily move to 
evacuation centres. So, it is both ways’. 
 
Here, Chikondi is highlighting that the context may make certain types of moves more 
appropriate. However, there is still some need for her to draw a distinction between a 
permanent and temporary move, with those being most affected requiring a permanent 
move out of the vulnerable area. This suggests that the chief concern for Chikondi is the safety 
of the vulnerable community, indicating her motivations behind the use of resettlement are 
altruistic (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). It is also interesting here that relocation is the term 
she prefers to use. As mentioned, relocation is more associated with a temporary movement 
as it does not incorporate the creation of a new settlement implied by the term 
‘resettlement’. However, she uses it to mean both a permanent and temporary move. This 
highlights the potential confusions over definition, and how the connotations of a word may 
not be the same for all actors involved.  
 
A more fluid perspective on the use of temporary and permanent resettlement is also 
apparent in the data. For example, NGO employee Samson: 
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Samson (NGO, 2017): ‘Of course, yes, in terms of dwelling houses, they need to move. In 
terms of farming they can still go and farm, because if they move as individuals still the 
land will be there. They can move to where they have resettled, go to the marshes, do 
their farming activities, go back home. So that when floods come, these people are safe, 
they are not vulnerable to floods’. 
 
Samson, like Chikondi, recognises that people need to move their ‘dwelling’ out of the 
vulnerable areas. Indeed, his use of ‘of course’ suggests this is very clear to him. However, he 
also allows for the need to return to the previous area to maintain a livelihood. It should be 
noted that the focus on the individual in this quote does not fit with the importance of 
community that is suggested in the community interviews, as I particularly highlighted when 
discussing the situation at village Mwalija in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, the need to return to 
the previous area, does coincide with the type of movement that many in the communities 
identify with and with the opinion of almost two thirds the government and NGO 
respondents. Indeed, the ability to still use the vulnerable land for cultivation is central to 
many residing in vulnerable communities studied, and occurs in the resettled community, 
Jombo. Samson, therefore, indicates an understanding of the priorities for those in 
communities, which suggests he appreciates their understandings in the resettlement 
process. 
 
Indeed, temporary resettlement, with access to the vulnerable area for farming is 
recognised by the national government as being the best compromise. It allows for the 
concerns of the community and for the concerns of those in governance to be addressed, as 
expressed by National Government DoDMA employee, Mtafu: 
 
Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘Yeah, I think that one [temporary resettlement] at least the 
reluctance would be lower, because you can say, ok I can still use this land while saying 
you should move upland just during the rainy season to save lives and property, but 
when the rains have gone maybe in March, you can come down and do your winter 
cropping because that is a critical thing for them to do and that is their livelihood. And 
maybe later you can say to move permanently away, but just to kind of maintain the 
buy in, to motivate them we can still be using this one, to say no you are still entitled to 
this land but just use it for the production of crops this and that, but invest in your 
permanent home, maybe upland or somewhere safe’. 
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Mtafu shows an appreciation for the community residents’ routine and livelihood. By 
suggesting that temporary resettlement would mean the ‘reluctance would be lower’, he 
highlights the importance of the community members being on board with the movement. 
Indeed, Stal (2011) has illustrated that a similar approach worked in Mozambique after their 
severe flooding in 2007, and that lack of consideration of the needs of those in the vulnerable 
communities, was the reason why the attempted resettlement did not work in Mozambique 
in 2001. 
 
Mtafu also suggests, however, that this temporary movement is a steppingstone to a 
more permanent move later, which he implies is his preference, but not the preference of the 
communities. This suggests that he thinks he knows what is best for the communities, the 
ramifications of which I will explore further in Chapter 6. Mtafu is part of national 
government, and therefore his opinion is influential. Indeed, this approach of initial 
temporary resettlement, as a way ‘to maintain the buy in’ to resettlement, appears to be 
growing in popularity and seems to be the future direction for resettlement in this area of 
Malawi. Such an approach indicates an appreciation for the concerns and understandings of 
those in the community. Although, whether this is just to facilitate the resettlement more 
easily with the hope of a permanent move later is unclear. If that is the case, it suggests a 
more manipulative motive for appreciating the concerns of the community. It echoes the 
work of Tadgell et al. (2018) who suggest that the focus should not be on whether 
resettlement is permanent, but rather how to make resettlement permanent. Here Mtafu is 
highlighting his position of authority and ‘greater knowledge’ by suggesting that temporary 
resettlement is the way in which to make resettlement permanent later. It does not 
necessarily fit with the idea that in order for resettlement to be successful it needs to be 
participatory (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015), as it shows there is some 
coercion involved. This suggests a form of governmentality, with the coercion of citizens for 
subject formation (Dean, 1999). This implies a perceived hierarchy of knowledge, that I will 
elaborate on in the next section on government structure.  There are also those who are less 
positive about any option of resettlement. 
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5.2.3 Resettlement as Unattainable 
 
 The process of resettlement involves many challenges, which leads some to feel it is 
unattainable for them or others. Most who speak of resettlement in this manner, are referring 
to the lack of resources that are required to undertake the resettlement. This framing is 
apparent in discussions with all actors involved. However, it occurs differently at the 
community level and the NGO and government level.  
 
On a community level the unattainable nature of resettlement is often associated with 
individual and community level poverty, which is prevalent in this region of Malawi. Six of the 
community respondents spoke specifically of the need of more resources in order to resettle.  
Martha illustrates the predicament faced by many in her community: 
 
Martha (Mwalija 2017): ‘I am not sure about what will happen because we are still living 
at a flood prone area and we do not have resources or a way to get resources so we can 
move out of a flood prone area, so we are at risk. We are still clinging to the area, yet it 
is because we lack resources.’ 
 
Martha’s focus is on the lack of resources. She implies that this is trapping her into a particular 
area. This echoes the immobility paradox discussed in the Chapter 2: those most vulnerable 
to climate change are the least able to move out of vulnerable areas (Findlay, 2011). The 
immobility paradox portrays populations as trapped by their lack of resources and allows little 
agency to these vulnerable populations. However, the lack of resources is not the only aspect 
that is preventing the resettlement for those at village Mwalija, as I illustrated in Chapter 4, 
with the flooding water inhibiting movement, and as I will develop further in Chapter 6. The 
immobility paradox also brings in understandings of the cycle of deprivation (Findlay, 2011) 
which comes out of some community interviews.  
 
 Resettlement is seen as unattainable by some in communities due to the cycle of 
deprivation they experience (Findlay, 2011). Linked to the idea of the immobility paradox, is 
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the idea that due to flooding, the resources required to move become harder and harder to 
obtain (Findlay, 2011). Jacob describes this succinctly: 
 
Jacob (Mwalija 2017): ‘we will still be suffering because even when we plant, our crops 
are washed away and we tried this year to do some replanting, to take use of the 
residual moisture, but we do not produce much, we didn’t harvest much, which means 
we are still going backwards, which means we do not see ourselves as getting money, 
which we can use to buy the materials which can help us relocate or resettle somewhere, 
which means we will continue suffering’. 
 
Jacob’s continuous use of ‘which means’ highlights the interconnected nature of their 
poverty. The continual washing away of their crops makes it impossible for them to save and 
resettle. This was a point that only came out of discussions with those from Mwalija. This 
could be because they were deciding whether to move and accept the NGO assistance with 
this.  
 
The lack of resources is also seen to make resettlement unattainable by those in the 
government and NGOs. However, it is not discussed in the same manner as for the immobility 
paradox. The lack of resources is focused at the government level, not the individual or 
community level. Four of the 21 government and NGO interviews mention this. The emphasis 
is on the dependency on donor aid and the implications this can bring. For example, local 
government disaster officer, Keith says: 
 
Keith (Government 2017): ‘It is a question of, you know, provision of social amenities. 
Because you know we are overstretched in terms of resources. So, if of course we tell 
those people, the issue is if we move up there, how are you going to provide education 
facilities, health facilities, even water supply. Yeah so those are the issue which we get 
as feedback, when are you going to give us these social amenities, so we can move. ... 
That is why I am saying we are constrained by financial resources.’ 
 
Keith’s focus is on social amenities. He is acknowledging that the government is obliged to 
provide the social amenities required and make the resettlement successful. Indeed, Stal 
(2011) highlights how, in Mozambique, when resettlement was attempted after severe 
flooding in 2001, without adequate provision of social amenities, it did not work, and people 
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returned to their flood vulnerable area. Whereas, the resettlement after severe flooding in 
Mozambique in 2007 was more successful because of better understandings and provisions 
of what the communities required (Stal, 2011). Yet, Keith highlights how, in the case of 
Malawi, the government is often ill equipped to fulfil this obligation. When discussing this, 
however, the blame is not placed on him, as a local government employee, or, indeed, on the 
local government itself, rather, Keith talks of being ‘constrained by financial resources’. At no 
point in the interview does he discuss what could help with this. It is as if there is some 
external factor that is in charge of supplying the financial resources. This infers that funds are 
not making their way through the decentralisation process, highlighted in the introduction 
(Jagero et al., 2014), or just that there is a lack of funds in government. Therefore, the chain 
of responsibility and the blame for these resources goes higher. This could suggest a 
dependency on donor aid, which was raised in the previous chapter’s discussions of 
responsibility, and which other scholars have recognised as an issue in Malawi (Šakić Trogrlić 
et al., 2018). This reliance on external assistance also resonates with the findings of Manda 
(2014) about the lack of strength of government, particularly due to resources, and the 
detriment this can have on disaster risk reduction. Thus, the lack of government resources 
raise questions as to whether resettlement would even be helpful as a strategy to managing 
flooding. 
 
5.2.4 Resettlement as Unhelpful 
 
Finally, there is the view that resettlement is actively unhelpful in reducing the impact 
of flooding. Resettlement can be viewed as unhelpful if there are not enough resources 
available to make it successful, as discussed above. It can also be viewed as unhelpful due to 
the need to officially change the place of permanent residency, even if time is spent between 
two residences. The discussion of resettlement as unhelpful mainly occurs at the community 
level, as it is chiefly about the nuances involved within community identity. However, there 
are some at the NGO level that appreciate these nuances and discuss them also. 
 
 148 
Some people in communities do not want to be labelled with the official status of 
being resettled. As Sophia suggests this is connected to the idea that resettlement is 
permanent and requires a formal change in residence, which entails complications.  
 
Sofia (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘I don’t entertain issues of resettlement, even if the 
government says it may be providing social amenities to that area which we should 
resettle. I am not interested because here [TA Ndamera] we only stay two to three 
months and then we go back. So, to me, Nyachikadza is my place, I don’t want to 
resettle.’ 
 
It appears that Sofia believes that to resettle, a person has to be physically cut off from their 
current home area and due to this, their identity. Three quarters of respondents from 
Nyachikadza directly illustrated similar strong attachments to Nyachikadza. The fact that 
spending two to three months in the upper land is not viewed as a form of resettlement 
highlights the multiple perspective on resettlement, as this could be defined as a temporary 
form of resettlement (Johnson, 2012). However, the organic, informal nature of the 
movement prevents it from taking that label. This again sets up the difference between 
Resettlement and resettlement outlined in the Chapter 4.  
 
Thus, what is of importance is the official movement and change of identity that is 
associated with Resettlement. Yosef reiterates this:  
 
Yosef (Nyachikadza 2017): ‘I don’t want to lose the status that I am somebody from 
Nyachikadza, because when I come here people will be confusing that I am a person 
from Ndamera [the area in the upper land that they relocate to]’.  
 
His Nyachikadza status is crucial to Yosef, the status is connected to access to his land and for 
many in Nyachikadza, land is their most prised possession. For Sofia and Yosef, as for the all 
those interviewed from Nyachikadza, resettlement means changing their status to belonging 
to the upper land. At least two thirds of those interviewed from Nyachikadza actively did not 
want to change their status. This is unsurprising as I was made aware by district government 
officials, such as my two translator and seven of the NGO and government officials 
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interviewed that this is the community that is publicly known to be unwilling to resettle. It 
reiterates statements from the previous chapter, which highlighted the importance of this 
community’s attachment to place (Raymond et al., 2010a). However, as I also have 
established, moving to the upper land for two to three months, which many Nyachikadza 
residence undertake to avoid flooding, is considered by some in NGOs and government as a 
form of temporary resettlement. This again highlights the difference seen between official 
Resettlement, and informal community-led resettlement. 
 
There is a mismatch of perceptions of resettlement and what it entails. One NGO 
employee, Anthony, argued that this miscommunication of what resettlement is may hinder 
its helpfulness. He highlighted how there may be challenges in changing people’s perception 
of what resettlement is: 
 
Anthony (NGO, 2017): ‘It [resettlement] is viable, but at the same time we were looking 
at people that in terms of their economic status, having two houses is not as simple as 
it sounds, so OK, they can build a permanent house in the upper land and go down to 
the lower land for farming and the like but I think the problem with that, now the people 
giving away the land they don’t see the need to, because you are giving away land to 
someone who will end up having two houses so I think, having another house, or another 
type of shelter where we are saying you should move. So, I think the way of maybe 
compromising I am talking about, is they can have that land where they have the 
housing and yeah, they can have even the farming land, but it shouldn’t be a place where 
they have shelter there, a proper house there.’ 
 
Here, Anthony emphasises how obtaining land for a second house could be problematic. If 
resettlement is to occur with the help of the government and NGOs, it would most likely 
involve a negotiation for a second area of land. Yet there is limited land in Malawi, with most 
land belonging collectively to a community. It is therefore hard to argue the case for one 
community to give up some land for another community to use for their second homes. This 
is a practical consideration of how realistic resettlement is. Anthony was the only respondent 
to bring this up and this may be because many people do have two forms of housing, but this 
appears to have happened organically and gradually, with more and more acquiring two 
forms of shelter. This form of acquiring land for a second home has not been the product of 
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an organised resettlement established by the government, which suggests that currently, 
particularly when there is inadequate communication, resettlement is achieved more easily 
when independent of external involvement. It connects to the situation at Jombo where land 
was found for the community formally and they still face problems over this land two years 
on from the resettlement.  
 
 This section highlights how the notion of resettlement in Malawi currently is confused. 
There are many ways that resettlement can be seen as useful to managing flooding as well as 
a hindrance. Much of this is because resettlement is a relatively new approach to managing 
flooding. This was established in the previous chapter and is apparent in the fact that the 
official policy for resettlement is still under consideration and yet to be released. Six of the 21 
government and NGO participants specifically comment on the novelty of resettlement, with 
four of these being the most influential national and local government officials interviewed. 
NGO worker Kenneth provides a relevant summary of the how the interest in disaster 
management evolved: 
 
Kenneth (NGO, 2017): ‘if you go back, in the early 1990s, the main issue was HIV and 
AIDS, from there, there was the issue of food security, but now I think the issue of 
disaster is one of the main priorities of the government and NGO community’.  
 
Thus, it is only recently that there has been an interest in disasters and in resettlement in 
particular. Changing one’s settlement, even just for a few months a year, is complicated and 
it is unsurprising that there are multiple views on the potential success and use of 
resettlement. There also appear to be a variety of motivations for resettlement, most appear 
to be altruistic in nature although there are more economic and population controlling 
motivations visible (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019, Arnall, 2018). The data suggests that those in 
national government perhaps have more of an agenda in trying to control the populations 
movements than those in NGOs, this is unsurprising as they are more directly involved in 
determining how to manage resettlement. Potentially highlighting a form of  
governmentality, as government may want to manage resettlement to ensure control over a 
population’s movements (Death, 2013). 
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It is unsurprising that different actors view resettlement differently depending on 
their involvement with resettlement, whether they are managing or undertaking it. This 
highlights the importance of who is seen as a ‘manager’ and an ‘undertaker’. Indeed, the very 
fact that two factions: manager and undertaker, come out is interesting in itself, as it signifies 
a hierarchy and difference in the process, which I suggested in the discussion of responsibility 
in the previous chapter. It connects to power dynamics present in development, with Western 
NGOs, particularly large organisations like the World Bank, viewed as more knowledgeable 
than those in vulnerable communities, potentially of those in government (Goldman, 2004, 
Ferguson, 1994, Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Escobar, 2011, Li, 2007). I explore this further in the 
next section, where I analyse how Malawi’s government currently tries to unify the confusion 
over resettlement through their disaster governance structure, and the implications this 
involves. 
 
5.3 Malawi’s Disaster Governance Structure 
 
 As I established above and in the previous chapter, resettlement is increasingly seen 
as a way to manage flooding. However, whilst the resettlement policy is being developed, 
there is as yet no specific policy for resettlement. Instead it falls within flood management, 
which is part of disaster risk management in the official structure of the Malawian 
government (Government of Malawi, 2015b). In order to better understand the resettlement 
process in Malawi at the time of research, it is important to appreciate the structure into 
which its governance falls. The governance structure under discussion is part of broader 
disaster risk management and not specific to resettlement. This is significant when 
understanding the rationale behind it, as it is set up to manage all disaster related issues.  
Resettlement fits within three of the six priority areas of the DRM Policy. These are: the 
promotion of a culture of safety, and adoption of resilience-enhancing interventions; the 
reduction of underlying risks; and the strengthening preparedness capacity for effective 
response and recovery (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 5). The DRM Policy was directly 
referred to sparsely in the interviews, however, the relevance of the governance structure 
came out in over half of all the interviews. Throughout this section many of the quotes refer 
to the resettlement process, as this was the focus of the interviews, but the emphasis in this 
section is on what the data is suggesting about the structure of governance more specifically. 
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The structure shows how actors are positioned in terms of their official governance 
responsibility and importance. This highlights where power is allocated in determining the 
process of resettlement. Thus, in this section I explore the implications of the governance 
structure, as well as opening up the tension between official structure and practice, and the 
disconnect between actors. The tensions highlighted impacts people’s trust of the 
government, which is explored in the final subsection and is influential in the next chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Official Governance Structure of Disasters 
 
 The official governance structure of disasters was articulated in three quarters of the 
interviews with those in government and NGOs. It is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5.1. 
This diagram was shown unprompted in the interviews several times by government officials 
working on disaster management. It is freely available in the 2015 DRM Policy, available here: 
https://www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/43755_malawidrmpolicy2015.pdf. The readiness and 
eagerness to show this diagram arguably illustrates the pride felt about the disaster 
management structure by government employees.  
 
The structure is made up of several committees. The top part of Figure 5.1, up until 
the District Civil Protection Committee (DCPC), are the centralised committees that are based 
in the capital, Lilongwe. From the DCPC onwards are the local committees, dependent on the 
specific district, area (traditional authority, TA) and village. The TA and village level have 
customary leadership, whereas those at the district level are run by local government. The 
committee structure is part of facilitating the decentralisation process in Malawi, enabling 
the local government to have increasing influence in determining their district’s priorities 
(Jagero et al., 2014). Many from the interviews highlight the importance of the local 
committees in facilitating communication and the full participation of those involved. 
 
The linear set up of the diagram, suggests a hierarchy to the system. The cabinet is at 
the top. The technical sub-committees all appear on the same level, however, below them, 
from the district level downwards, the committees seem to be separated from the top by the 
technical sub-committees. This hierarchy can be seen in the way the structure is discussed by 
government. This hierarchy provides a basis for the perceived hierarchy to knowledge 
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discussed and explained further throughout the Results and visible in Figure 5.2. I 
purposefully place Figure 5.2, illustrating the perceived hierarchy of knowledge next to the 
committee structure to highlight how they may be connected. The key difference is that the 
disaster management structure has two-way arrows to suggest that communication flows 
both ways and participation is aimed for. This does come out from the interviews, as I explore 
below. Indeed, the committee structure does not appear to happen in practice exactly as it is 
set out in Figure 5.1. I will endeavour to show in the remainder of the Results how this is the 
case and the potential implications of this.
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Figure 5. 1 Malawi’s National Disaster Risk Management Institutional 
Structure. Source – Malawi’s Disaster Risk Management Policy, 2015, P10 
available: https://www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/43755_malawidrmpolicy2015.pdf  
Figure 5. 2 Perceived hierarchy of knowledge in 
the resettlement process 
i. Formed through my research analysis 
Large International Donors (e.g. The World Bank) 
Smaller NGOs  
National Government 
Flooding-Vulnerable Communities 
Local Government 
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The official structure of the governance of disasters is split between centralised 
aspects of governance and newly decentralised aspects of governance. Nearly half of the 
participants from government and NGOs commented on the importance or utility of the 
committee structure. A full description of the structure can be found in pages 10-11 of the 
2015 DRM policy (Government of Malawi, 2015b), however in this section I am more 
interested in illustrating how the structure is viewed by the participants. Mtafu, a national 
DoDMA (Department of Disaster Management Affairs) government official, highlights well 
the central government stance on the structure: 
 
Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘We have the national disaster risk management 
institutional structure. So, it is starting with cabinet, ministers and the like, then we have 
a committee made up of permanent secretaries, we call them principle secretaries here. 
Then below it we have a technical committee, then within it we have the technical sub-
committees, some of these sub-committees are also functioning as clusters, you know 
like the UN, like the way we have clusters you know water, sanitation, hygiene, 
education and the like. …  
We have local structures, committees, so we have the village head, the village civil 
protection committee, the area civil protection committee, so these are the structures 
that are already there. So, they take up these issues [about disasters risk reduction] and 
they take them to the district council. Normally for us, we are at the central, the 
headquarters here [Lilongwe]. So, it is more like policy, guidance and the like. Because 
of the challenges of resources at that district council level, that is why maybe some 
cases, we are still handling some cases from this office, from the central, but ideally with 
the decentralisation that is happening we are supposed to, these councils are supposed 
to be fully equipped with resources to manage’ 
 
Mtafu’s expansion of the diagram above highlights subtle clues in how he, in his position in 
DoDMA, central government, views this structure. Firstly, his acknowledgement that ‘we call 
them principle secretaries here’ implies that this structure is based on a more general 
structure, which is elaborated further when he refers to how their technical sub-committees 
are ‘like the clusters in the UN’. It becomes clear that this is a structure taken from an external 
international organisation, the UN, suggesting an international influence. This is not that 
surprising as the development of the 2015 DRM policy was funded by UNDP (Government of 
Malawi, 2015b). It highlights the infiltration of Western, technocratic understandings into 
Malawian disaster management. Mtafu’s reference to it also suggests that he is proud of it, 
and that it gives Malawi’s structure greater legitimacy to me, the Western interviewer. This 
 156 
highlights how the top form of knowledge in the perceived hierarchy of knowledge is sourced 
from large international organisations, such as the UN and the World Bank, as represented in 
Figure 5.2. However, it also shows how these technocratic forms of governance can mix with 
Malawian understandings through the decentralisation process and the attempt to 
incorporate village level views. This reiterates the fluidity of knowledge (Raymond et al., 
2010b) as well as the different scales that knowledge can work through. I will nuance this 
further in Chapter 6.  
 
Secondly, Mtafu highlights issues with the decentralised aspect of governance. Mtafu 
illustrates how this structure builds on customary structures ‘already there’ showing how the 
government includes local forms of governance. However, despite this being the key part of 
the structure discussed in the interviews, it appears to be the aspect Mtafu is least happy 
with. It could suggest that he views those at the district level as inferior, reiterating the 
hierarchy suggested by the diagram in Figure 5.1 and set out in the hierarchy of knowledge in 
Figure 5.2. Or it may just be referring to the lack of resources available at this level, which was 
also commented on by the two local disaster officers interviewed. The different forms of 
governance, both central and local, present in the structure, highlight the potential for 
contrasting opinions on the process of resettlement. Moreover, the committee structure 
seems to allow for different opinions to be made in different committees, but it is unclear 
exactly how well these opinions are communicated to and received by the other committees.  
 
 Crucial to the success of this structure, therefore, is the flow of communication and 
the perceived accurate representation of those involved. The initial fabric (the disaster 
governance structure) of the resettlement process, with the inclusion of multiple committees 
of various actors, suggests that different knowledges are allowed for (Government of Malawi, 
2015b). I will discuss whether and how this occurs in practice throughout the Results. The 
DRM 2015 policy sets out that the structure is designed to facilitate a chain of communication 
between those in the villages all the way to those in the cabinet (Government of Malawi, 
2015b). It illustrates how participation is implicit in the resettlement process, despite no 
participants specifically stating it, participation is de rigour in development practices and is 
expected as the norm in a country reliant on donor aid (Mohan, 2007). The aim of this thesis 
is to explore how apparent participation is in the resettlement process understudy in Malawi. 
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This will be particularly relevant for the next chapter. However, despite what is suggested by 
the two way arrows in Figure 5.1, a quarter of the NGO and government respondents spoke 
of the flow of communication as one directional, top down. This is highlighted by local 
government disaster officer Keith: 
 
Keith (Government, 2017): ‘These structures [civil protection committees] tend to work 
hand in hand. So, we coordinate those structures and brief them and this time we have 
resources from department of disaster management affairs to go down and brief these 
structures about the weather pattern.’ 
 
Keith shows that the way he views the flow of information is from the top ‘down’ to the 
‘structures’, to inform them about the upcoming weather patterns.  This highlights the way 
he views the role of these structures: to allow for easier communication to those in the 
villages. It is a top-down measure. This suggests that the structure could be a technique of 
governance to ensure government control and management of the population, illustrating 
the fourth key foci of governmentality (population control) as set out by Dean (1999) and 
Death (2013) independently. However, there is little about the importance of hearing the 
views of those in the villages, which is significant given that Keith is a local government 
disaster officer, and so is in the middle of the chain of communication. It is also what other 
scholars have found as important in disaster management (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). Keith 
should, technically, be perfectly poised for hearing the views of those in the villages and 
communicating them to the national government. Yet he does not suggest this. Whilst this 
was explicit in a quarter of the government and NGO interviews, there was only one direct 
contradiction to this, in which a national red cross officer highlighted how the process worked 
both ways. This is a key reason why there is only one direction in the perceived hierarchy of 
knowledge represented in Figure 5.2.  
 
Despite the unidirectional flow of information, two of the 49 community members 
interviewed appear happy with how the committees work. Samuel, community member from 
Nyachikadza highlights how he views the role of the committees: 
 
Samuel (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘We have a very good chain, from my side we receive a 
report from council directly, even my phone, the boss has my phone, not only phone, we 
have all information address and so on. If they hear some new message there, we have 
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the information. They try to sensitise us, and we take that information and give to VCPC 
[village civil protection committee] members. We have climate change, meteorological 
message, on the phone, not only me but all the members of the committee on the phone, 
on the office as well as council. Each and everything happening we must have the chain.’ 
 
Samuel shows how he uses the committees, in this case particularly the VCPC to spread early 
warning information to those who need it. Indeed, the effectiveness of this, through the use 
of technology, such as mobile phones, causes Samuel to proclaim it is a ‘very good chain of 
communication’. Two other community members mentioned the use of phones in spreading 
information through the committee system. However, again there is a sense that the 
information is coming to them, and they are not providing information the other way. He 
refers to ‘the boss’, implying they are the authority in this situation. This perpetuates the 
difference in knowledge implied by the structure: those in government have the knowledge 
needed by those in the villages, as indicated in the perceived hierarchy of knowledge, Figure 
5.2. This sets up a dependency on the government for the information, and the sharing of the 
information, perpetuating the top-down approach to governance. Therefore, whilst the 
structure may allow for different knowledges, it also accentuates the differences between 
them and appears to impose a hierarchy on them.  
 
This perceived hierarchy of knowledge by those in government and NGOs, set out in 
Figure 5.2, suggests that large international organisations and donors are on top, due to their 
control of the funding. The government is below, followed by local government and smaller 
NGOs, which in this case incorporates country offices of international NGOs. The NGOs can 
be influenced directly by larger international organisations and donors, due to the funding 
possibilities they provide, therefore there is an arrow connecting the international 
organisations and donors to NGOs. The vulnerable communities are at the bottom. This 
corresponds to discussions in development over the power dynamics of those assisting the 
vulnerable communities (Escobar, 2011). The very fact that a community is seen as vulnerable 
means they are viewed as unable to deal with a situation on their own and require assistance 
(Li, 2007, Adger, 2006) linking in with the discussion in the responsibility section of the 
previous chapter. If the government or an NGO is able to provide that assistance, this can 
make them appear as more capable, putting them high up the hierarchy, see Figure 5.2. As 
Li’s (2007) work highlighted this assistance is meant improve the community, with those 
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assisting in charge of the improvement. There is much discussion about this in the 
development literature (Goldman, 2004, Ferguson, 1994, Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Escobar, 
2011, Li, 2007), which is mainly referring to international involvement. Yet, it is also relevant 
when discussing the government’s involvement as well. It suggests that the government 
needs to provide the dominant narrative, a key aspect of governmentality (Death, 2013, Dean, 
1999). As I will highlight further below and in Chapter 6, this hierarchy does not produce the 
inclusive atmosphere necessary in voluntary resettlement, advocated for in the resettlement 
guidelines (Wilmsen and Rogers, 2019).  
 
Despite the suggested top down nature of the structure, the four key national (from 
DoDMA and the Ministry of Housing) and local (Disaster Officers) government employees 
suggest that the governance structure provides the representation required for successful 
resettlement. This is also apparent in the 2015 DRM policy’s description of the committee 
structure, which emphasises how the many committees allows all sectors and stakeholders 
to be actively involved in the process (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 11). Local government 
disaster officer Charles, explains the levels of representation involved: 
 
Charles (Government, 2017): ‘We make sure that all the relevant community 
representatives should be part and parcel of the committee, like the business 
representatives, the community policy forum representative, umm youth 
representative, red cross volunteer, the primary school advisor in that particular 
community, agricultural development officer or extension worker, the health 
surveillance assistance ought to be part of that particular committee and even the water 
monitoring assistance, social welfare assistance, um there are many, there are many, 
normally they are part and parcel of the civil protection committee at tier level.’ 
 
Charles illustrates all the different representatives that make up the civil protection 
committee. He is thinking on the spot and the emphasis he places on the variety involved is 
evident. It suggests that at government level they feel they are, or at least they should be, 
widely representing the communities. Additionally, much of the discussion has been about 
the relationship between government and communities with little talk about NGO actors, yet 
Charles indicates that NGO workers are involved: 
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Charles (Government, 2017): ‘most of the extension workers are part and parcel of such 
committees, … and even the volunteers, the red cross volunteers, are also part and 
parcel of the committees’.  
 
Extension workers here refers to anyone involved outside of government and the 
communities, he stresses that this includes volunteers. This is interesting because it implies it 
is unnecessary to be an official employee of an NGO for an opinion to be valued in this 
structure. The inclusion of NGOs within the committees was apparent in two NGO interviews. 
Yet, the governance structure is not commented on much by those in NGOs apart from the 
frustration some feel towards the inefficiency of government to fulfil their role and provide 
adequate guidance to NGOs, to be discussed later. There are also those in the communities 
that do feel less appreciative of the current structure. 
 
A fifth of all the community members interviewed directly referred to the inadequate 
representation they felt in the governance structure, and half of these commented on the 
lack of appreciation of the power dynamics within communities. Apart from the two 
community members that praised the committee structure, the remaining community 
members commented on the use of committees in an indifferent manner, highlighting the 
lack of influence and reach these committees held in the communities. Jombo community 
member, Phillip explains how he felt about the committee structure: 
 
Phillip (Focus Group, Jombo, 2017): ‘Everything was left in the hands of the VCPC [village 
civil protection committee] where none here is a member. We had nobody to represent 
us at that forum’.  
 
He is part of the resettled community at Jombo, which is meant to be integrated into a host 
community, but which they feel they have little representation in. The lack of representation 
felt by some raises questions into whose agenda is being followed, as they clearly feel it is not 
theirs. Nyachikadza resident, Kelvin explains how differing agendas within the structure foster 
problems: 
 
Kelvin (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘We [the people of Nyachikadza] are able to communicate 
with the NGOs or the government through traditional leaders, so if government wants 
something or NGOs wants something they pass it through the traditional leaders, chiefs, 
community structures like committees within our community and pass the message to 
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the community and then the feedback goes the following way. … That is not the best 
way to communicate because these chiefs do have more power in their communities, so 
they just take whatever they want. So, the best way is that there are some committees 
at the gvh [village] level, like civil protection committee, it would be proper if our issues 
relating disaster management would pass through the VCPC and the ACPC and the TA 
[area chief] just advises and is not a member.’ 
 
Kelvin illustrates how including chiefs in the committees is problematic. Interestingly, Kelvin 
does discuss feedback going ‘the following way’ along the chain of communication, which was 
not clear from many of the interviews, as discussed above. Although, the lack of focus on this 
could suggest he does not attach much importance to it. Kelvin’s focus is that the chiefs in the 
committees have an agenda, which may not represent the rest of the community. This 
suggests there is mistrust of those in positions of power: that they may not use their power 
for the good of their subjects, but for the good of themselves. This resonates with the findings 
of Ferguson (1994) who suggested that the involvement of the IMF in Lesotho, was primarily 
to further the capitalist system, which may or may not assist the vulnerable population. This 
finding has been echoed in various ways in the literature several times since 1994 (Briggs and 
Sharp, 2004, Scott, 2008, Goldman, 2004). In this instance, the issue of mistrust highlights 
how there is a difference between what the official structure is meant to implement and what 
happens in practice. This is particularly due to the ambitious attempt to include multiple 
different actors and knowledges in the structure, despite a hierarchy of knowledge, which is 
not openly acknowledged or fully allowed for in the structure. I explore the mismatch and the 
mistrust further below.   
 
5.3.2 Mismatch Between Official Structure and Practice  
 
 In the first subsection, I explored the parameters of the official governance structure 
of disaster management, and the use of committees at varying levels as a key governance 
technique. However, there appears to be a mismatch between what the official structure sets 
out to facilitate and what happens in practice. Much of this is associated with a feeling of ill-
representation, discussed above, and lack of understanding between those in communities 
and those in government and NGOs. Much of the narrative that highlights this is centred on 
resettlement, as the questions were focused on this. However, in this section the purpose of 
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the quotes is to illuminate the mismatch between structure and practice and not to infer 
specifically about the resettlement process. This mismatch is mainly seen in the relationship 
between those in government and those in communities, but it also occurs between those in 
communities and NGOs. It reiterates the disconnect between these actors, suggested in the 
previous chapter.  
 
 The interviews suggested that there was a disconnect between those in government 
and those in the communities. Within each community there is one particular issue where 
confusion was presented. At Jombo, it was the issue of whether they belonged under their 
previous or current village head. This was mentioned by at least half those interviewed from 
Jombo and means that they can slip through the structure and not be represented by either 
village’s civil protection committee. I explain this further in the next chapter. Those at village 
Mwalija illustrate how communication has broken down between them and the NGO that is 
meant to be assisting them. Protocol dictates that this NGO should go through the committee 
structure, but this does not appear to be working. I elaborate on that example in this section. 
Finally, in Nyachikadza there is the issue of the no-go zone and the government technically 
not recognising Nyachikadza excepts when it suits them, as I expand on below. Gloria 
synthesis a common sentiment to come out of all of these situations: 
 
Gloria (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘they are failing to understand, government is failing to 
understand them, and they are failing to understand government’.  
 
Interestingly Gloria puts the failing of understanding on both parties involved: the 
government and those in the communities, not allocating blame. Gloria’s view does suggest 
however, that there is miscommunication occurring and that the governance structure is not 
working as planned. Gloria is from Nyachikadza, the community that opposes the 
government’s persistent calls for them to resettle. Thus, it is unsurprising that this 
relationship comes across as discordant. In the next chapter, I will explore further how the 
Nyachikadza community resist government. 
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The particular relationship between those in government and those in TA Nyachikadza 
is complicated further by the contradicting behaviour expressed by the government. This is 
explained by Peter who is the only Nyachikadza interviewee to mention it: 
 
Peter (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘it seems those NGOs whilst they do take on whatever the 
people of Nyachikadza want, they don’t deliver. On top of that it seems that even 
government says that NGOs should not go that side to the people of Nyachikadza with 
social service for this side. It seems somehow tricky cos when it comes to election time 
that is when the government follows the people of Nyachikadza to Nyachikadza for their 
votes.’ 
 
Peter highlights that whilst the government declares that Nyachikadza is a no-go zone in 
terms of aid, when it comes to the elections, the government is willing to come to their area. 
This is not specifically with reference to the structure of disaster governance, however, it is 
related and does deliver a conflicting message to the people of Nyachikadza. The government 
involvement at election time suggests that the government are just engaging with them to 
further their own interests. Peter implies they are left feeling disrespectful to the 
government. Whilst no other interviewee mentioned this, I was made aware of it informally 
by an NGO employee in Nsanje after an interview, he was discussing the difficulties and 
hypocrisies of the no-go zone but did not want them officially recorded. Nyachikadza is not 
the only community to suggest an inharmonious relationship with external influencers. 
 
 Over a quarter of those interviewed at Village Mwalija exhibited frustration at waiting 
for Bongo to return. Two community members took this frustration further to suggest a lack 
of consultation with the community, particularly before the government and NGO decided 
the new place for resettlement, which led to funds being misspent. In an environment where 
funds are limited, misspending is particularly frustrating. Community member, Jacob, 
elaborates: 
 
Jacob (Mwalija, 2017): ‘Those NGOs that want to help here should also be coming here 
to ask for our views instead of maybe making their plans at a district level and then come 
here to drill the boreholes at this place and this place, but we would prefer those should 
be coming here and say where should we drill boreholes? So, the community here, the 
ACPC, DCPC, should be sitting down and making that decision.’ 
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Jacob highlights the lack of respect that develops from undertaking a procedure without the 
consultation of the village members through the channels set out in the disaster governance 
structure. He shows his frustration by saying what the NGOs should do or what they, the 
community members, would prefer them to do. The fact that he has ideas of how NGOs 
should behave and the lack of consultation he feels they received prior to the procedure, 
again raises questions over how different knowledges are perceived and prioritised. Jacob’s 
comments suggest that the views and knowledge of those in communities is not respected or 
seen as relevant in the disaster governance structure and consequently the resettlement 
process. This reiterates the hierarchy of knowledge, previously discussed, and how those in 
NGOs can be seen as more knowledgeable, the improvers (Li, 2007). However, the other side 
of this situation, seen from the NGO involved suggests the miscommunication is the fault of 
the community. 
 
 The NGO involved with village Mwalija suggests there is a high level of consultation 
with those in the community, which does not come out from the community interviews. This 
raises questions as to why there are contrasting opinions. Jake shows the NGO opinion on 
how the process of communication with village Mwalija works: 
 
Jake (NGO, 2017): ‘During all these forums we had the councillor, we had the TA, we had 
the chief of the village, and us despite we are here in Blantyre but there is an assembly 
[council], Chikwawa district assembly, which we are working with, and then the link 
between the community, and the assembly and us is [the disaster officer] and also 
maybe this is a long chain but there, there is a ward councillor and also a chief who had 
all this information to say once as a community you are ready about these issues a TA is 
there, we are waiting for you. … and from there if the old councillor is not giving them 
readily information is to go to the assembly, the Chikwawa district assembly, to say this 
is our position, we are decided. OK, and then we take it [the resettlement opinion], 
because we didn’t want to push, but now we wanted to give a platform for them to 
realise the dangers of the floods, that them themselves experienced and if this situation 
shall happen again, we shall be in a very big problem, with the climate change and all 
that.’ 
 
Jake is reiterating all the levels of communication available to those in the community and 
within the disaster governance structure. He is keen to point out the local level of 
communication, that of the ward councillor (village spokesperson), the TA (area chief), and 
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the district council. These points of contact between the NGO and the community appear to 
be those in leadership roles, which enables the power dynamics and ulterior agendas 
discussed earlier to be apparent. This calls into question the level of communication that 
occurs, as it is just with the key leaders, which is not addressing the issues with 
communication raised in the previous paragraphs. Jake is specifically referring to the 
community members letting his NGO know when they are ready to resettle. For according to 
the NGO, they were waiting on the community to let them know, and according to five of the 
16 interviewed from the community they were waiting on the NGO to come and help them 
resettle. This suggests a miscommunication between the NGO and the community members 
and the disaster governance structure not working as planned.  
 
Jake strongly advocates that the aim of the NGO is to let the community come to the 
decision themselves without interference. This shows a level of respect for local knowledge 
and understandings rare in other comments from local government officials and NGO 
employees. However, there is also a lack of acknowledgement of the agenda of key players 
involved. When so much power of communication is placed on a few key actors, such as the 
TA or ward councillor, it raises questions as to whether they may have reasons for disrupting 
the negotiations (Chiweza, 2007, Eggen, 2011). Indeed Eggen (2011) highlights how the 
parallel forms of indirect rule from chiefs and direct rule from the state has led to a dual state 
in Malawi, which is beneficial for those able to engage in both. However, it can also lead to a 
vacuum of governance particularly with regards to civil rights for vulnerable populations 
(Eggen, 2011). The complicated interplay of different knowledges is ill allowed for by the 
structure, and the problems this can bring, can also be seen by comments made by 
government officials. 
 
 There was a suggestion by a third of those in government and NGOs that the clash of 
different knowledges, scientific and local, can cause problems with the governing structures 
and led to mistrust. This was discussed in regard to early warning systems, as well as views 
on resettlement, particularly community’s reticence to resettle. Local government disaster 
officer, Charles illustrates this at length: 
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Charles (Government, 2017): ‘something that I may specifically put forward to you, these 
communities have got their own indigenous knowledge, and their institutional memory 
was something like against what had been forecasted by Met [Meteorological Office of 
Malawi]. In the sense that, when Met had forecasted … that possible from November, 
December, January, we would receive maybe too much rainfall in the high region which 
may cause flooding in the low-lying areas, the communities thought it otherwise, 
according to their institutional memory to say, no, in Chikwawa, normally floods occur 
maybe March, not normally December, January as being put forward by the department 
of metrological services, so maybe it will be business as usual, they will lie again to us.  
Because initially the challenges we were experiencing, it was about even getting 
accurate information from the department of meteorological services, they would say 
tomorrow it will rain heavily, please carry the umbrellas, and the opposite would 
happen. So even the issue of trust, by the communities was not there but I would say 
since 2012,13,14 they have improved, whatever they happen to issue out as a weather 
bulleting, or a season forecast, it really happens as it has been forecasted.’ 
 
Charles shows how there can be a clash between local knowledge structures and the scientific 
knowledge. He explains how previous inaccurate reporting led to mistrust in the scientific 
information from the meteorological department and how this coupled with the information 
being contra to local knowledge led to people not adhering to the early warning forecasting 
for the severe 2015 floods. This highlights how for the governance structure to work there 
needs to be a degree of trust in all levels of the structure (Manda, 2014). Whilst it is possible 
to put an official structure in place, it cannot achieve its goals when there is a lack of trust, 
belief, or respect at any stage of the structure. This goes both ways and is not just a lack of 
trust, belief, or respect of government but also of those in NGOs and in communities. This is 
not always apparent. Kalanda-Joshua et al. (2011) found that the rural population in Mulanje, 
Malawi, were sceptical of the official forecasts because they did not include indigenous 
techniques of forecasting, indicating that they found a lack of trust at both the government 
level, with the lack of inclusion of indigenous methods, and at the community level, of the 
scientific forecasts. Indeed, the way that Charles juxtaposes the information from the Met 
Office with the ‘indigenous’ knowledge, suggests that he views them as producing different 
results, with the Met Office information ultimately being the one that should be viewed. Thus, 
he clearly distinguishes and prioritises knowledge, reiterating the perceived hierarchy to 
knowledge in this process.  
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5.3.3 Mistrust of the Governance Structure 
 
 The mistrust apparent in the data is mainly from the community members towards 
the government. There is a belief that the government disaster structure is in place to enable 
the government to fulfil their own agendas. This was discussed in relation to prospective 
resettlement and it is therefore only apparent within communities that have yet to resettle: 
Nyachikadza and Mwalija. Six respondents from these two communities spoke of specific 
suspicions. The key element of suspicion is over land. There is suspicion that the government 
wants to take their land and profit from it themselves, due to its fertility. Sofia sets this out 
clearly: 
 
Sofia (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘I am pessimistic of why the government wants us to 
relocate. I have some sense that the government wants to use our land for some other 
use. I do not know what, but I think government wants to use our area, because of 
maybe its fertility.’ 
 
Sofia highlights a vague mistrust of the government’s motives. She cannot specify her 
mistrust, which implies an overall disconnect with the government. It is clear she does not 
feel the government is on her side, that their priorities are not aligned. It also highlights the 
importance that some community members place on their land. The importance of land in 
many African societies has been extensively studied, especially with regard to ongoing land 
reforms (Boone, 2007). The land is the community’s livelihood and it is unsurprising there is 
protectiveness over it.  
 
The importance of land comes out strongly from 14 of the 49 community interviews. 
Shadreck, in the focus group discussions at Mwalija also shows an example of the kind of 
protectiveness discussed:  
 
Shadreck (Focus Group, Mwalija, 2017): ‘sometimes we feel that if organizations are 
telling us to move then they have got an interest on our land. Sometimes this is the 
reason the communities opt for shifting [temporary relocating for a short time] during 
rainy season rather than resettling’.  
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The protectiveness suggests that these communities have more of a connection to the land 
itself than to the government, which raises questions over feelings of identity and nationality.  
This quote also raises again the importance of definitions and perceptions of resettlement 
discussed above. Shadreck suggests there is a difference between shifting and resettling, 
particularly in terms of the permanency attached to it. Chiefly, this quote shows that these 
community members feel a strong connection to the land they inhabit, again reiterating the 
attachment to place apparent (Raymond et al., 2010a). Their connection to the land takes 
priority in their decisions, particularly over government advice. This could be due to the 
parallel forms of governance occurring with different priorities, or at least miscommunicated 
priorities and motivations for resettlement (Eggen, 2011). The customary forms of 
governance at the local level, in which the land is paramount, overrides the state government 
and could contribute to a disregard and disconnect to the state level of governance. It 
suggests that the current structure, or perceived knowledge hierarchy (see Figures 5.1 and 
5.2), do not allow for proper communication between actors. 
 
The connection to land can breed mistrust not only with the government but also with 
neighbours and multinational companies. This was apparent in four of interviews from 
Mwalija and Nyachikadza. Frances elaborates: 
 
Frances (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘there are rumours that if government locates us to upper-
lands. It wants this area to cultivate sugar cane. So, with that rumour people are 
resisting to relocate. So, for others that are willing to relocate, it is challenging for them 
to find a piece of land in TA Ndamera [neighbouring area] because people do take into 
account that these people have no-where to go so they charge a big price to acquire 
that land. So, if government could acquire that big land to say that whoever wants 
should only go there and build his house then people would change their mind and go 
to that place. But looking at Nyachikadza area no one should tamper with that land 
because it is our own land and if we move to the upland our cultivation would always be 
done in the low area. The land, which is here should be owned by us, no one should come 
there.’ 
 
Here Frances puts great emphasis on how they should be the only ones to have control over 
their land, reiterating this sentiment three times at the end of her statement. She not only 
highlights how the community suspects their neighbours to take advantage of their situation 
and charge more for land, implying that trust is community specific; but also, she highlights 
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how they suspect the government of collaborating with multinational companies to allow this 
area to be cultivated by sugar cane.  
 
The involvement of sugarcane companies also comes out from interviews with those 
from other communities. For example, Gina from Mwalija: 
 
Gina (Mwalija, 2017): ‘We wonder if we move, this land should be used for farming 
cultivation and we think that organisations like Illovo for sugar plantations, that is we 
fear, that Illovo will come and grab this land without discussing with us and start 
planting sugar cane.’ 
 
There is a growing Illovo sugar plantation in the same district as village Mwalija and the 
neighbouring district to TA Nyachikadza. Illovo is the largest African sugar company, founded 
in South Africa, with plantations in six African countries, and two within Malawi (Illovo, 2019). 
There are many stories of Illovo buying up land in this area. However, what Gina is suggesting 
is the ‘grabbing’ of land with no prior consultation. There thus is little trust in the system to 
manage land. There is currently ongoing land reform in Malawi, with the land law recently 
changed in 2016 to enable greater privatisation of land (The Government of Malawi, 2016). 
Again, this highlights the percolation of Western capitalist land understandings of property 
into local concepts of land. As established in Chapter 3, the largest national resettlement 
project in Malawi, the Community Based Rural Land Development Programme (CBRLDP), was 
set up between 2004 – 2011 by the World Bank, as a way to test how these concepts could 
work in Malawi (World Bank, 2013, Sharp et al., 2018). However, through an informal 
discussion during fieldwork in 2017 with the Senior Coordinator at LandNet, a leading charity 
trying to establish the Land Reforms, it became clear that whilst the Land Reforms may have 
been passed in 2016 there had not yet been imposed effectively and had not impacted the 
Lower Shire Region at the time of research. Yet, the turmoil and uncertainty of this situation 
can be seen in these quotes, there is a feeling of insecurity of community members’ positions 
with regards to resettling and ownership of their land, and a mistrust of what the 
government’s position and motivations really are. There is a real concern with the power 
dynamics involved as well as miscommunication occurring between NGOs and community 
members and government, as seen in previous quotes. 
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 In this section, I set out the ideal, official structure of governing disasters, where the 
governance of resettlement sits. This is meant to allow for the inclusion of all actors, yet it 
still perpetuates disparities between knowledge systems. This perceived knowledge hierarchy 
(see Figure 5.2) and its implications is a recurring theme throughout this research. Thus, there 
is a difference between the ideal disaster governance structure and current governance 
practice with regards to resettlement. This impacts community members’ trust and sense of 
identity. In this section I focused on the current government technique of managing 
resettlement: the disaster governance structure and its multiple levels of committees. Next, 
I will explore the proposed and desired government technique: a resettlement policy. 
 
5.4 Desire for a Resettlement Policy 
 
 The Results thus far have illustrated how resettlement is a relatively new government 
strategy to manage flooding in Malawi. The previous section highlighted how resettlement is 
not well incorporated into the current government structure of decision making. This is 
particularly due to the multiple viewpoints on how resettlement should occur, if at all, as 
outlined in section 5.2. As discussed, officially classifying flooding related movement as 
resettlement may cause complications, particularly with contested understandings of land 
ownership and place attachment. Mtafu, a national government DoDMA employee, 
highlights some of the problems the government face: 
 
Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘we have been promoting resettlement, but what has been 
the challenge is that it is not well entrenched’.  
 
Here he emphasises the government’s support of the phenomenon but that the lack of 
experience, how it is ‘not well entrenched’, makes it hard to implement. This was particularly 
evident in four key government interviews, with the two national government employees in 
DoDMA and the Ministry of Land and Housing, and with the two district disaster officers 
interviewed. However, it also came out of interviews with NGOs, particularly through their 
frustration with government implementation of resettlement, as will be expanded on below. 
A change in a governance approach to a problem takes time to establish, especially if a change 
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in mind-set is required (Bee et al., 2015). Bee et al. (2015) highlight how many government 
approaches are manifested in everyday practice, which means that changing an outlook 
involves changing the everyday practices as well. In this section, I delve further into the desire 
to combat these complications through the implementation of a resettlement policy. There 
is currently no policy on resettlement.  
 
The policy is a top-down tool in the resettlement process. It is being developed by the 
Ministry for Land and Housing and is about all forms of resettlement, not just those relating 
to flooding, but also development induced resettlement. It is as of yet not finalised and there 
is no clear date for finalisation but it is expected to occur in 2020. Nevertheless, my interview 
analysis suggests that the policy will help with the resettlement process, of flooding-
vulnerable communities in particular, in a three-fold manner:  
1. It will make it clear what resettlement is and what the procedures around it are for 
those in government and NGOs, for those in the communities resettling, and for those 
in the new host communities.  
2. It will standardise and unify the approach to resettlement.  
3. It will give more power to those in government and NGOs to implement it.  
I will explore in detail each of these aspects in this section. I will also examine the international 
influence on the resettlement policy, to highlight the other factors involved within 
resettlement and suggest reasons why this might be the case. 
 
The discussion about the resettlement policy did not occur at the community member 
level. This was due to two main factors: one there was little knowledge of the government 
and NGO structure of resettlement shown by community members and, secondly, because of 
this, no specific questions about a resettlement policy were asked. There were comments 
about how community members wished to be consulted more in the resettlement process, 
which I have touched on in the previous section and shall discuss further in the next chapter. 
Therefore, as the policy is only discussed by those involved in governing the resettlement, 
those in government and NGOs, it is only their views that are present in this section. This 
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reiterates that the policy is a top-down measure of governing resettlement. I will explore the 
implications of this further in this section. 
 
5.4.1 Policy to Clarify What Resettlement Entails 
 
In order for resettlement to be successfully facilitated within a decentralised 
government system, where district council are meant to have responsibility to facilitate 
aspects like resettlement (Jagero et al., 2014), there needs to be a shared understanding 
across the government, NGOs and the communities of what resettlement entails. As I 
established in the section above, this is not currently the case. Indeed, priority six of the 2015 
DRM policy states that there has previously been problems in coordinating responses, clarity 
in understanding would aid with this (Government of Malawi, 2015b).  A resettlement policy 
was suggested by a quarter of the government and NGOs interviewee, particularly those 
involved in developing the policy (those in DoDMA and the Ministry of Land and Housing, as 
well as MFERP) among others, to provide this clarity for the resettlement process specifically, 
as shown by national government worker, Mtafu: 
 
Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘yeah that [resettlement policy] will really assist because as 
of now … there are some guidelines here and there but in terms of matters of 
resettlement there is nothing saying this is what will be done. It is a bit tricky. So, the 
finalization of this policy will deal with a lot of those issues.’  
 
Mtafu reiterates that, currently, people do not know the best way forward for resettlement, 
there is no point of reference. The policy is set to be the point of reference required to give 
those in government and NGOs the confidence needed to undertake successful resettlement 
projects. Thus, this time period, when the policy is being determined and decisions about 
resettlement are being made, is particularly interesting to study.  
 
The desire for a policy on resettlement to provide ‘guidelines’ suggests that there is a 
wish to spread the responsibility, linking in with discussions of responsibility in the previous 
chapter. This came out of four of the 21 government and NGO interviews. A policy that 
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incorporates many organisations takes the responsibility away from an individual 
organisation or people that are directly involved. Due to the intricate nature of resettlement, 
with the potential of many viewpoints on how it should occur, as illustrated above, it is 
unsurprising that there is a desire for guidance on how to facilitate resettlement. This is 
slightly different to the shared responsibility discussed in the previous chapter, which was 
discussing responsibility post an event: flooding, whereas this is responsibility prior to an 
event: resettlement. William, who is in charge of MFERP, which is funded by the World Bank 
and is helping to fund the work on the resettlement policy, suggests that the policy will be 
based on international organisation guidelines: 
 
William (NGO, 2017): ‘that influence [World Bank guidelines] is there, in the sense that 
you don’t want to reinvent the wheel’.  
 
The use of international organisation guidelines as a template for the country’s policy 
highlights the reliance on international aid, as often a country needs to adhere to the 
guidelines to receive funding (Weiler et al., 2018). Indeed, the influence of international 
organisations guidelines perpetuates the current type of development practice, particularly 
as many international organisations, particularly the World Bank, have their foundations in 
Western ideologies (Briggs and Sharp, 2004). William’s opinion on this is influential, as his 
organisation is funded by the World Bank, and is involved in funding the resettlement policy. 
I was made aware of this by an employee of the Ministry of Land and Housing. This could 
perpetuate the hegemony of Western understandings within the resettlement process 
(Escobar, 2011, Sillitoe and Marzano, 2009). Through his analysis of the World bank 
involvement in the Mekong River Basin, Goldman (2004) highlights how dependency on a 
large international organisations, such as the World Bank, can perpetuate Western capitalist 
expansion without the knowledge of the vulnerable communities involved, making the 
dependency imperial in nature. Ferguson (1994) found a similar scenario in his studies into 
the IMF’s involvement in Lesotho. Moreover, the previous experience of the World Bank’s 
involvement in resettlement in Malawi, with the CBRLDP, highlighted how there were 
significant aspects not fully considered, chiefly community power dynamics and land 
interactions (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). The potential influence of large 
organisations, like the World Bank, is a key reason why they are placed at the top of the 
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perceived hierarchy of knowledge in Figure 5.2. However, William implies that the guidelines 
are not prevalent to perpetuate Western hegemony, rather they are important because they 
portray the best option, they are ‘the wheel’. I explore the international influence further in 
a later subsection.  
 
 Despite the assistance of international organisation guidelines, it is proving 
problematic to establish what the policy will entail. When discussing the policy, three NGO 
workers displayed frustration at its delayed arrival. Anthony, an NGO worker, described the 
process as ‘dragging’ and ‘taking too long,’ which meant the NGO opted to use their funding 
for other projects and not resettlement. Daniel, who works in the national government 
ministry drafting the policy, suggests the following reasons for why it is taking so long: 
 
Daniel (Government, 2017): ‘it [the policy] is not yet finalised because the issues of 
resettlement they are so broad. Some of the things they are issues of maybe 
compensation, and also the willingness of the people to move from one area to another, 
and at the same time the acceptance of the people that are already in the proposed area 
where people are to resettle, yeah, are the people willing to accept new people coming 
in.’ 
 
Daniel illustrates how some aspects are hard for a policy to broach. ‘Willingness’ and 
‘acceptance’ are traits that come differently for people. In order to achieve willingness and 
acceptance often incentives are used. This reiterates the importance of place and home, as 
Daniel is outlining the difficulty of moving people from where they feel they belong, and how 
this can be hard to quantify in terms of compensation. NGO worker, Thomas, suggests an 
answer to this: 
 
Thomas (NGO, 2017): ‘give them [the vulnerable communities] the best offer that they 
cannot refuse’.  
 
The policy would aim to provide the guidelines on compensation to give a unified approach 
for all the players needed and make it a fair system. This attitude was key in the World Bank’s 
CBRLDP, with the resettlement package designed attractively to highlight the buyer seller 
model of land, which is central to land privatisation. However, critique of this project 
illustrates how the resettlement process was too complicated for the compensation to work 
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effectively: the manner in which land ownership was obtained was confusing, with first group 
deeds being allocated to a trust, and individual’s only able to buy their deeds when they 
reached a certain income, which was not clear from the get go (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 
2018). Additionally, the setup of the trust meant that there was room for corruption and 
nepotism to develop, which meant that not every participant benefited equally (Chinsinga, 
2008, Sharp et al., 2018). Thus, compensation can be hard to manage. Daniel’s quote also 
highlights the importance of incorporating the potential host community as well, which can 
often be forgotten. I discuss this in more detail in the Chapter 6. 
 
5.4.2 Policy to Provide a Unified Approach 
 
A quarter of those interviewed from government and NGOs suggested the policy 
provided a way of unifying government and NGO approaches to resettlement and flooding, 
precisely because it clarifies what it entails. This again links into the frustration displaced in 
the 2015 DRM policy about the previous lack of united response that needed to be addressed 
in disaster management more broadly (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 8). The resettlement 
policy is hoped to provide those involved in resettlement with the same mandate to work on, 
as can be seen in the quote by NGO worker, Arthur: 
 
Arthur (NGO, 2017): ‘We really need to make sure that all the players are involved, we 
do the same thing, we can really control it. And again, government policies really play a 
role, because the government is there to ensure that things are going in the right 
direction, so, at times maybe the government leaves the responsibility to the NGOs to 
do it, but in that sense of firm regulation environment, I don’t think they understand. 
Because NGOs they come in an area within a space of time they leave. The government 
is still there. So, if the government is not enforcing whatever has been built by the NGOs 
all the things are lost in the process.’ 
 
Arthur highlights how in the current procedure of development projects, when an NGO moves 
out of an area without a policy, much of the benefit of that project is ‘lost’, as there is no 
agreed direction for future projects. A policy with guidelines on how to approach 
resettlement enables the implementer to change many times but ensures the end result is 
the same. Arthur lays the responsibility of enabling this unified approach on the government. 
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Not only this, he suggests that currently the government do not ‘understand’ their role in 
creating a long-lasting change. This reiterates the structure, present in my research, of 
reliance of NGOs on government guidance, as highlighted in the methodology, and the 
NGOization process apparent, where NGOs become a less accountable extension of the 
government (Choudry, 2010). However, it also highlights some tensions within this 
NGOization process, as Arthur is suggesting that not all NGOs are happy with the capability of 
the government. This reiterates that whilst NGOization was present in this research, it may 
not be universal in Malawi. The mistrust in the government’s ability also comes out from 
community interviews. Arthur’s comment illustrates one of the few occasions in the research 
where there is a distinction drawn between the NGOs and the government because it is 
discussing a failure in the structure. This is also a reason why there is a separate arrow in 
Figure 5.2 connecting smaller NGOs with large international organisations, as they do have 
the possibility to be influenced directly by them and not the government. 
 
A unified approach should incorporate the views of those in communities as well as 
NGOs and government. Much of the discussion in this section has focused on the governance 
angle. The implementation of a policy was mainly discussed by those in government and 
NGOs, as it is those that it directly involves. However, in order for it to be representative and 
not merely a top down measure, it should integrate the views of those in the communities 
undergoing resettlement. Indeed, the CBRLDP, discussed above, suggests that the vision for 
the resettlement needs to be understood at all levels, especially within communities, 
otherwise there is a risk the potential benefits are not realised (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 
2018). Other scholars have highlighted how community involvement is vital to successful 
resettlement, where communities stay resettled (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 
2015). This inclusivity is not apparent in the interviews with NGOs and government. The 
discussed benefits to the communities of the policy inversely is suggested by four of the 
government and NGO interviewees to come from them having to resettle, with little option 
to dispute the process, as those in positions of authority will now have more legitimacy in 
dictating the movement. For example, Mtafu highlights the power the policy will give to the 
government: 
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Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘[the policy will enable us] to reach out to people and say 
they should move based on these tools [provided by the policy]’.  
 
Here, Mtafu suggests that the government will have the information to provide to the 
communities, again reinforcing the perceived hierarchy of knowledge outlined above. This 
reiterates the portrayal of the government as more knowledgeable, which, whilst meant to 
be helpful, also places the power with the government. The policy enables them to control 
the knowledge on resettlement and also when and how they inform people of this 
knowledge. Thus, I argue that the policy will be a technique which the government uses to 
manage their population and determine how the process of resettlement is understood and 
known, placing them high on the knowledge hierarchy (Figure 5.2). In this way it indicates a 
form of governmentality by the government, as it is a technique of population control (Death, 
2013, Dean, 1999). I will elaborate further on the implications of this on participation in 
Chapter 6.  
 
5.4.3 Policy to Provide Power to Those in Government and NGOs 
 
In the previous chapter, I set out how government was legitimising their involvement 
in resettlement, the policy would be the ultimate outcome of this. By giving greater legitimacy 
to the government approach to resettlement, it has the potential to take power away from 
those in communities in the resettlement process. The potential power the policy awarded 
to government was commented on by a quarter of the government and NGO interviewees. 
Indeed, NGO worker Roland highlights how it will give more power to those in government: 
 
Roland (NGO, 2017): ‘The policy would help because the policy gives you power to act, 
so we have a minister of land and housing, mandated to manage issues of resettlements 
in the absence of the policy they cannot take anybody to task because legally they 
cannot do that, yeah so, I think a policy is indeed an item or an element that is missing 
in the whole process.’  
 
Here Roland explicitly states that the key benefit of the policy is the power it enables. It is 
interesting that whilst resettlement is presented as a unified approach by those in 
government and NGOS, the government is still the one viewed as having the power of 
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controlling it, not any of the NGOs also crucial in implementing it. This reiterates the process 
of NGOization, as the government is viewed as controlling the direction of the NGOs 
(Choudry, 2010). The fact that Roland focuses on the benefit of ‘taking anybody to task’ 
implies that sometimes NGOs, or local government do not provide sufficient services, and 
there is a need for there to be a leader in the resettlement processes: the national 
government. 
 
The policy provides greater power to those in government to actually facilitate 
resettlement. Once there is a unified approach, decisions can be made more easily. As 
illustrated by local government disaster officer, Keith: 
 
Keith (Government, 2017): ‘I think once the document has been finalised by the ministry 
of land then I think we will be having a backing so that even the local leaders can be 
sensitised to say this is something that can be giving a legal document to say if these are 
going to settle’. 
 
Keith highlights that once they have everyone’s backing, they can get a ‘legal document’ to 
enforce the resettlement. The focus on the legality that the policy provides is present in the 
last two quotes and reiterates the power involved in the policy. The lack of legal frameworks 
is also something which the existing 2015 DRM Policy is trying to address in its first policy 
priority, mainstreaming disaster risk management into sustainable development, indicating 
the perceived (and actual) importance of legal frameworks in effective implementation 
(Government of Malawi, 2015b: 5). The policy, when discussing priority five, also displays 
frustration at the previous ‘laxity of enforcement’ in policies and frameworks focused on 
disaster risk reduction, thus there seems to be a definite desire for greater power in 
implementation (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 5). Reference to the law also highlights the 
difference between the government and those in communities, as the type of law being 
referred to is inaccessible to many of the vulnerable population, particularly the illiterate. In 
2015 the literacy rate in Malawi was 62% (The World Bank, 2015). It also resonates with the 
notion of an audit culture (Kuus, 2016), as it requires something legitimate and accountable. 
The use of the word ‘sensitised’ implies that they will be informing the community that the 
best option is to resettle and not consulting them. I discuss sensitisation further in the next 
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chapter. Ultimately, the control over someone’s settlement is a significant form of power and 
responsibility to possess. For many their home is an extension of themselves, thus, to take 
away someone’s right to their home, where they feel they belong and have a strong place 
attachment, can be similar to stripping part of their identity (Roizblatt and Pilowsky, 1996, 
Raymond et al., 2010a).  
 
5.4.4 The International Influence on the Resettlement Policy 
 
In Chapter 2, I stated that there has been shift in academia to view environmental 
migration as adaptation (McLeman and Smit, 2006). This has been symptomatic of a global 
shift in viewing migration as an adaptive strategy. Indeed, implementing resettlement as a 
way to manage flooding is an offshoot of this, as it constitutes resettlement as adaptation to 
climate change (Arnall, 2018). As mentioned, international guidelines are used in the creation 
of the new policy. In this subsection, I will take this further to analyse specifically how the 
international arena may influence resettlement policy in Malawi and why this is important. 
The perceived hierarchy of knowledge set out in Figure 5.2, suggests that large international 
organisations and donors are at the top of this hierarchy, with potentially the largest influence 
on the resettlement process. I shall highlight below how this is likely to occur in this top-down 
measure of a resettlement policy. 
 
The World Bank exclusively funds the Malawi Floods Emergency Recovery Project 
(MFERP). This project was set up after the severe flooding of 2015, and is based in the capital, 
Lilongwe, working closely with the government to combat flooding. It is an important 
programme that holds influence over the government, particularly in its funding of the 
resettlement policy. William, an employee of the organisation, illustrates the importance of 
the government to adhere to World Bank guidelines if the World Bank is to be involved in 
resettlement: 
 
William (NGO, 2017): ‘we are not necessarily tackling resettlement, because with regard 
to the principles of the World Bank, if we are facilitating resettlement then it requires a 
lot of other policies that need to be taken into consideration. For instance, social and 
environmental safeguard policies, have to be seriously considered.’ 
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Here William is implying that currently resettlement processes in Malawi do not consider all 
their implications, and therefore cannot be supported by the World Bank. In order for them 
to obtain World Bank’s substantial assistance, they need to adhere to their protocol. 
Therefore, the power of the World Bank guidelines to dictate what can be done, in terms of 
flooding management, is significant. Moreover, the only significant resettlement experience 
to occur in Malawi, the CBRLDP, was funded by the World Bank (World Bank, 2013) and was 
referred to in three government and NGO interviews. A key reason for the influence of this 
organisation is because of the relatively large amount of funding associated with it (Weiler et 
al., 2018, Goldman, 2004). This is a further reason why international organisation are placed 
at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge in Figure 5.2. However, there are also ways around 
the strict conditions connected to the World Bank’s influence.  
 
The interview with William suggested that international guidelines are not as all 
pervasive as initially suggested, there is some contextual flexibility. For example, William goes 
on to say: 
 
William (NGO, 2017): ‘we establish possible evacuation sites … [that may be] considered 
later by government as resettlement sites. So, it is up to government to reconsider some 
of these sites that we are identifying as resettlement sites’.  
 
Therefore, William illustrates that he can be unofficially part of the process even if it does not 
fit with the World Bank guidelines. However, he and his organisation cannot be responsible 
for it. Indeed, he is very keen to point out that they are ‘not facilitating the actual 
resettlement’ (William, NGO, 2017). Therefore, the role of international organisations such as 
the World Bank on the ground, with local employees, is more nuanced than initially perceived. 
Local employees may have an allegiance to the international organisation for which they work 
but they may also be better acquainted with how their country facilitates situations and how 
best to manipulate the guidelines for this. This illustrates the fluidity of knowledge (Raymond 
et al., 2010b), as it shows how the international system is taken up and moulded by the local 
context, meaning the knowledge is neither ‘Western’ or ‘Local’ but rather Malawian, a mix of 
influences present in the Malawian resettlement context. This also highlights how knowledge 
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can mix and jump scales, similar to what Shulz et al. (2019) found with their categorization of 
indigenous knowledge, however the jumping of scales suggested in this quote is from a top-
down perspective.  
 
Additionally, as mentioned, the use of international organisations’ guidelines or 
experience may be favourable to national government, as they shift responsibility further up 
the command chain to the international organisation (Escobar, 2011). The use of international 
guidelines also fits into the idea of an audit culture: everything measured and practices 
occurring for the sake of a criteria required to be fulfilled (Kuus, 2016). Research into audit 
culture suggests that it enables a certain amount of shirking responsibility (Kuus, 2016). This 
is counter to the supposed neoliberal society in some ways: the onus is not on the individual 
(Castree, 2010). However, the responsibility is also not directly on the state either. Therefore, 
setting up a general policy that is shaped by international organizations guidelines takes away 
the responsibility from the state and places it on an abstract actor that it is impossible to hold 
accountable. This is a critique that has been made about development practices (Escobar, 
2011). It is almost the next level up from NGOization, instead it could be governmentalization: 
where governments act at the behest of international organizations, taking accountability and 
responsibility off themselves. It also echoes Enroth’s (2014) idea that the focus of government 
has shifted from society to solving global problems. 
 
There is a similar rationale for the use of international experience, which was 
important in three interviews with government and NGO officials. Indeed, the use of policy, 
guidelines and international experience are discussed as part of building capacity of the 
government, as can be seen when Mtafu discusses how district councils will facilitate 
resettlement: 
 
Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘We will need a lot of capacity for the councils to do that. 
Capacity not just in terms of resources but tools to do that, like the policies and the 
guidelines and learning how other countries like Mozambique are doing and the like.’ 
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Here Mtafu describes guidelines and international influence, such as the experiences from 
Mozambique, as tools that give district councils greater capacity and confidence to undertake 
resettlement projects. Part of this greater capacity and confidence may come from the fact 
that learning from past experiences takes away some responsibility from the district council 
and allocates it to the past experience. Therefore, giving them greater conviction in 
implementing such an approach.  
 
 This section highlights the desired implementation of the policy, which is proposed as 
addressing the many complications to resettlement through its clear unified approach. The 
policy is still being finalised and is set to come out in 2020. However, the discussion on the 
policy highlights the potential to create a growing dichotomy between those in government 
and NGOs and those in the vulnerable communities, as the way it is discussed represents top 
down, technocratic knowledge, with little space for community participation. As I will show 
in the following chapter, and as much existing literature illustrates, participation is essential 
for successful resettlement (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015) and communities 
can still manage to make their needs known. This section also shows the role of international 
organisations in determining the policy (Goldman, 2004), and the potential agendas they 
might have, which may not fully appreciate the dynamics of those in the vulnerable 
communities. Therefore, whilst the implementation of the policy may make the process of 
resettlement easier to enforce, it may not ensure its success, as, from the discussion, it 
appears to be inaccessible for those in the communities. This implies they would have little 
to no involvement in the resettlement process. Thus, there appears to be a disconnect in what 
the entire process of resettlement requires: initiating resettlement is a start but ensuring its 
success is more complicated, as I will show in the next chapter.  
  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have explored how the government plans to use resettlement as a 
strategy to manage increasing flooding severity. The chapter helps to answer research 
question 2, asking how and why government resettlement is used to manage flooding. I did 
this by first setting out the context of the multiple perspectives on the usefulness and success 
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of resettlement, which perspectives currently seem most dominant and the motivations 
behind them. Next, I showed the governance structure, which is the process that resettlement 
fits into, and highlighted its current tensions and cracks. I illustrated that the current approach 
is not a sufficient way to manage the multiple understandings. Finally, I explored the proposed 
way to unify all these perspectives: the use of a resettlement policy that provides ultimate 
power to the government. I examined the motivations behind the desire for the resettlement 
policy, showing potential implications and the role of the international community within it. 
The culmination of these sections implies that the government process of resettlement is 
currently in flux, with multiple spaces for different levels of involvement from various actors, 
and ultimately room for it still to evolve, making it particularly interesting to study. The 
chapter suggests that a top down approach to the resettlement process is currently favoured 
by government and NGOs due to the ease in facilitation this provides, suggested by 
interviewees to be currently difficult. The suggested push internationally for climate change 
adaptation strategies, implies that resettlement may be taken up in other countries that are 
reliant on donor funding, and may follow a similar approach. In the next chapter, I will 
illustrate the community response to government resettlement and how this can disrupt the 
perceived knowledge hierarchy set out in this chapter. 
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6. COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO RESETTLEMENT 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, I illustrated how the government is attempting to initiate 
and establish the resettlement process. In this chapter, I explore further the community 
involvement in this by examining the varied levels of community agency in the resettlement 
process. This provides context for considering the role of those resettling in the resettlement. 
I illustrate the diversity of decision making processes that are present in these communities, 
but that are often not fully considered by those managing the resettlement. In this chapter, I 
will explore whether the diverse forms of agency present in the communities are 
incorporated into the process through participatory techniques on the part of government 
and NGOs, analysing the levels of participation apparent (Arnstein, 1969). I will outline how 
communities re-appropriate resettlement to illustrate their own needs from the process. I 
aim to go deeper into the nuances of how resettlement is practiced, to show the often under 
acknowledged role of the ‘vulnerable’ populations. I purposefully put vulnerable in 
quotations here, as I will highlight how these populations may not be as vulnerable as the 
government perceptions suggest. I will show how there is push back towards the government 
understanding of resettlement so that it includes and appreciates community 
understandings, the re-appropriation. The chapter thus helps to answer research question 3, 
which is concerned with the role of flooding-vulnerable communities in the government 
strategy of resettlement.  
 
I first analyse, in section 6,2, the nuances of community agency present in each 
community. Next, in section 6.3, I build on discussions of governance structure in the previous 
chapter to assess how participatory the participatory methods really are. Finally, in section 
6.4, I highlight how ‘vulnerable’ communities have re-appropriated resettlement to fit their 
needs. I will explain the term ‘re-appropriated’ later, as it will enable a focus on the 
contradictions of the resettlement process.  
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6.2 Nuance within Community Agency 
 
In the literature review I established that agency referred to one ‘having the ability to 
act and be agents of their own development’ (Eversole, 2011: 51) and community agency, 
referred to the forming of local relationships that increase the capacity for collective action 
and adaptive capacity of the community (Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 
2010). Often agency can be attributed to, or taken away from, actors without evidence or 
consultation (Anderson, 2008). This has the potential to portray actors incorrectly to a wider 
audience, which can have broader ramifications. In the Results thus far, I have illustrated how 
community members are often perceived as vulnerable populations. This is particularly 
apparent from the government and NGO perspective. As I set out in the literature review, 
vulnerability is linked to having little agency (Brown and Westaway, 2011). Thus, in this 
section I will focus on exploring the presence of community agency in each community, to 
illustrate the levels of vulnerability from a community perspective, as high community agency 
suggests high adaptive capacity and low vulnerability. However, most literature on 
community agency, is focused on a Western perspective (Eversole, 2011, Luloff and Bridger, 
2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010). In this section, I go a step further than the existing 
literature on community agency to suggest there is variance within the types of community 
agency present. The variability of agency could also indicate a fluidity of knowledge outlined 
in the literature review (Raymond et al., 2010b).  
 
 One way in which I will outline community agency is through exploring the decision 
making process in each community (Brown and Westaway, 2011). All the communities I study 
illustrate a hierarchy of decision making. Those at Village Mwalija and TA Nyachikadza are 
negotiating resettlement, where the government and NGOs are in favour of resettlement. 
Those at Jombo have resettled and are attempting to integrate into a host community, where 
tensions are visible. At a time where the policy on resettlement is being drawn up, the 
experience of how resettlement is communicated in these communities is influential in 
determining the future approach to resettlement. In the following, I concentrate on two 
aspects of community agency. The first aspect is the influence that the community as a whole 
can have on the resettlement decision, the collective community agency. Nyachikadza is the 
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key focus here. The second aspect delves deeper into this and explores the multiple voices 
within each community, their role in the decision, and how this is viewed by the other actors 
involved. I split this into two parts that I term: hierarchical agency, which focuses on village 
Mwalija, and segregated agency, which focuses on Jombo resettlement site 
 
6.2.1 Collective Community Agency at Nyachikadza 
 
I argue that collective community agency facilitates the collective community action 
discussed by Brown and Westaway (2011). Through their review of several papers Brown and 
Westaway (2011) do not differentiate between the different types of community agency, 
suggesting that all community agency produces collective action, but, with the help of my 
interview data, I will illustrate how collective community agency differs and can be nuanced 
into other forms of community agency, specifically hierarchical and segregated community 
agency, which I outline below.  
 
Collective community agency is particularly evident in the community at Nyachikadza. 
As established, those residing at Nyachikadza are reluctant to resettle. This reluctance is born, 
in part, from their unwillingness to leave Nyachikadza, present in three quarters of the 
interviews of those from Nyachikadza, with only one exception, as I have illustrated 
throughout the Results thus far. However, one aspect which I have yet to discuss, but that is 
present in three interviews, is the reluctance to resettle born from more practical reasons: 
their inability to resettle without the assistance of the government in the process. The 
government is failing to provide the form of resettlement that they will accept. Nyachikadza 
community member, Kelvin, highlights this: 
 
Kelvin (Nyachikadza, 2017) ‘It is only government who should try to provide that land to 
us, because we have tried our best to provide good discussions with the people of 
Ndamera but nothing has materialised’.  
 
Here Kelvin highlights the need for the government to aid an appropriate resettlement 
scheme. He particularly speaks of the need for assistance in negotiating an area of suitable 
land to resettle. It is difficult because the land needs to be near to Nyachikadza for them to 
still cultivate there, but the surrounding area is highly populated. The quote suggests that 
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Kelvin views the government has having more power in influencing the other potential host 
communities involved. Thus, Kelvin’s statement suggests a mutually co-dependent 
relationship: the government are dependent on the community members to go along with a 
resettlement scheme and the community members are dependent on the government for 
their assistance in producing an adequate resettlement solution that allows for them to still 
cultivate in Nyachikadza, and still allows them to be known as people from Nyachikadza. 
However, currently, neither side is delivering this.  
 
Although the reasons for reluctance to resettle in this community may be slightly 
different, such as Kelvin’s focus on the lack of land available, there is an agreed collective 
action: the reluctance to resettle, which is found in three quarters of the interviews with those 
from Nyachikadza, with only one exception, who had more permanent house in Nyachikadza. 
It is possible that further variety is present within the community and was not identified in 
the research. However, dissention was identified in the other two communities, suggesting 
that Nyachikadza is different. Moreover, the reputation of residents from Nyachikadza being 
unwilling to resettle was strong and came out from informal conversation with the two 
translators used in this community, as well as in the interviews with NGO and government 
employees who were involved with Nyachikadza, which totalled seven. The collective action 
of reluctance to resettlement found in the Nyachikadza interviews suggests a cohesive form 
of community agency within the resettlement process. This is the most straightforward form 
of community agency observed in the data. 
 
Collective community agency is more complicated in the other two communities. As I 
highlighted in Chapter 4, individuals at village Mwalija will do something they do not 
necessarily wish to do if it is the desire of the whole community, producing collective 
community agency but not through mutual agreement. Additionally, at Jombo there was a 
sense that decisions over their resettlement were made at a community level and the 
community took priority in this decision. So much so that they refused initial offers of 
resettlement that required them to resettle separately. Thus, this shows collective 
community agency. However, they are technically now part of another community, but they 
seem unsure of their place within it and do not seem to identify with it, complicating their 
collective community agency. This will be expanded on below. Similarly, at village Mwalija 
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there was more to decisions than following the views of others in the community, as I outline 
in the following subsection. 
 
6.2.2 Hierarchical Community Agency at Mwalija 
 
Interviews from those at village Mwalija also implied a collective community agency. 
Although, with further discussion this is not as simple as first impressions suggest. Arnold 
highlights how he views the involvement of the community in the resettlement decision: 
 
Arnold (Mwalija, 2017): ‘I think of resettling but not as my family only but if the whole 
community is moving then it is when we can resettle’.  
 
This implies that he is not able to determine his own development, and therefore does not 
have individual agency in the decision, instead he waits for community approval in order to 
move. The community decision outlined here could also mean community members move 
when they do not want to. 11 of the 16 Mwalija interviewees referred to the importance of 
community within the resettlement decision. For example, earlier, in chapter 4, I noted that 
Dina would move if the whole community moved but it ‘would not be what I wish’ (Mwalija 
2017). This further illustrates the potential lack of individual agency. This is complicated 
further by the role of the village head in the decision-making process at village Mwalija. 
 
The data suggests a hierarchy to the decision-making process, with the village head 
being central. There is suspicion attached to moving before the village head does, which was 
mentioned by five of the 16 Mwalija interviewees. For example, Dorothy highlights this when 
discussing what influences her move: 
 
Dorothy (Mwalija, 2017): ‘I cannot move if this village head does not move first. Because 
according to traditional beliefs, if one gets there before the village head and the village 
head does not give them blessings that you can move and that person just moves, that 
person can meet several calamities like diseases, death, misfortunes etc. so I don’t want 
to experience that.’ 
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The power of the village head in decision making is clear in all the communities but especially 
in Mwalija, where they are deciding whether to resettle. Unfortunately, I was only able to 
interview one village head in the research, at Jombo. The village heads in TA Nyachikadza, 
and the village head for village Mwalija were unavailable. Therefore, I rely on the testimony 
of the villagers, like Dorothy. Dorothy declares her submission to the village head’s decision 
and her loyalty to follow him. In this way Dorothy allows the village head to determine her 
development. In other words, she gives the agency to determine much of her life to the village 
head.  Not all in Mwalija took this strong a view and two interviewees still view the option for 
them to move as an individual decision. They still believe that they control their life decisions. 
Therefore, there are varying degrees of agency present.  
 
The agency of the village head in determining the resettlement decision at village 
Mwalija is even recognized by those in the district council (local government). As illustrated 
by local government disaster officer Charles: 
 
Charles (Government, 2017): “Unfortunately people were not willing to resettle and they 
were alluding to the fact that traditionally I think they were saying it is actually the 
village headman Mwalija who is supposed to start the resettlement and people could 
follow him there, because they were saying ‘if I happen to go there and resettle when 
my chief is here it would appear as if I am possibly doing the opposite way. The chief 
should be the first one to resettle and we would be following him.’ So, actually village 
headman Mwalija did not resettle, was not championing the whole essence of 
resettlement, so people never followed, and they never moved to that other safer area, 
regardless that partners were even willing to construct some start up housing facilities 
and even the drilling of the borehole itself.” 
 
This is the perspective of a government official and not straight from a community member, 
but it does corroborate the previous quote. Charles illustrates the key point: the power that 
a village head may have in determining a community member’s role in resettlement, despite 
many in the community proclaiming they would like to move. It illustrates collective 
community action, in that the whole community is not moving, but this appears to be because 
they are following one member of the community: the village head, and not because they 
collectively do not want to resettle. The fact that a government official comments on this, 
indicates that the hierarchy in decision making is appreciated by local government. 
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However, it is suggested that the village head may not be best situated to represent 
the community. This comes out of five of the 16 Mwalija interviews, which were pro-
resettlement. For example, community member, Benjamin highlights the amount of people 
who wanted to resettle: 
 
Benjamin (Mwalija, 2017) ‘A lot of people were for that decision that we go and resettle. 
Estimating almost that 60 something were for that and 30 something were against it’.  
 
This implies that they took a vote to gauge the community views, but following Charles’ view, 
the village head is proving a significant impediment for this move. This resonates with the 
potential ulterior motives of those in power, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 Data from village Mwalija expands on this to examine the ulterior motives of why 
some community members may want to move. From two of the Mwalija interviews it is 
suggested that some may be in favour of resettlement to avoid paying fines for a new scheme 
in operation in the village. This is explained by Arnold: 
 
Arnold (Mwalija, 2017): ‘Those that are ready [to resettle], are ready because they know 
that there will be a scheme in this village. There are rules for everyone who has got 
livestock, that if the livestock are found in this field in this scheme, they will be punished. 
So, there are people who have got livestock who are fearing that. That might have an 
impact on them. There are those who are willing, they can move even now. While the 
others who are not willing to move it is a larger number than those who are willing to 
move now.’  
 
Arnold is suggesting that it is the fear of a fine that is motivating people to resettle rather 
than the fear of flooding. This not only gives an insight into the internal governance of a village 
on a local level, but also shows how these immediate, everyday factors impact community 
members’ motivations. Arnold also implies that there are more who are against resettling 
than for, which is the opposite of what Benjamin is claiming in the paragraph above. This 
contradiction reiterates the diversity of views within this community, and, whilst the lack of 
resettlement may be due to the village head not moving, it could also be due to divided 
opinion within the community. This would suggest that the community provides a collective 
community agency (Brown and Westaway, 2011) but by chiefly following one key figure: the 
village head. Therefore, I label this hierarchical community agency.  
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6.2.3 Segregated Community Agency at Jombo 
 
 The situation of the community at Jombo illustrates how it is not just the resettling 
community that is involved in the process, but also the host community as well. Two thirds of 
those interviewed at Jombo identified hostilities with the host community. Alfred explains 
how the host community can influence the success of the resettlement: 
 
Alfred (Jombo, 2017): ‘The relationship [with the host community] is not good because 
the village head is dividing these people. He gave us land, but he also wants to take it 
back. When relief items come, instead of leaving us to distribute it among ourselves, he 
takes a committee and takes control, and mostly the items go to them and few go to 
our village.’ 
 
Alfred communicates the hostility between the two communities that are meant to be united. 
Indeed, two thirds of the interviews with those at Jombo suggest they are two separate 
communities and have not integrated, which makes it hard for either to live harmoniously, 
especially when relief items are involved. Four other interviewees echoed the problems 
around delivering relief aid. 
 
The difficulties between the host and resettled communities at Jombo has a particular 
impact on leadership within the community, expressed by three quarters of the Jombo 
interviewees. For example, community member Anna: 
 
Anna (Jombo, 2017): ‘Sometimes fights exist between our community and the host. … It 
is the issue of leadership … I keep on wondering whether we have a leader or not in the 
form of the village head. So, I am waiting for the time when government will come to 
tell us we are under Jombo or the one we are coming from [Champanda]. At the moment 
I do not feel I know whom I am under. So, I hope that will be clarified in the future 
because right now we are like orphaned children.’ 
 
Anna highlights how the lack of a leader impacts their sense of identity and well-being as a 
community, as well as causing fights. It is also interesting that she puts the responsibility to 
solve this issue on the government. The imagery of ‘orphaned children’ is particularly 
powerful in reiterating the importance of customary leadership, and the dependency of those 
within the community on the government to assist with multiple problems including that of 
leadership. This emphasises the interplay between the two forms of governance and the 
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precedence of the government leadership over the customary, as it suggests the government 
has greater authority (Eggen, 2011). Yet, it also emphasises the need for the government to 
engage with the customary forms of governance to resolve issues, such as those faced at 
Jombo, and facilitate a successful resettlement. This reiterates the need, outlined by other 
scholars, for participation in resettlement (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015), 
which I will explore further in the next section of this chapter.  
 
This section has illustrated the varied forms of community agency present in each 
community: collective, hierarchical and segregated, adding nuance to the existing notion of 
community agency (Brown and Westaway, 2011, Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-
Cascante et al., 2010).  The variety of agency reiterates how every resettlement process is 
context specific (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015). It indicates that including and appreciating 
the different forms of agency and opinions within the resettlement process may be 
challenging. A suggested way to combat these challenges is through a participatory approach 
(Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). As I established in Chapter 5, currently the resettlement process 
does aim to be participatory and inclusive through the governance structure. However, I also 
illustrated in Chapter 5 how this structure did not always work, and how the government was 
looking to exhibit more control through the upcoming resettlement policy. I take this further 
in the next section, which assesses how participatory the resettlement process is.  
 
6.3 ‘Participatory’ Approaches: A Tool for Dialogue or Monologue? 
 
 The literature on resettlement, as well as the interview data, suggest that those in 
communities need to be consulted throughout the resettlement process (Tadgell et al., 2018, 
Wilmsen and Wang, 2015, Stal, 2011), especially if it is to be voluntary (Arnall, 2018). This has 
been referred to directly and also indirectly, through the role communities play in the 
resettlement process highlighted above, and through the official structure of committees 
previously discussed. However, as has been apparent in the discussions over the official 
structure and the community agency there appears to be an underlying bias that runs through 
these perspectives, which can also be seen in the way participatory approaches are discussed. 
This section will explore this further by first examining how participation is discussed directly 
before focusing in on the implications of ‘sensitisation’. 
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6.3.1 Discussion of Participation 
 
There is an attempt by those in government to include local knowledge in the 
resettlement process. This can be seen in the way the committee structure is developed but 
also through how community participation is discussed, and it is that which I focus on here. 
Around half of NGO and Government respondents discussed the importance of considering 
local knowledge. National government DoDMA official Mtafu highlights how they try to work 
with the communities to focus on where the relief and evacuation centres are best placed. 
 
Mtafu (Government, 2017): ‘So even as a department we have the flood emergency 
recovery project, besides from identifying the hazard, … it is a community perspective 
on what risks are there and what disasters they are prone to, why are they prone to 
those, like vulnerability assessment, why are they prone to this, is it because of social 
factors, is it physical factors and economic and also the capacities and also to say which 
areas can be used as evacuation points and the like.’ 
 
Here Mtafu is referring to the flood emergency recovery project, MFERP, discussed in the 
previous chapter. Mtafu suggests that crucial in this project is the information that the 
community provides about the flooding in their area through community mapping. Mtafu’s 
discussion seems to suggest a mix of perspectives: he is keen to gain information from the 
community, but is framing it in a scientific manner, such as his referral to ‘like vulnerability 
assessment’. An increasing attention to vulnerability assessments is mentioned as a strategy 
in the 2015 Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy (Government of Malawi, 2015b) 
indicating the unsurprising influence of the policy on government perspectives. He is turning 
the local knowledge into something that can be useful to his department, making it jump scale 
to become national knowledge. This is similar, but not quite the same as the 
professionalisation of knowledge discussed in the literature review (Laurie et al., 2009). In this 
case the professionalisation is occurring in a top down manner, with the government initiating 
it, which is different to the findings of Laurie et al. (2009) who illustrated how indigenous 
communities in the Andes professionalised their knowledge. Thus, it could be suggesting a 
more extractive form of participation (Agrawal, 1995). Nevertheless, the quote reiterates the 
fluidity of knowledge (Raymond et al., 2010b). Indeed, Mtafu’s quote suggests that defining 
knowledge as either ‘scientific’ or ‘local’ may not be representative of the situation. However, 
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it appears that when more detail into who is consulted is discussed, a different level of 
participation is portrayed.  
 
There appears to be a limit on who is able to participate by those in NGOs and 
government. Just over a third of NGO or government workers suggest that it is mainly local 
leaders who are consulted in the resettlement process, as they are viewed as having the most 
influence in the resettlement decision of the communities. I discussed this previously with 
regards to the government structure and committee makeup, where a fifth of community 
members illustrated dissatisfaction with representation within this. The preference for local 
leaders can also be seen in broader discussions over participation, as made evident by NGO 
employee Samson: 
 
Samson (NGO, 2017): ‘Local leaders who are managing communities in the marshes, 
maybe with the government they need to sit and discuss further before the issues are 
taken to the community members themselves. So, it is like a step, government or 
responsible officers go to the local leaders have a special talk with the local leaders. Then 
what will be included in that particular meeting that should be taken to the 
communities.’ 
 
Samson himself refers to it as a stepped process, which came out of six other interview with 
government and NGOs. This indicates that the step with the local leaders comes before the 
last step in the process, which is the consultation of community members. This reiterates the 
perceived hierarchy of knowledge and its control highlighted in Chapter 5 and implies that 
community members are not viewed as important in the decision-making process, as they are 
at the bottom of the ladder in terms of consultation. They are informed of the outcome, but 
not part of determining it. Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation is relevant here, as Samson 
indicates that what is occurring through this stepped process is either non-participation of 
those at the ‘lowest’ level, or tokenistic participation on Arnstein’s (1969) ladder scale. It 
similarly echoes the second form of tyranny outlined by Cooke and Kothari (2001), outlining 
how participation can actually be a way of reinforcing local power dynamics instead of moving 
past them. Indeed, NGO worker Jake suggested that there is too much of a difference 
between those in the NGOs and those at the community level, and that this intermediary step 
with local leaders is needed for a project to successfully occur, and for meaning to be 
successfully communicated between the different ‘steps’, as I will outline below. 
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 The perceived difference in levels of understanding by many in government and NGOs 
means that some NGOs believe they cannot communicate directly with community members 
but have to go through ‘middle men’ in the form of local leaders. This was implied in half the 
government and NGO interviews. Building on earlier comments in the previous chapter about 
how representative local leaders are of community members, this raises questions about 
whether this is really participation, as is evident in NGO worker, Jake’s comment below. Jake 
is working in the NGO involved in persuading village Mwalija to resettle. He is therefore 
focused on effective communication. 
 
Jake (NGO, 2017): ‘We felt the traditional authority [area chief] and other gurus that 
understands more of cultural beliefs can take them [the community members] on their 
own, and from that platform they can be advised to say ok, if we don’t move and cling 
to our traditional culture and say our parents have been there for so long, then we are 
ready to suffer again. Then we should take the responsibility if anything happens to us 
then I think we should take the responsibility of that. So maybe the technical people 
from the grassroots who can take this is probably the TA and other gurus that can 
understand much better the issue of traditional beliefs.’ 
 
It interesting that Jake here refers to ‘taking the community members on’, which implies he 
views it in the manner of a conflict. Jake appears to view these local leaders and ‘gurus’ as 
‘technical people’ who will be able to understand more than the average community member 
but also be able to understand the cultural beliefs, which he openly admits is difficult for many 
NGO workers. However, if these ‘technical people’ are not listened to by the community then 
Jake does not believe that the community deserves any external assistance, the impact of the 
flood is their responsibility. It is apparent that there is a hierarchy to the views Jake discussed, 
that his views are the ones with more sense for the community and the important thing is to 
make them understand this. This reiterates the perceived hierarchy of knowledge presented 
in Chapter 5. Therefore, the approach is not to include the community views, but rather to 
make them more easily take on the NGO perception, which touches on the issue of 
sensitisation, discussed further below. This does not coincide with what transformative and 
empowering participatory approaches are designed for (Kesby, 2005, Hickey and Mohan, 
2008, Kamruzzaman, 2020), as set out in the literature review.  
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 A further example of the difficulty with participation is illustrated by the issue of a 
dyke in Nyachikadza. Almost half of the Nyachikadza community members interviewed 
demonstrated a desire for the government to build a dyke to manage the flooding, instead of 
resettlement. The government know of this desire but believe resettlement is a better 
solution. Chris expresses the community desire well: 
 
Chris (Nyachikadza 2017): ‘The best way to manage flooding, us as citizens of TA 
Nyachikadza, what we want actually is the government through donor funding is to assist 
us to construct a dyke, all the way from Nsanje Boma [town centre] to Nyachikadza, it is a 
distance of 40 something km. If they will do that maybe we shall have permanent villages, 
what we were doing in the past. Staying there forever, rather than having a house here 
[Ndamera] and going there for farming. It really troubles us a lot, we just do stay here and 
go there for farming. It is somehow not good at all, but it is our appeal to the government. 
If they have resources through some donors to assist us to construct a permanent dyke.’ 
 
Chris illustrates that he is aware that the government would be unable to achieve this without 
donor funding. He also shows awareness of what would be required to construct a dyke. This 
indicates an appreciation for a process which could be considered ‘technical’ and thus, if the 
view of Jake in the previous quote is followed, outside the understanding of those in the 
vulnerable communities. Moreover, Chris highlights how the temporary form of movement 
that so many have suggested is their own local way of managing flooding, is difficult for them. 
He indicates that it is tough to be between two places, without a permanent home. This gives 
an insight onto the personal toll that being split between two homes can have. However, the 
government takes a different view. 
 
 Whilst many in government do attempt to provide platforms to hear community 
views, it does not mean that they will act on them. This can be seen with the government’s 
response to the issue of the dyke, explained by government employee Hector: 
 
Hector (Government, 2017): ‘We also involved them [Nyachikadza community] in a 
process called deliberative polling process. Yeah where they process interventions, 
various alternatives, which the government can implement for them not to relocate. 
They [Nyachikadza community] proposed a dyke, they proposed improved early warning 
system. They provide more structural mitigation works, building dykes, banks 
whatsoever, dredging the river but those alternatives some are expensive like 
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constructing a dyke. They were mentioning of constructing a dyke almost 14 kilometres, 
20 kilometres, 30 kilometres, which is expensive. Yeah so, relocation as of now is the 
only best alternative, because once they relocate, government will be able to provide 
them with services there, but they will still have that freedom of going back and do their 
farming.’ 
 
Hector highlights how the government is providing platforms to hear community views, 
through the polling process. The government decided that the community suggestion are 
unattainable due to expense, which is understandable. However, what these two quote from 
a community member and government official illustrate is inadequate communication. They 
are both aware of the others opinions but yet there is not full understanding. The community 
show awareness that the dyke may be expensive and require donor funding, but it is the 
government’s responsibility to explain that this is a severely unlikely scenario so the 
community can fully appreciate their options. When I discussed the idea of dyke informally 
with officials at Nsanje district council, there first response was to laugh, indicating that they 
do not take the views of the community seriously. This suggests that the government is 
facilitating consultative participation as defined by Agarwal (2001). Whereby, opinions are 
heard without it necessarily impacting decisions (Agarwal, 2001). This implies that they are 
undertaking tokenistic participation, as set out by Arnstein’s (1969) ladder. The emphasis on 
cost reiterates the lack of resources available to local government. It indicates a difference in 
the motivations for resettlement from those in government and those in communities: it 
suggests government may have a focus on the most resource efficient solution, and 
communities may be concerned with what is best for their livelihood. Thus, there is an aim to 
be participatory, and to allow community members to have varied forms of agency within the 
decision. However, the outcome of this participation does not appear to be communicated, 
as community members don’t appear to appreciate the difficulty in building a dyke. If this is 
not communicated then community members may not appreciate that they have been 
listened to and resentment may develop, inhibiting further effective communication. The 
focus on efficiency resonates with the critique that the rise in interest in participation by large 
development organisations was driven by a desire to make processes more efficient and not 
necessarily to empower marginal populations (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Kamruzzaman, 
2020). Many in NGOs and government suggest that sensitisation is the best way to convince 
communities to move, or to move on the government’s terms. The aim of sensitisation is to 
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close the gap between the government and NGO perspective and the community perspective. 
I explore this further in the next subsection. 
 
6.3.2 The Role of Sensitisation 
 
 Sensitisation is the spreading of information, flooding forecasts for example, and ideas 
on how to manage flooding, usually from government or NGOs to a vulnerable population. It 
was discussed by many interviewed as a key technique to combatting flooding. Sensitisation 
is often seen as synonymous to education, particularly with reference to flooding forecasts. 
In this way it fits on the third rung of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation: informing, 
indicating tokenistic participation. However, for others, it went deeper, to represent 
behavioural shifts, apparent when some NGO and government members encourage people 
to resettle, which potentially places it at the first rung of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of 
participation – manipulation, classified as non-participation. Sensitisation is a global 
development term but is directly discussed little in the literature (Jakimow, 2013). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, it originated from immunology (Cooke and Veer, 1916, Janeway et 
al., 2001) and Psychology literatures (Cautela, 1967, Myin-Germeys et al., 2005). For this 
research it relates to discussions over risk awareness (Weichselgartner and Pigeon, 2015, 
Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018), education (Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004) and resilience 
building (Mavhura et al., 2013). The way in which it is discussed by my interviewees, 
illuminates certain perspectives held by many interviewed in government and NGOs, on the 
perceived hierarchy of different knowledges, set out in the previous chapter. In this 
subsection, I highlight how sensitisation is discussed as information spreading. I will show how 
this can merge into manipulation of behavioural change (Arnall, 2018) and how the 
discussions on behavioural change show a prejudice of the knowledges involved in a process 
which is meant to involve the vulnerable communities. 
 
 The relevance of sensitisation within the resettlement process was discussed by over 
half the government and NGO interviewees. Three interviews suggested that sensitisation is 
a method through which local government and NGO officials inform communities of an 
upcoming flood warning. Thus, it becomes part of early warning systems, as mentioned above 
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this is more about informing and less about behavioural change. Rosalind explains how it is 
used in this way: 
 
Rosalind (Government, 2017): ‘We inform the people through the sensitisation, the 
community sensitisation, we actually go and sensitise them even before disaster comes, 
like the flooding disaster. We go about and sensitise people to relocate because like this 
year we are expecting the normal to above normal rainfall, so what it means is that we 
may have flooding, so we actually go in advance and sensitise those people.’ 
 
Rosalind’s repetition of informing us that they go in advance and her use of the word ‘actually’ 
implies that this advanced sensitisation could be a new strategy, which would fit with the idea 
that resettling out of an area is a newly supported method by the government to manage 
flooding. Therefore, there is more than just information dissemination, there is advice on how 
to manage the flooding: through resettling. Anthony takes this further:  
 
Anthony (NGO 2017): ‘there is a need for sensitisation, proper sensitisation to highlight 
the advantages of them moving, why it is necessary that they should move as well’.  
 
Anthony shows the progression from ‘highlighting the advantages’ of moving, to actually why 
they have to move. This shows a more forceful side of sensitisation, which is advocating for 
behavioural change. This came out of over a quarter of the government and NGO 
interviewees. It reiterates the idea that the NGO think they know best, which was a key part 
of the critique of participation, that it can subtly reinforce Western development ideals 
(Mohan, 2007). The use of sensitisation is discussed by the community members as well.  
 
Six of the 49 community members mention sensitisation. The community members 
undergo sensitisation in a variety of ways. Alfred from Jombo community explains how this 
can work: 
 
Alfred (Jombo 2017): ‘while we were there at Champanda, [we got information] through 
the area telling us to move to upper areas because we would be expecting flooding. 
While here we get it from the DCs [district commissioners] office through community 
sensitisation meetings’.  
 
Alfred shows the difference in access to sensitisation from the previous flood prone area, 
where he lived before resettling, and the resettled area. In the previous area the information 
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is spread less directly, through word of mouth, radios or mobile phone text networks. 
Whereas, at the resettled area they get the information directly through meetings with 
district council members, which are termed ‘sensitisation meetings’. It indicates how 
sensitisation is linked to government.  
 
Indeed, Roster from Mwalija highlights further the process of sensitisation for his 
community: 
 
Roster (Mwalija, 2017): ‘I get information through radios, and through radios we are 
told that those who are near Shire River should be alert to move because the rivers are 
going to flood so we will be affected. So, when I get that message, because here we are 
near Shire River, we keep observing Shire River and when we see that it might flood 
anytime, we gather together as a community, we hold sensitisation meeting where the 
village head takes the lead. Whereby people are told to get ready and to find a place 
where they can go to relocate.’ 
 
Roster shows us how sensitisation messages about flood forecasts and the need to move 
percolate through the community. This links back to how each community get their 
information on flooding, discussed in Chapter 4. Roster suggests there has been increased 
vigilance and the holding of their own sensitisation meetings on whether they should move, 
with the village head being central in the process, as discussed previously. This was suggested 
by one other community member from the same community. Therefore, sensitisation does 
not just refer solely to meetings between NGOs/local government and community members, 
it has also pervaded into the vocabulary of those in communities. This indicates another jump 
in scale from the international to the local and highlighting how in flux the knowledges of 
those in communities are (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019) and how labelling knowledge may 
provide too static an impression of the reality (Halvorsen, 2019). Alternatively, this use of 
sensitisation in this manner could be due to the government translation. Some NGO 
employees believe those in communities do not act quickly enough on the information passed 
onto them. 
 
 There appears to be a contradiction in how those in NGOs want the communities to 
act on sensitisation and how they view them as actually acting on sensitisation. This 
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frustration comes out clearly in almost a quarter of the government and NGO interviews. For 
example, Chikondi: 
 
Chikondi (NGO, 2017): ‘So, the sensitisation has been around how can they use the river 
gauges, how do they read that this level of the river gauge is making this sign. But the 
whole purpose of it, is for them to act first. And the action that we mainly talk about in 
terms of floods is relocating to the upper land. So, the relocation of the community to 
the upper land is not only when the disasters have occurred, but they need to relocate 
when the disasters have not occurred, which has been a bit of a challenge for the 
communities. Yeah, I think the communities have mainly only a reactive kind of 
response, whereby when they see that somebody has been affected [that] is when they 
move. They go maybe to the evacuation centre. Maybe when they see the waters have 
gone and then they come back to their original places, but then the message has been 
they should be able to read their land depending on the trend of disasters that has been 
occurring in the communities. They should be able to read their land and at least settle 
at a safer place. So that has been the message but then the response has been not that 
good.’ 
 
Chikondi highlights how the sensitisation her NGO is involved in is focused on making the 
communities better able to read their land through the introduction of river gauges. Chikondi 
believes that the knowledge her NGO is sharing can enable them to move before a flood 
occurs, even if it contradicts previous flood trends. It is an attempt to merge scientific and 
local knowledge, by placing a scientific measure, gauge, into a local early warning system, 
watching the river and using reeds as gauges, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. However, she 
implies it is not working, there is a reluctance for people to move. Indeed, her use of ‘should’ 
implies a responsibility on the community members to be proactive and a reprimand that 
they are not. The focus on proactive movement, resonates with the literature on pre-emptive 
resettlement, and its benefits, outlined in Chapter 2 (Tadgell et al., 2018). Tadgell et al. (2018) 
point out that proactive resettlement is also associated with voluntary resettlement, which is 
meant to provide more successful and permanent resettlement outcomes. This could be 
another reason why Chikondi is advocating for it. 
 
The emphasis on the individual present in Chikondi’s quote, also echoes the 
suggestion that there is an increasing neoliberalisation of development activities in 
environmental migration (Baldwin, 2014). This is the logic that the individual should be given 
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the tools so they are in charge of the process and thus, they are responsible for making sure 
it occurs successfully (Baldwin, 2014). This does give agency to community members. 
However, agency is only given if they comply with the neoliberal structure. The need to 
comply to a structure in order to obtain agency, raises questions as to whether agency is 
actually being obtained. It suggests that resettlement may be being used to manipulate 
behaviour to fit with a more controllable and economic population, as suggested by Arnall 
(2018). Yet, Chikondi states that the compliance does not appear to occur in practice. 
 
 Chikondi is not the only NGO employee to show frustration at the way community 
members respond to sensitisation. This was also present in three other interviews. For 
example, Kenneth highlights the difficulty in influencing people’s behaviour: 
 
Kenneth (NGO, 2017): ‘We as a government, NGOs, we try to raise awareness that they 
have to move away from places that are flood prone areas. Some moved, but not 
everyone. Still there are some. You know, wherever you go in the communities, you can 
go with the same information but not everyone is going to be convinced. We have had 
innovators that after hearing that information, they may see sense in that information, 
they may move. But there are some, they are so reluctant, they are waiting maybe 
something terrible has to happen first before they move.’ 
 
Here, Kenneth puts the NGOs and government together as having the same mission of 
persuading people to move away at times of flooding, reiterating the NGOization process 
(Choudry, 2010). It suggests an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ scenario. Kenneth’s use of ‘innovators’ to 
describe those that do move, highlights how they are praised as being proactive and taking 
the opportunity, fitting with the neoliberal ideology discussed above (Baldwin, 2014). 
Kenneth suggests that they need a disastrous event, like that of 2015, before they will 
consider a movement. As devastation incurred by the 2015 flooding is the very thing his NGO 
is trying to prevent, his frustration with that situation is paramount.  
 
 Two NGO workers viewed the behaviour of those in the community as contradictory: 
they agree to the sensitisation suggestions, but then act in the opposite way. Chikondi 
highlights this fully: 
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Chikondi (NGO, 2017): ‘I think it is something to do with behaviour change. Because 
when you are doing the sensitisation you see positive, positive faces from the 
community, but the action is not there. … When we are talking of relocating they are 
even talking of the need to relocate, but then you find that they are not very much willing 
to do that, because you find that maybe somebody’s house got damaged by the previous 
floods, you find that if that person manages to get some little resources, he will choose 
to reconstruct right there, where the previous house was, despite maybe having some 
options to go to some upper land. So, on that one you can see that the reasons that they 
give of resources may not be very much valid, but maybe that willingness is not there, 
or the community is very much used to their old land, so they would still want to be 
there.’ 
 
Here Chikondi separates sensitisation and behavioural change. She highlights that even when 
ulterior land and resources are available community members choose to stay in the 
vulnerable location. Until the 2019 flooding, this was the situation at village Mwalija. Chikondi 
suggests that the community members do not give a ‘valid’ reason for their lack of willingness, 
which could imply that she puts the blame for the unsuccessful sensitisation on the 
community members. As with Kenneth, Chikondi shows frustration with the situation and the 
community members. There is a sense that she believes the community members are using 
their agency and power in the situation in the wrong way, indicating she views the community 
members as heedless. This highlights a side of development which some scholars have 
critiqued for suggesting that vulnerable populations are irresponsible, in that they have been 
given the knowledge and yet still act against it (Mohan, 2007). In actuality, this could highlight 
a lack of understanding behind community members behaviour, in Mwalija for example, the 
unwillingness to move is related to resources but also to community power dynamics and the 
influence of the village head, as I will elaborate on in the next section. 
 
 One NGO employee, Jake, went further to suggest that community members’ 
traditional values need to change. Jake was the only interviewee to state this directly, yet I 
acknowledged in my field notes, a sense dissatisfaction with those in rural communities after 
10 of the government and NGO interviews. Jake is an employee in the NGO which is 
attempting to persuade those at village Mwalija to resettle and suggests they are responsible 
for exacerbating their suffering: 
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Jake (NGO, 2017): ‘To cling to the tradition and values, while suffering with this 
situation, or also to change their perception with the environment that we are in and 
the climate change and be a community that is going by what is happening currently. … 
this resettlement should be a success. Not because bongo [the NGO] has come in, not 
because the government has come in, but first of all they should understand the issue at 
hand. And changing their perception for us we felt it was a challenge because it was 
coming from another level, then we devised to bring it down so that they can understand 
it from this level of the same people that they meet daily.’ 
 
Similar to the previous quotes, Jake suggests that communities need to be ‘progressive’ and 
go with what is ‘happening currently’, instead of ‘clinging to traditions and values’. Jake 
implies the community needs ‘to understand the issue at hand’ and that this understanding 
corresponds with the NGO understanding. This suggests that he views the NGO perspective 
as the right way to view this situation and the community view as outdated. Again suggesting 
that the community is ignorant and/or irresponsible, a view which is critiqued in development 
discourse (Mohan, 2007). Thus, what Jake highlights here is the real danger with sensitisation: 
the suggestion that the community understanding is wrong, they need to take the perspective 
of the NGO, but they need to come to this ‘on their own terms’ so it becomes their 
perspective. Effectively this is wiping away their previous understanding and introducing the 
NGO view but making it seem like it is theirs. Thus, the process of sensitisation present here 
illustrates a classic conundrum in development discourse: the desire to empower and give 
agency to vulnerable populations but only if it coincides with the NGO and government view 
(Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Escobar, 2011, Mohan, 2007). Sensitisation can therefore act as a 
government technique of subject formation, which is part of a governmentality rationale 
outlined in the literature review (Dean, 1999). This places this form of sensitisation on the 
manipulative rung of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation, making it non-participation. It 
also reiterates the perceived hierarchy of knowledge held by the government, outlined in 
Chapter 5.  
 
The quote illustrates how the community perspective is viewed as lesser than the NGO 
perspective. Jake highlights a great effort to make a change in mindset come from within, 
through the people ‘they meet daily’, yet it is clear that he views this knowledge as coming 
from a different level than that of the NGO. Indeed, he refers to ‘bringing it down so that they 
can understand it from this level’ which implies that he views them as on a lower level to 
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those in NGOs. Thus, the process of sensitisation here, reiterates the hierarchy between those 
in NGOs and government and those in the community. This is ironic as participatory 
approaches and sensitisation are meant to level this hierarchy, but in this instance appear to 
be reinforcing it, which is an established critique of participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), 
as set out in Chapter 2. It implies that those in NGOs and government view their knowledge 
as correct and part of their job is to impart it to others. This influences the way the knowledge 
is communicated, as if the organisation views there knowledge as correct they are less likely 
to listen to a different perspective. In analysing this, I am not commented on whose 
knowledge is correct or not, but rather how the perception of others’ knowledge influences 
communication. Scholars examining the empowering potential of participation have shown 
how high levels of participation come from conversations where understanding is shared in 
all directions, with no hierarchy placed upon them (Kamruzzaman, 2020). This would allow a 
flexibility and openness to welcome ulterior perspectives and a respect to adequately explain 
why this may not be possible, and it is these aspects which I argue the perceived hierarchy of 
knowledge is preventing and therefore inhibiting participation to move beyond being 
tokenistic.   
 
 This section on participation builds on the government structure section of the 
previous chapter to illustrate the various ways in which the community is part of the 
government approach to resettlement. It does this by analysing the attempts made by the 
government and NGOs to include the community members in the resettlement process. In 
this research, I am not passing judgement on whose knowledge is more important or correct, 
rather I am attempting to analyse the process and level of participation involved in the 
resettlement process. Important in this is understanding how actors are perceived, my 
research illustrates how there is heterogeneity within group understandings (see section 5.2 
which shows the heterogeneity in government and NGO understandings of resettlement, and 
section 6.2, which indicates the variety in community agency present), however these group 
understanding can be homogenized by an outsider, which has important ramifications for the 
process and deepness of participation (Arnstein, 1969). The research suggests there is a desire 
to include community members points of view, but that this does not always follow through. 
Indeed, often, these methods which are meant to increase participation actually decrease 
diversity in opinion through imposing knowledge on a group without fully listening and 
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communicating with the group. If the group is listened to it appears the communication is not 
finished off to illustrate why certain views are not being acted on. This may lead to a unified 
opinion; however, it is unlikely to be one that has come from allowing all voices to be 
communicated with. This suggests that the level of participation present is, at best, tokenistic 
(Arnstein, 1969). Some of the discussion over sensitisation goes further to reiterate the 
perceived hierarchy of knowledge outlined in Chapter 5, as it indicates a presumption that 
knowledge flows unilaterally downward to communities. The next section will explore how 
communities actually start to re-appropriate the government form of resettlement to work 
for them. 
 
6.4 Community Re-Appropriation of Resettlement 
 
 This section will illustrate how the communities under study contest the view of 
resettlement held by those in government and NGOs. They re-appropriate it to show how it 
should work for them. The word ‘re-appropriate’ has specifically been chosen, as often ‘to 
appropriate’ has connotations of the West taking aspects of culture or knowledge from the 
Global South without permission or consultation, and sometimes using it for their own 
purposes in ways it was never intended (Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Halvorsen, 2019). Re-
appropriate is purposely used here to illustrate how this formal process of resettlement is 
contrary to the custom in the communities but yet they can still use it to show what they need 
from resettlement. Thus, they are re-appropriating the term. In this way they are causing 
those in government and NGOs to question how best to undertake resettlement projects. 
This use of the term ‘re-appropriate’ is also seen in Van Damme and Neluvhalani (2004) work 
exploring the increasing uptake of indigenous knowledge into education systems in the Global 
South. They illustrate how locals are re-appropriating out-dated, colonially influenced 
education systems to better suit their society.  
 
The re-appropriation of resettlement in my research is most apparent at the 
community at Nyachikadza but is also present at village Mwalija and to some extent at Jombo 
resettlement site. In this section, I explore how the government and NGO view of 
resettlement is re-appropriated in each of these communities to illustrate what they need 
from the process and what this means for their role within it. Much of this re-appropriation 
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is about highlighting the issues each community has with Resettlement, as can be seen in 
Table 6.1. Thus, these issues form the basis for the re-appropriation and I shall explore them 
below.   
 
Table 6. 1 Summary of the issues with Resettlement found in each community 
Community Issues with Resettlement 
Jombo 
Resettlement Site 
Integration into host community – They are still not accepted or feel 
at home in the host community. 
Village Mwalija Community decision making – The village head holds influence and 
the community feel inadequately consulted by the NGO involved. 
TA Nyachikadza Land – The fertility of the land in Nyachikadza and the lack of 
available land close by to Resettle to, which would enable them to 
still cultivate their fertile land.   
 
The re-appropriation resonates with the ideas of community agency discussed above 
(Brown and Westaway, 2011), as it involves the communities making their voices heard in the 
determination of the structures being placed on them. When communities have collective 
agency, as at Nyachikadza, they most strongly re-appropriate resettlement. The other two 
communities, with their more diverse agency, illustrate further the nuance of resettlement, 
how it does not conform to expectation. This can be seen in their forms of re-appropriation. 
In this way re-appropriation is similar to the ‘claims-making’ from below suggested by Arnall 
et al. (2019) as a key way to ensure community participation in government resettlement. 
However, ‘claims-making’ is different in that the re-appropriation I discuss below, does not 
occur from any formal kind of protest or activism (Arnall et al., 2019) but more through the 
collective community agency discussed above. The notion of re-appropriation resonates 
better with the work of Scott (2008), Weapons of the Weak. Particularly his notion that the 
vulnerable poor can resist without forming a revolutionary party but through their everyday 
actions, which slightly oppose the hegemonic ideas placed upon them (Scott, 2008). However, 
Scott’s (2008) identified forms of resistance are more subtle than in my research, in which it 
occurs through refusing to resettle, or through failing to act out successful resettlement if 
resettled. In this way the communities are destabilising the government and NGO perceived 
hierarchy of knowledge set out in Chapter 5. 
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6.4.1 Re-Appropriation at Nyachikadza 
 
 Nyachikadza provides a key example of the strength of a community against a 
government strategy. As established, the government has declared TA Nyachikadza as not fit 
for human settlement and put in place a no-go zone, meaning there is no humanitarian 
assistance or government services. This community has a reputation of being reluctant to 
resettle, as was made evident to me informally by the two government translators I used with 
this community, as well as in seven of the government and NGO interviews.  Indeed, this 
community is stigmatised by the government for their approach to resettlement. As touched 
on, this is an interesting contrast to those at Jombo resettlement site who are praised for 
their resettlement, despite that both communities involve movements driven by cultivation 
and flooding. However, unless the movement is mandated or approved by the government it 
appears to not be appreciated or supported by them. Instead of those at Nyachikadza being 
disheartened by this stigma and the lack of assistance they receive, three quarters of those 
interviewed from this community demonstrated a sense of pride to be from Nyachikadza, 
even to go so far as to rejoice in the autonomy this enabled, as shown by Aliva: 
 
Aliva: ‘In Nyachikadza, we do not depend on assistance, but in TA Ndamera we would 
depend on government and NGOs for each and every thing … So, we are content, we 
have whatever we need.’ 
 
Aliva emphasises how the independence from assistance satisfies and fulfils their community. 
It raises questions over the notion of identity and sense of belonging, and the role that one’s 
country, land and government have in this. In this case it highlights the land and community 
as the key priority.  
 
 Moreover, it is not just the freedom from dependency that appears to give those at 
Nyachikadza a sense of autonomy, there is also a deep connection with the land. There were 
three analogies that came out of the interviews to express this. Sofia highlights a stimulating 
example:  
 
Sofia (Nyachikadza, 2017): ‘I was born there so that’s my place. Can you take a crocodile 
and put that crocodile in the upper land where there is no water? No. we are crocodiles 
and we live with the water’.  
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It is interesting that she compares them to a crocodile, a creature most would fear, yet which 
she believes most resembles them. It is evidence of their relationship and adaptation to this 
area that a creature an outsider would fear, they view as kin. It illustrates their local 
connection and communication with the constantly changing area they inhabit, tying in with 
the discussion of indigenous knowledge set out in Chapter 2 (Briggs, 2013). It also reiterates 
their independence from government and external involvement and assistance. However, 
they are very aware that the government wants them to move. 
 
My research suggests that those from Nyachikadza may use their mobility as a 
bargaining tool in the resettlement process. I have illustrated that despite external pressure, 
Nyachikadza three quarters of residents interviewed strongly refuse to resettle away from 
their area. Nine of the 16 Nyachikadza respondents mentioned the importance of the fertility 
of the land at Nyachikadza as a key reason why they did not want to resettle, indicating the 
significance of having access to this land. Indeed, two respondents went further to suggest 
they would resettle if the right land was available for them to move to, as can be seen by 
Isaac:  
 
Isaac (Nyachikadza, 2017): “The government of UDF [United Democratic Front] is the 
government that has come with the decision that it is a disaster area. So, from that time 
to this time they have not given us a place to go, they haven’t given us land. They just 
say ‘move from that area to the upper land, move from that area to the upper land’ but 
they haven’t, the government hasn’t given us the land.” 
 
Isaac shows how they cannot move without the government providing them with a place to 
go, reiterating the responsibility of the government to facilitate resettlement, building on 
previous discussion, but also suggesting that they will refuse to move until this is fulfilled. The 
emphasis on the fertility of the land found in over half the Nyachikadza interviews, and the 
strong connection to Nyachikadza and reluctance to resettle found in three quarters of the 
interviews, illustrates how the people of Nyachikadza are making themselves part of the 
resettlement process by indicating the importance of land for them, and their reluctance to 
resettle. They are thus obtaining agency through failing to oblige with government wishes. 
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 The case of Nyachikadza highlights how the government’s current approach to 
resettlement is not welcomed by all who are vulnerable to flooding. It illuminates the areas 
where greater consideration and discussion is required. Chiefly, that of land. It also shows 
that no matter what pressure the government place on a community, short of destroying 
their home area and physically forcing people to move, they cannot make the people of 
Nyachikadza move out. This shows the power and conviction a vulnerable population can 
have, despite the harsh livelihoods they may face (Scott, 2008). Eight of the government and 
NGO interviewees recognised the importance of fertile land for communities. Additionally, in 
Chapter 5, I illustrated how government was aware of the need to move to more temporary 
resettlement to allow for the continuing use of land. However, the way that this was discussed 
also illustrated that the approach of temporary resettlement was used ‘to maintain buy in’ to 
resettlement, with the hope that it would turn into the government desired permanent 
resettlement (Mtafu, Government, 2017). This suggests the community views were 
potentially only considered to facilitate the government desired resettlement, suggesting that 
possibly they are only re-appropriating resettlement to some extent, and may still be being 
manipulated by government desires (Dean, 1999). A different aspect of re-appropriation can 
be seen by those in village Mwalija. 
 
6.4.2 Re-Appropriation at Village Mwalija 
 
 Village Mwalija provides a slightly different re-appropriation than is evident at 
Nyachikadza. The community at Mwalija is not directly opposing government wishes by 
refusing resettlement. They are still deciding. However, what they are contesting is the 
hegemonic view that resources are the key necessity to resettlement. This follows the logic 
of the immobility paradox: those who are most vulnerable to environmental change will be 
the least able to move because they have too few resources and will subsequently be trapped 
in their vulnerable area (Foresight, 2011). As established, village Mwalija is being offered 
assistance with the resettlement: an NGO has committed to provide assistance to the most 
vulnerable households and a borehole has been drilled in the new place. These resources are 
important, and two interviewees from this community, who presumably would not be 
categorised as ‘most vulnerable’, expressed a desire to resettle but cited the lack of resources 
as the key constraint. However, as the interview analysis in sections 6.2 and 4.3 have shown, 
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there are other more influential impediments to their resettlement, chiefly the influence of 
the village head. This suggests that other cultural factors may be important in resettlement 
decisions. In particular, the role of customary leadership. The new place for resettling village 
Mwalija is within the same TA so no change in customary leadership is required. Yet, the 
village head still seems to be impeding the movement by not moving first, which appears to 
be crucial in the resettlement. This was demonstrated by almost a third of Mwalija 
interviewees, more than those who referred resources as the key inhibitor. It illustrates that 
the situation is more complicated than just enabling a resettlement which requires no change 
in leadership. Thus, village Mwalija re-appropriates the idea of resettlement to make it more 
than just resources, a key focus of the government and of resettlement literature (Stal, 2011, 
Tadgell et al., 2018). It highlights how there needs to also be greater attention to the 
community dynamics within the resettlement and a recognition of the potential hierarchical 
agency that can evolve from this (see section 6.2). 
 
 The NGO involved in the potential resettlement believed they were providing 
adequate resources by installing a borehole in the new site and assisting with the 
infrastructure for new houses. As shown by Jake: 
 
Jake (NGO, 2017): ‘We had a specific area that we wanted to support, that is rebuilding 
their life by contributing to their infrastructure in the first place we identified 65 families 
to start with, as an ongoing project. So, these 65 families were identified by all 
stakeholders. They were heavily hit by floods. Whereby all their infrastructures were 
demolished. And then they were living with the friends, within the very same area. … 
then we roped in other stakeholders from the assembly [district council] level to put up 
boreholes in that area.’ 
 
There is a clear emphasis on infrastructure. However, it is not completely universal, it is only 
the most vulnerable who receive the most benefit of this project. This could be a reason why 
there is mixed feelings from those in the communities, as previously highlighted. Jake 
discusses the initial enthusiasm by those at village Mwalija for the project but the lack of 
follow through, with people being unwilling to commit to it.  
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 Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the lack of participation involved in the 
planning of the resettlement at Mwalija is a key reason why two community residents are 
unwilling to commit. Jacob’s view, is exemplary at highlighting this: 
 
Jacob (Mwalija 2017): ‘I suggest that those NGOs that want to help here should also be 
coming here to ask for our views, instead of maybe making their plans at a district level 
and then come here to drill the boreholes … I would prefer those should be coming here 
and say where should we drill the boreholes?’ 
 
The lack of participation within the process means community members do not see it as being 
best for them. This implies that resources are not the only things required to move but also a 
willingness and investment in the resettlement process. It also reiterates the need for 
resettlement to be community led, emphasised earlier and in the literature (Wilmsen and 
Wang, 2015, Tadgell et al., 2018). However, Jake, employee of the NGO involved, suggests 
other factors for the unwillingness to move. The lack of follow through with the project, Jake 
attributes to ‘fears’ in the community of changes to chieftaincy and moving away from their 
ancestral land. Jake describes the situation now:  
 
Jake (NGO, 2017): ‘We said OK, can we give you another chance. Now it is you to call us, 
if you are ready to move after resolving all this, of your fears and all that’.  
 
Jake’s reference here to giving them another chance, implies they were at fault to not proceed 
with the resettlement initially. His tone and grouping together of ‘fears and all that’, suggests 
he does not appreciate or understand these issues. However, Jake acknowledges that it is 
hard for him to appreciate the viewpoint of those in communities and aims to be flexible to 
this. 
 
The resistance of the people in the village Mwalija community to conform to the NGO 
view of resettlement has led to some changes to the resettlement proposal. Indeed, Jake 
suggests that the opinion of his NGO has changed from a permanent move to a more flexible 
form of resettlement: 
 
Jake (NGO): ‘Always I have been thinking, because they have not been contacting us … 
You need to develop an approach of how can we move with this approach? How can we 
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understand each other with this approach? So that the permanent resettlement area is 
where their property and everything can be. And then this area is an area where they 
can still practice whatever, but during the rainy period we sensitise them and they go 
back to their permanent structures. Those are just kind of an office thing that I am trying 
to develop kind of, because maybe we cannot understand. And we cannot push, but we 
can at least balance up to solve the situation at hand, of which is flooding.’ 
 
Jake illustrates how the silence of the community on proceeding with the resettlement has 
acted as a form of communication. It has led him to think further on how he can change the 
approach to resettlement to make it more acceptable. He is aware that he may not fully 
understand their reasons and hence it is difficult to push the resettlement, but he can be 
flexible with how the resettlement process could take place to better allow for the current 
difficulties he is coming up against. It thus shows an adaptability in the governance of 
resettlement and, similar to what Scott (2008) found, how the resistance of the vulnerable 
can lead to change in the hegemony. This is particularly important for resettlement as it is still 
in the early stages of establishment, without a formal policy and thus more able to be 
influenced and altered. 
 
 However, I acknowledge that two in the community did refer to lack of resources as 
the hindrance to their resettlement and five did suggest that they were waiting on the NGO 
assistance, whilst the NGO said they were waiting to be called by the community. This has 
been mentioned previously however, it is relevant I restate in this section to highlight how 
the resistance may not be intentional. Alternatively, community members may cite lack of 
resources or lack of communication from the NGO in the interviews due to their perceived 
audience. They may believe that I, as a Western researcher could impact the resettlement 
situation in some way, either by providing more resources or reminding the NGO of their 
presence. I was made aware that they had discussed as a community what they should say to 
me in the interviews. If the discussion was intentionally manipulated to provide them with 
more attention and resources, then that in itself could be a form of manipulation of the 
system.   
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6.4.3 Re-Appropriation at Jombo 
 
 The re-appropriation of resettlement present in the resettled community at Jombo 
occurs in their integration with the host community. A key part of a successful resettlement 
is a smooth integration in the host area. However, the community at Jombo have been there 
for two years and still face problems of integrating with the host community, with hostilities 
mentioned by half of the Jombo respondents. Connected to this, is the uncertainty over who 
is there leader, coming out of almost three quarters of the respondents, which is felt in part 
due to their constant return and contact with their previous area, which all the respondents 
bar one, who worked at the Illovo sugar plantation, took part in. Their previous area is where 
their cultivation lands are situated. Therefore, it is unsurprising that they travel to this area 
frequently. However, it makes it harder for them to fully belong in their host area. Indeed, 
there is lack of willingness to integrate into the host community. This is where the 
government view of successful resettlement, suggested for those at Jombo resettlement site, 
is contested. 
 
 There is a deep connection felt to their previous area which inhibits those at Jombo 
resettlement site from conforming to the new community. This is apparent in over a quarter 
of the Jombo interviews and is illustrated by Henry: 
 
Henry (Jombo, 2017): ‘deep down in my heart I know I am under Champanda, where I 
came from, because that is where we are doing our farming and that land is controlled 
by farming’.  
 
Henry’s use of ‘deep down’, implies that this is where he feels he belongs. Additionally, his 
link to farming, reiterates the role that farming has in these communities in forming identity. 
As it is suggested that future resettlement should allow for return to the previous area for 
cultivation, it is likely that integration into a host area may continue to be difficult. This is 
particularly the case when allegiance is still held to the previous area. Indeed, Kenny highlights 
how strong this can be: 
 
Kenny (Jombo, 2017): ‘I am worried that I have grown up under Champanda, and 
Champanda, I regard him as my father, and I have come here and now I am under a new 
father who adopted me. I felt like Champanda loved me unlike this one. That is why 
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sometimes when items or food come to be distributed to this area, those from Lighton 
Jombo would prefer to write names from his village, and these ones [those resettled] 
become the last, most of the time a few people are taken as beneficiaries, whilst people 
are left.’ 
 
Kenny illustrates the deep relationship possible with village heads. He uses the metaphor of 
family, which has been used previously in section 6.2 to discuss the connection, or lack of it, 
with a village head for those at Jombo resettlement site. The role of the village head appears 
to impact their sense of belonging and identities, seen through the hostilities related to aid 
relief discussed previously. This could also highlight the imbalance that external intervention, 
such as relief aid, can cause to local systems.  
 
The government appear aware of the need to include the host community in the 
resettlement process. This comes out from the DoDMA official interviews as well as local 
government official, Charles discusses the strategy of inclusion of the host community: 
 
Charles (Government, 2017): ‘The hosting community is also maybe interested, maybe 
interested in the maybe social support that is maybe being channelled to the internally 
displaced people who have maybe possibly been resettled or integrated in the existing 
villages. So, the approach now, has been that whenever we are bringing an intervention 
in that particular community we should also make sure that, even some members of the 
host community should also be benefitting, which is even making it very expensive 
because you can not only maybe think of the vulnerable households which were possibly 
affected by the floods, but even considering people who were not affected by floods, but 
maybe by the fact that they have allowed these people to be integrated to come in their 
community then that is even calling for more.’ 
 
The many ‘maybes’ used by Charles illustrate the multiple ways that the resettlement process 
can play out and influence those involved. However, Charles suggests that the government is 
aware that the involvement of a host community and the need for integration of one 
community into another has the potential to be problematic. The fact that he says ‘the 
approach now’ implies that this is new and could perhaps be due to the lessons learned from 
the Jombo resettlement. The hostilities with the host community at Jombo also came out of 
two NGO interviews, and was mentioned on the way to the site by the government translator, 
this suggests that it is quite well known, but this does not explain why initially this community 
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was suggested to me by a DoDMA government employee as a success story of resettlement. 
It is interesting that Charles’ main focus in this is regarding resources and the more resources 
that including the host community requires, emphasising the strain on resources felt by his 
department.  
 
 The re-appropriation of resettlement at Jombo is light compared to that at 
Nyachikadza. It is not actually prohibiting the resettlement, just hindering its ‘success’. 
However, the issue of integration into a host community and developing a new sense of 
belonging and identity is often not considered in the resettlement process, yet it is vital to its 
realisation. Government and NGO employees do seem to be increasingly aware of this: two 
of the NGO employees interviewed, as well as the two government officials discussed earlier, 
mention the role of host communities. It may have been ill considered previously because it 
is a ‘post’ resettlement dilemma, in that it is important long after the initial resettlement 
occurs. Tadgell et al. (2018) emphasise the importance of considering the post resettlement 
phase when facilitating resettlement. Thus, the experience of those at Jombo helps to 
reshape the notion of resettlement so that it is not just about the actual move, but also the 
life after. 
 
In all three case studies the communities do insert their approaches onto resettlement 
and re-appropriate it for what it means to them. Each community shows their own stance on 
resettlement, simplistically these are: land at Nyachikadza; consideration of other factors 
than material resources, particularly to look further at leadership influences at village 
Mwalija; and life post the move at Jombo. Resettlement has yet to occur in the exact way 
predicted and initially planned by those in government and NGOs. However, in each case 
government and NGO workers seem to be responding to this. There appears to be a growing 
appreciation that can be seen throughout the Results for each of the issues illustrated here. 
This is encouraging for resettlement. It suggests that the voices of those who resettlement is 
supposedly for are audible and potentially able to destabilise the perceived knowledge 
hierarchy. However, it is still not clear whether they are truly being respected and viewed as 
equal to those from government and NGOs. There is suggestion they are just being listened 
to for the ease of facilitating resettlement. This reiterates questions of inclusivity and 
participation in resettlement, potentially highlighting the current pervasiveness of the 
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hierarchy of knowledge set out in Chapter 5, as this seems to influence how vulnerable 
populations are perceived. It suggests that managing resettlement as a form of adaptation to 
climate change, as promoted in the literature (Black et al., 2011b) is feasible when there is 
time to deliberate the best approach with all the actors involved and determine the best 
approach for voluntary resettlement. It is much harder when it is a reactive situation. This 
was the case at Jombo and potentially will be for many future situations, as many may prefer 
to hold off moving until they have no choice. The community re-appropriation also highlights 
the other factors, most notably around government control, that need to be constantly 
reviewed and reflected upon, in order to ensure fair resettlement. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter focuses on the involvement of the vulnerable communities in the 
resettlement process. The research suggests that the resettlement process is constantly 
evolving and is context specific (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015). Indeed, each community 
studied shows different forms of community agency occurring within them (Brown and 
Westaway, 2011). This contests the use of a universal approach to resettlement, for which 
the policy I outlined in the previous chapter is an advocacy for. It is a warning against the 
dangers of an inflexible approach to resettlement, as communities may not accept it. I 
illustrate in this chapter the influence that community members can have through re-
appropriation of resettlement, but which is not accessible to them through the current 
participation attempted by government and NGOs. Whilst NGOs and government officials do 
aim to include community members’ opinions in the resettlement process, the engrained 
hierarchy of knowledge perceived by those in government and NGOs prevents a conversation 
from occurring. Community opinions do not seem to be fully respected or communicated 
with, suggesting that an outdated view of development is occurring where community views 
are seen as potentially lesser or ignorant (Mohan, 2007). However, the re-appropriation of 
resettlement illustrated by the vulnerable communities, and the fact that at least some in 
government and NGOs are taking on board these points suggests a hopeful future direction 
for resettlement. It illustrates the fluidity of knowledge. Although, it is not clear whether the 
viewpoints of those in the communities are being considered because they are hindering the 
resettlement process, and therefore government must address them to ensure successful 
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resettlement; or because they are genuinely respected by the government. Regardless of the 
reason why, they are being listened to and addressed. In this way community members make 
themselves part of resettlement and indicating that with appropriate reflection, 
accountability, and communication, it can be a feasible form of adaptation to climate change 
(Black et al., 2011b, Miller and Dun, 2019).  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 The growing support for migration as adaptation to environmental change found in 
the literature (McLeman and Smit, 2006, Foresight, 2011, Black et al., 2011b, Arnall, 2018), 
and increasingly in governments and international organisations, has led to an increasing 
interest in governing environmental migration (Arnall, 2018). Due to the novelty of this 
interest, there is currently little research on the governance of environmental migration and, 
specifically, on the role of participation in that governance. This is the key gap in the literature 
that my research has contributed to. I explored this through focusing on one specific form of 
governed environmental migration, resettlement due to flooding in Malawi, and on three 
communities that had different attitudes towards resettlement: resettled, undecided and 
unwilling. Malawi is undergoing increasingly severe environmental change and its 
government and NGOs are questioning how best to manage these changes, with resettlement 
being a key flood management strategy. There is a resettlement policy in development but it 
has yet to be passed by parliament. Thus, government resettlement in the Lower Shire Region 
of Malawi has been an appropriate context in which to study the increasing interest in 
governing environmental migration, and how this process occurs in practice.  
 
 To explore the participatory nature of resettlement, my research focused on the 
knowledges and practices involved in the process. The focus on knowledges was particularly 
appropriate because environmental migration is context specific and personal. It involves 
moving out of a space, either permanently or temporarily, where people feel at home. Thus, 
there is the potential for many priorities to be involved in the movement, making it difficult 
for the process to be participatory, as all these multiple understanding need to be considered 
and communicated with. The issue of who has power and control in that decision-making 
process is further complicated by the varied and unpredictable impact that flooding can have, 
both on a personal level and more broadly. This research appreciated the dynamics of the 
knowledge production process of resettlement particularly through focusing on three 
communities with three different attitudes towards resettlement, which allowed for a clearer 
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view of the intricacies of the process. My research focused on using the following aim to 
answer three research questions outlined below:  
Aim 
To explore the extent of the participation of the relevant actors within the resettlement 
process in Malawi. 
Research questions 
1. How and why is flooding in Malawi seen as an increasing threat? 
2. How and why is resettlement used as a technique by government and NGOs to 
manage the population and flooding in Malawi? 
3. What role do flood-vulnerable communities have in the government strategy of 
resettlement? 
 
Through focusing on this aim and answering these research questions, I develop 
significant contributions both conceptually, particularly furthering the theory of participation, 
and empirically, through exploring three communities at three different stages of the 
resettlement process. From these I also provide tentative policy recommendations for the 
upcoming resettlement policy in Malawi. I set out these contributions and recommendations 
below before expanding on the relevance, and answer to, each research questions, which 
ultimately led to these contributions. Finally, I set out a key potential area of further research: 
community-led resettlement. 
 
7.2 Contributions and Recommendations  
 
7.2.1 Conceptual Contributions 
 
 My research adds to the theory on participation, particularly to the literature of 
participation in development, and to theory on community agency, with emphasis on 
resistance to resettlement. As established in Chapter 2, the literature has illustrated how 
participation can be detrimental to development by subtly reinforcing power dynamics 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001) but also can be transformative and empowering when actors are 
fully involved and deep participation, as set out by Arnstein (1969), can occur (Arnstein, 1969, 
Hickey and Mohan, 2008, Kamruzzaman, 2020). However, much of the literature recognises 
that it is not as simple as participation being either helpful or unhelpful, but rather there is a 
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scale of participation possible, ranging from participation being tyranny to participation being 
transformative and emancipatory (Kamruzzaman, 2020). The graded nature of participation 
is well established (cf. Arnstein, 1969) but the implications of this on the recent interest in 
resettlement as climate change adaptation have yet to be explored, and it is to this area in 
particular that my research contributes.  
 
 This research and the existing literature has illustrated how resettlement as climate 
change adaptation is difficult to navigate in a participatory manner for several reasons. Firstly, 
it is a novel form of climate change adaptation and there several ideas on how to approach 
it. This is evident in the vagueness of the existing international guidelines (Correa et al., 2011, 
Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, UNHCR, 2014, Displacement Solutions, 2013) and also in 
section 5.2 of this thesis, which highlights the multiple understandings of resettlement found 
in this research. Secondly, there is a sense of urgency around climate change actions. The 
media and literature is overwhelmed with discussions of tipping points and temperature rises 
(Falkner, 2016, Arnall et al., 2014) and so there is a pressure for governments and 
international development to act quickly. Thirdly, the lack of unity in understanding what 
resettlement entails can lead to a desire for a top down approach to resettlement. This is 
visible in section 5.4 of this research, which discusses the desire for a resettlement policy. 
Indeed, the historical use of resettlement in development was top-down, and my research, 
along with the literature, shows that these connotations still persist today (Wilmsen and 
Webber, 2015). However, the community responses explored in this research illustrate how 
resettlement due to climate change is highly emotive and likely to yield strong responses from 
the participants, as illustrated in section 6.4, highlighting the community re-appropriation of 
resettlement. This is a key reason why, if resettlement is to be adaptive rather than 
maladaptive, it needs to be participatory to ensure the participants are onboard and that their 
lives will be improved by the process. Thus, resettlement as climate change adaptation 
highlights a contradictory aspect of participation. Participation is particularly necessary in 
uncertain, urgent and emotive processes, such as resettlement as climate change adaptation, 
yet this is also when it is most difficult to carry out effectively due to the combination of the 
complexity and urgency, meaning there is a strong desire by those actors who are able to be 
more powerful in the process to use this power to ensure the process occurs. Thus, whilst 
participation platforms may be apparent in these uncertain, urgent and emotive processes, a 
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significant effort is necessary to ensure the level of participation is more than non-
participation or tokenistic, as set out by Arnstein (1969). My research adds further 
contributions related to what this significant effort may entail. 
 
 My research has illustrated that for participation to be effective, of a high level, it 
needs to be a conversation with all actors involved, where effort is made to ensure all sides 
are understood. It is not simply about listening to participants, but also communicating with 
them. This is similar to what several scholars have found in their exploration of the different 
levels or stages of participation (Arnstein, 1969, Cornwall, 2002, Kamruzzaman, 2020, White, 
1996). Previous research has suggested reasons why participation may not be meaningful, 
such as it being motivated by efficiency rather than power sharing, or an insufficient structure 
to allow for participation (Kamruzzaman, 2020), or the perception of different actors involved 
(Scott-Villiers, 2011). My research adds additional contributions to the participation literature 
through exploring further the inhibiting nature of perceptions on participation. Similar to the 
findings of scholars before me (Scott-Villiers, 2011, Kamruzzaman, 2020, Arnstein, 1969), my 
research illustrates how groups, such as vulnerable communities, are not homogenous but 
contain much diversity, see section 6.2 and 6.4 as well as the following paragraph. However, 
it is the perception and treatment of them as a homogenous group that can be particularly 
problematic for participation (Scott-Villiers, 2011, Kamruzzaman, 2020, Arnstein, 1969). My 
research links the perception of different groups to a perceived hierarchy of knowledge, see 
section 5.2, to suggest that a lack of respect for different understandings, prevents 
participation from occurring. Whilst others have made reference to the inhibitive nature of 
perceptions (Scott-Villiers, 2011), this direct linking of a perceived hierarchy of knowledge to 
the effectiveness of participation is a novel contribution of my research. It adds another 
dimension to participation, as it is not just about the context of the process, as discussed in 
the paragraph above, but rather the mindset of the actors involved. Thus, I argued that the 
effort mentioned in the previous paragraph, as necessary to ensure the level of participation 
is greater than tokenistic, is related to facilitating respect and an equal perception of 
knowledge between the actors involved in a process, without this I claimed it is impossible to 
have more than tokenistic participation.  
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  The contributions to concepts of community agency made in my research are evident 
primarily in the variety of agency displayed both between and within communities. The 
literature suggests that community agency refers to collective action formed through local 
relationships (Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010). However, my 
research highlights that because of the diversity of local relationships, collective action and 
therefore community agency can occur in a variety of ways, see sections 6.2 and 6.4. This 
indicates that vulnerable community members have much more individual agency than often 
allowed for in the literature (cf. Mwale et al., 2015), but also that this individual agency can 
come together in different ways to form community agency, and it is this which is novel in 
discussions of community agency: the exploring of the interaction between the individual and 
community agency, and how this can occur differently in different context. As touched on 
above, this has practical implications, as it highlights the necessity for an outsider to 
appreciate the context of each community and its members before embarking on something 
like participatory research, for example, as I elaborate on in the policy implications.  
 
7.2.2 Empirical Contributions 
 
 This research explored three communities with three different attitudes towards 
resettlement, but also at three different stages of resettlement. Those at TA Nyachikadza had 
not yet embarked on the resettlement process in any way; those at Village Mwalija were at 
the start of the process, considering resettlement; and those at Jombo resettlement site had 
resettled. There is as yet no study which explores communities at different stages of 
resettlement as climate change adaptation within the same country and time frame. Studying 
the different stages of resettlement illustrated the different priorities apparent at each stage. 
For those at Nyachikadza it was the importance of land and their strong connection to 
Nyachikadza; for those at Village Mwalija it was the community decision making dynamics; 
and for those at Jombo resettlement site, it was the interaction with the host community. 
This gives an insight to what might be important for the government to consider at the 
different stages of resettlement and could be a useful approach to exploring the resettlement 
process in the future. Indeed, from this research I produce four policy recommendations.  
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7.2.3 Policy Recommendations 
 
Malawi is in the process of developing a resettlement policy, the first of its kind in 
Malawi. Based on my research I produce four policy recommendations: 
1. Build on existing community movements. My research illustrated that 
movement was used in every community as a way to manage flooding, as a 
form of temporary seasonal migration, but, whilst over half NGO and 
government interviewees recognised the potential in temporary seasonal 
resettlement, none made the connection to the existing community 
movements. This seems like a natural place to start. 
2. Incorporate the host community from the beginning. The resettled community 
at Jombo illustrates how unresolved issues with the host community will 
pervade for years after the initial resettlement. Thus, the host community 
needs to be include from the beginning.  
3. Appreciate community power dynamics. The process at village Mwalija 
highlighted the influence of the village head in the community decision 
making. However, the research also showed, in section 5.3.1, how village 
heads may have their own agendas. The complexity of communities 
highlighted in the theoretical contributions need to be allowed for in the 
resettlement policy.  
4. Enter into a resettlement conversation with vulnerable community members. 
Building on the theoretical contributions, this is to allow for adequate 
participation to occur.  
 
7.3 Research Question 
 
7.3.1 How and Why is Flooding Seen as an Increasing Threat? 
 
Previous research has illustrated the potential for hidden agendas behind 
resettlement, for it to be used as a method to gain greater control over the population and 
push it into a certain economy (Arnall, 2018, Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019, Wilmsen and Rogers, 
2019). I was interested to see whether this was occurring in Malawi. It was not. Rather, my 
research showed how an illustrated increase in flooding was viewed as a significant enough 
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threat to legitimise government involvement in resettlement. This signified the legitimisation 
process that Arnall (2018) highlights as central in the use of resettlement as adaptation to 
climate change. Thus, I highlighted how the government produced a visible space for 
governance, which is consistent with the governmentality framework outlined by Dean 
(1999). However, in section 5.2, I took this further to question the motivations of government 
resettlement, exploring if there was an agenda behind the legitimization of government 
involvement or whether it was solely due to a desire to manage flooding effectively. Following 
the example of Rogers and Wilmsen’s (2019) suggested motivations of resettlement, I queried 
whether resettlement in Malawi was advocated for due to altruism, to save vulnerable 
people; to gain more control over an increasingly mobile population; for improved economic 
efficiency; to form a certain type of citizen desirable to the government; or in response to 
pressure from the international community to invest in climate change adaptation. Whilst I 
found a mixture of these motivations to be apparent in my research, predominantly the 
motivations present were altruistic. Thus, I answered why flooding was seen as an increasing 
threat: because there was a belief in increasing flood and responses to this were driven 
primarily by a desire to assist those most vulnerable. This helped provide the context for 
exploring the resettlement process. Next, I summarize how flooding was seen as an increasing 
threat.  
 
 My research showed that the analysis of flooding data was one technique the 
government used to legitimise its involvement in resettlement. I described this data in 
Chapter 4, it highlighted the increasing severity of flooding, essentially presenting flooding as 
a national threat. This data made up part of the episteme of government, forming the 
government’s knowledge base (Dean, 1999). In Chapter 4, I showed how the government 
relied on this data to illustrate the increasing flooding in Malawi. Data on weather metrics 
over time is commonly used to highlight climate change and the need for action (Lövbrand 
and Stripple, 2011) and so it was unsurprising that the government used this to justify their 
interest in flooding and resettlement. Furthermore, I highlighted how the use of such data 
was synonymous to technocratic forms of knowledge, indicating the presence of an audit 
culture (Kuus, 2016). This is common in national government, especially one with a reliance 
on donor aid. Thus, I concluded that there was little evidence that the government had a 
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hidden agenda behind the government interest in resettlement. This was important to 
establish before analysing the resettlement process in more detail. 
 
7.3.2 How and Why is Resettlement Used as a Technique by Government and NGOs to 
Manage the Population and Flooding in Malawi? 
 
 In answering this research question, I developed two key connected points from my 
research: the difference and disconnect between those in government and NGOs, and those 
in the flooding-vulnerable communities; and the hierarchy of knowledge perceived by those 
in government and NGOs. These points are connected because the difference and disconnect 
is a key reason why the perceived hierarchy of knowledge pervades. The differences and 
perceived hierarchy were identified when exploring why resettlement was used as a 
technique by government. How resettlement is used as a technique by government and NGOs 
was less clear, but in many ways more straightforward. At the time of research there was no 
unified approach to government resettlement but there were hopes that this will be provided 
by the upcoming resettlement policy. This resettlement policy would be a top-down method 
of instigating and managing resettlement. As mentioned, much of the resettlement literature 
suggests that top-down policies do not adequately reflect the needs of those resettling and 
that resettlement works better when community led (Arnall et al., 2019, Tadgell et al., 2018). 
My Results showed that those in government and NGOs appeared somewhat aware of the 
need for participation, yet still it did not occur. Indeed, many government and NGO 
employees interviewed showed a desire for a resettlement policy that would enable more 
power to government to enforce resettlement, rather than being more open to community 
concerns. Therefore, this was significant for my key contributions, as it explored further why 
government resettlement in this region in Malawi is top down with little respect for 
community concerns.  
 
 Resettlement has connotations of being top-down and abrupt (Rogers and Wilmsen, 
2019). The abrupt nature was favoured because flooding was seen as a significant threat, as 
illustrated above, and resettlement was viewed as removing the vulnerable population from 
danger. In section 5.3 and 5.4, my research illustrated that there were platforms for 
participation but a top down approach was favoured. I argued this was due to a perceived 
difference, which I illustrated in section 4.4, between those who the government and NGOs 
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viewed as responsible for causing the increasingly severe flooding – those in vulnerable 
communities, and those they viewed as responsible for managing the severe flooding – 
themselves. This difference was particularly evident in the difference between Resettlement 
and resettlement illustrated in Table 4.1 Moreover, I argued that this difference manifested 
itself in a perceived hierarchy of knowledge, see Figure 5.2.  
 
 
My research highlighted how a perceived hierarchy of knowledge in the resettlement 
process developed when those interviewed in positions of power (government and NGOs) 
felt disconnected to the vulnerable populations, and viewed a problem, such as flooding, as 
significant enough to merit their involvement. This hierarchy of knowledge can be 
summarised diagrammatically, as indicated in Figure 5.2. The figure sets out how large 
international organisations and donors, such as the World Bank, are viewed by those in 
government and NGOs as at the top of the knowledge hierarchy and have strongest influence 
over funding and the direction of many development projects. They often work with national 
government and so these are second in the hierarchy, followed by the local government and 
smaller NGOs, which my research suggested to be under the instruction of the government. 
At the bottom of this hierarchy are the vulnerable populations for whom the resettlement 
process is supposedly for. Other scholars, such as Li (2007), Goldman (2001) and Ferguson 
(1994) have found similar situations within development projects. Indeed much of the work 
on participation within development has been concerned with levelling this hierarchy (Hickey 
and Mohan, 2008). Thus, important for developing my contributions was analysing how a 
hierarchy occurs in, and the subsequent implications it can have on, the evolving issue of 
managing the social impacts of climate change, which environmental migration governance, 
and resettlement due to flooding more specifically, fall into. 
 
Sensitisation was a key method through which the government and NGOs attempted 
to level understanding. I showed how this was discussed by NGO and government employees 
interviewed, particularly when a community was not behaving in the desired way. As I set out 
in Chapter 2, there is little literature on sensitisation in development, although it fits with 
concerns about the hypocrisy of participation outlined in some critiques (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001). I argued the focus was on ‘educating’ communities to the ‘correct’ way of behaving 
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that fitted with government and NGO understandings and that sensitisation was not 
participatory. Thus, I highlighted how the critiques directed at participatory approaches also 
applied to sensitisation. In particular, the critiques highlighting how participation, or in this 
case sensitisation, can perpetuate existing power dynamics, often without those of low power 
being aware it is happening (Kapoor, 2005). This was influential in the development of my 
conceptual contributions, as I showed how a system built on a perceived hierarchy of 
knowledge, gave little agency to those in communities who the resettlement was meant to 
benefit. This was particularly surprising when there has been much discussion in the literature 
on the importance of participation in development (Hickey and Mohan, 2008, Kindon et al., 
2007, McKinnon, 2007, Mohan, 2007, Kesby, 2005) and resettlement more specifically 
(Wilmsen and Wang, 2015, Arnall, 2018) and when an aim at participation was implicit in the 
interviews.  
 
7.3.3 What Role do Flood-Vulnerable Communities Have in the Government Strategy of 
Resettlement? 
 
My research illustrated that the bulk of the power over the resettlement process 
decisions lay with large international organisations, government and to some extent, NGOs. 
However, the resettlement under research required the voluntary movement of a community 
out of their home to a new one for some period of time. It was consequently a highly emotive 
issue. Whilst the perceived hierarchy of knowledge within the process did not allow much 
agency to the communities, my research showed that the resettlement process was viewed 
as voluntary and the communities were not physically forced out of their homes. Therefore, 
community members found ways to exercise their agency and meet their needs within the 
resettlement process. In exploring this I developed my final conceptual contribution on 
community agency. 
 
 In two of the communities studied, official government or NGO resettlement was yet 
to take place. My research suggested that there were specific reasons for why this was the 
case, as seen in Table 6.1. I argued that these specific reasons illustrated that the communities 
did have some agency within the resettlement process, as they were able to highlight, if 
asked, their needs within the process. The resettled and host community exhibited their 
agency through the lack of integration of the resettled community into the host community, 
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which had persisted two years after the resettlement. The continuing separation of the 
resettled and host part of the community showed that adequate consideration of the host 
community is needed for successful resettlement to occur.  
 
For each community, agency was expressed in different ways, highlighting the 
multiple systems in which a community can interact, as indicated in the conceptual 
contributions. My research outlined three forms of community agency: cohesive, hierarchical 
and segregated. As my conceptual contribution highlighted, these forms of community 
agency nuance the notion of community agency present in the literature (Eversole, 2011, 
Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010, Brown and Westaway, 2011), 
reiterating the need for a context specific approach in resettlement and in the governance of 
environmental migration more generally. It also gave more nuance to the role of the 
community in the resettlement process. Often the literature clumps together vulnerable 
communities (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019), focusing on the inhibiting nature of the vulnerability. 
This prevents exploration into the ways in which vulnerable communities conduct their 
livelihoods whilst still being vulnerable (Scott, 2008), an interesting understudied aspect. 
Much policy research is focused on providing a solution (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, 
UNHCR, 2014), when a key contribution that this research illustrated is that much can be 
learnt from exploring the agency of the vulnerable community.  
 
 I illustrated that the reasons given for the lack of movement exhibited by the ‘yet to 
resettle’ communities, and the failure of the resettled community to fully integrate into the 
host community, highlighted each community’s needs within the resettlement process. In this 
way they re-appropriate resettlement. The data suggested that this lack of movement, or lack 
of success in resettlement, was forcing the government and NGOs to listen to the concerns of 
those in communities and address them, but only with the conviction that this would 
ultimately serve the government’s desired approach. Thus, I argued that they were able to 
listen and include the concerns of those in the communities because this was framed as a way 
of reaching the government’s goals. It did not suggest that these concerns were being 
included because of a genuine appreciation of the community needs but rather because this 
facilitated resettlement. This was significant in forming my conceptual contributions, as it 
opens up an understudied aspect of resettlement and participation research more generally: 
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the importance of the perception and respect of the vulnerable population. Respect is 
subjective and difficult to analyse empirically. The implications of a lack of respect for the 
process of resettlement, or participation more broadly, is consequently hard to deduce. 
Scholars such as Arnall (2018) and Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) have highlighted the 
importance of how those resettling are framed in determining the process of the movement. 
Arnall (2018) goes further to link the development narratives to government perceptions of 
vulnerable populations. However, more research is needed to explore further the significance 
of perception and respect on the resettlement outcome. 
 
7.4 Further Research: Producing a Framework for Community-Based 
Resettlement 
 
 Given the need for resettlement as climate change adaptation to be voluntary, and 
therefore participatory, it is important for research to focus further on communities’ use of 
resettlement. In this research I have set out a rationale as to how and why governments may 
be getting increasingly interested in using resettlement as climate change adaptation, and 
what this process might look like from a government perspective. Much of the resettlement 
literature calls for adaptive resettlement to be community led (Arnall, 2018, Arnall et al., 
2019, Miller and Dun, 2019, Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). However, there 
is sparse literature on how this should occur. Thus, future research could explore further how 
to make resettlement more community focused, as my research has highlighted that a 
prejudice against the capability and knowledge of vulnerable communities still pervades, 
despite extensive research arguing against this, and impacts the meaningfulness of 
participation. However, my research does not explore in detail how to respond to these 
findings.  
 
Whilst high level participation was not evident in the process of resettlement present 
in this research, the potential benefit of high level participation, participation as conversation, 
was. Much of the literature discusses the hypothetical benefit of participation, how it can be 
empowering for the community (Kamruzzaman, 2020), how it can be level power dynamics 
(Kesby, 2007) but more research is needed to understand better how this works. In my 
research I illustrate how vulnerable community members use movement as a way to manage 
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flooding, see section 4.3. Over half of the government and NGO interviewees, however, did 
suggest that temporary seasonal resettlement would be appropriate way to manage flooding, 
see section 5.2. The temporary seasonal resettlement is very similar to the existing use of 
movement by rural community members, yet, only two government and NGO interviewees 
barely acknowledge this fact, and no interviewee suggests that the existing movements could 
be worked with and developed further into a more formal type of temporary resettlement. 
In theory, many of the challenges around implementing resettlement, such as land 
availability, acceptance of the host community, changing of chieftaincy, connection to land 
and acceptance of new areas; should be much lower if resettlement was built from existing 
movement, links and ties established in the community. Thus, it would be interesting to 
explore further how this could work. 
 
Indeed, for many flooding-vulnerable communities, flooding is a not a new 
phenomenon. It is something they have been coping with for many years. Moving out of the 
path of an impending flood is a common strategy for vulnerable communities to manage 
flooding, as I found in my research. Therefore, I suggest that an interesting piece of future 
research could be to explore these movements further, examining exactly how communities 
use movement to manage flooding, gaining a database of this from several countries to see if 
there are any cross cuttings themes that could be used to produce a framework of 
community-based flooding movements. Moreover, it would be interesting to take this 
framework to relevant governments to see where government could assist with the 
movement, thereby ensuring it was community resettlement with the necessary government 
assistance, instead of government Resettlement, with limited community involvement. This 
would show respect to the community movements occurring already, which could help to 
solve the pervasive issue of participation that seems to plague government resettlement, and 
also help to explore whether improved respect of flooding-vulnerable communities within 
the resettlement process makes a difference, as advocated for earlier. 
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8. EPILOGUE 
 
 I returned to Malawi twice after my PhD fieldwork in August – November 2017. Once 
in September 2018 and in September – November 2019. The trip in 2018 was to assist with a 
pilot development project undertaking a Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review 
in three districts: Zomba, Dedza and Nkhata Bay. Whilst interesting and useful at providing 
extra context and knowledge for Malawi, it did not significantly impact my PhD findings. 
However, my trip in September 2019 was working with the same communities as in my PhD 
work and highlighted some interesting developments since my PhD research. I discuss this 
trip further below. 
 
 In September 2019 I, along with fellow researchers at the University of St Andrews, 
embarked on a scoping research project exploring the implications of Cyclone Idai on disaster 
management in Malawi. Cyclone Idai was a cyclone that occurred in March 2019 and 
impacted Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi. We were aware that the nature of Cyclone 
Idai was unusual, as the weather system came on land, went back out to the Indian Ocean 
and then came back on land again. This doubling back of the weather system is uncommon 
erratic behaviour. Additionally, the cyclone had a severe impact on Zimbabwe, Mozambique 
and Malawi, despite Zimbabwe and Malawi being landlocked countries. We wanted to see if 
all of this had an impact on how disasters were perceived and prepared for in Malawi. To this 
end I conducted fieldwork in Malawi between September and November 2019, working with 
the same or similar participants I had used for my PhD fieldwork, which also enabled me to 
follow up on some of my PhD findings. Overall, we found that government officials from 
DoDMA were reticent to acknowledge the increasing threat from cyclones, as they viewed 
them as comparatively low risk compared to other disasters, or from flooding related to 
monsoonal rains. However, we also found that two of the most severe flooding events in 
Malawi, in 2015 and 2019, were due to weather systems originating in the Indian Ocean and 
not from monsoonal flooding. I, along with many of my participants, were unaware that the 
2015 flooding was due to a weather system from the Indian Ocean. Weather systems that 
form from the Indian Ocean are less predictable than monsoonal rains. Monsoonal rains are 
able to be part of the seasonal forecasts, whereas weather systems forming in the Indian 
Ocean are only able to be predicted a few days before they hit land. This requires a different 
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kind of early warning systems and preparedness. Also, these weather systems gain energy 
from the ocean, and start to lose it when they hit land. It is therefore uncommon that they 
impact Malawi, yet the two most severe flooding events were due to them. This, to us, 
suggested that it could be interesting to undertake further research exploring the impact of 
weather systems occurring in the Indian Ocean on Malawi. 
 
 Two other aspects of the scoping study were relevant for my PhD research. Firstly, 
there appeared to be an even greater focus by government on resettlement as a strategy to 
manage flooding than there had been in my previous fieldwork. Resettlement came up 
extensively without me asking about it, reiterating that it is of interest to government. 
Secondly, village Mwalija did resettle post flooding in March 2019. This suggests that a 
disaster may be required to push resettlement to occur, querying whether it is voluntary 
resettlement and potentially highlighting the current inadequate participation procedures. 
Despite this, national and local government appeared very proud of Mwalija’s resettlement 
process. Local government officials showed me the site of the washed away village, we then 
drove some few minutes to the camp site, where the village camped for 3 months, and then 
to their resettlement site, which was the original new area that had been allocated to them 
previously and where the borehole had already been drilled. This route of devastated village, 
camp area, and resettlement site seemed to be well trodden by the government officials. I 
was made aware that they had taken an important UNICEF official along it only a month 
before. It suggested to me that the government wanted to show off this resettlement as a 
great achievement, which reminded of how they had spoken about Jombo resettlement site 
during my PhD visit. 
 
However, similar with my experience with participants at Jombo during my PhD 
research, when discussing with the community members from village Mwalija, it was clear 
they were not completely happy with the resettlement. They highlighted how the flood 
waters had destroyed their houses and so they had no choice but to accept the new houses 
built for them by Red Cross. However, these are small, one room houses, with insufficient 
space for many households and they have caused several problems. Many believe they have 
been built in a way that make it difficult to expand. Therefore, there is discontent amongst 
the community members over how the resettlement has taken place. This reiterates 
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questions as to whether the resettlement for village Mwalija was voluntary, if they had no 
houses in which to live in their previous area. It reinforces the resource intensity of 
resettlement, which is recognised in the literature (Arnall, 2018), as Red Cross could only 
provide one room houses. Yet, it also highlights how the needs of the people are not 
adequately considered, as many community members suggested it was a real issue living in 
one room with other family and extended family members, couples and children altogether. 
It suggests that another area of interesting future research could be to explore the difference 
between post-disaster and pre-disaster resettlement, to establish the different needs and 
priorities in these scenarios. 
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APPENDIX 3 – PARTICIPANT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORMS, 
ENGLISH AND CHICHEWA 
 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
(NGOs) 
 
Project Title  
Knowledge Production of Migration and Environment in Malawi 
 
What is the study about? 
We invite you to participate in a research project about the process of knowledge production of 
environmental migration in Malawi 
This study is being conducted as part of my, Hebe Nicholson, PhD in the School of Geography and 
Sustainable Development. 
 
Do I have to take Part? 
This information sheet has been written to help you decide if you would like to take part.   It is up to 
you and you alone whether or not to take part.   If you do decide to take part you will be free to withdraw 
at any time without providing a reason.    
 
What would I be required to do? 
You will be asked to complete an interview that we anticipate will take between 30-60 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Will  my participation be Anonymous and Confidential? 
Only the researcher(s), translator(s), transcriber(s) and supervisor(s) will have access to the data, 
which will be kept strictly confidential. Your permission will be sought in the Participant Consent form 
for the data you provide. Anonymity of the data cannot be guaranteed due to the role of the participant 
in the NGO, government, or community, which may be given away in the interview. 
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Storage and Destruction of Data Collected 
The data we collect will initially be accessible by the researcher, translator, transcriber and supervisor 
involved in this study only, unless explicit consent for wider access is given by means of the consent 
form.   Your data will be stored indefinitely in an anonymised format on a computer system. This 
research is funded by the ESRC, therefore to fit with their guidelines, after the completion of the study 
the anonymous data will be put on a public database for other researchers to access if required. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be finalised by September 2020 and written up as part of my PhD  
 
Are there any potential risks to taking part? 
No 
 
Questions 
You will have the opportunity to ask any questions in relation to this project before giving completing 
a Consent Form. 
 
Consent and Approval 
This research proposal has been scrutinised and been granted Ethical Approval through the University 
ethical approval process. 
 
What should I do if I have concerns about this study? 
A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical Committee 
is available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/ 
Contact researcher directly 
 
Contact Details 
Researcher:  Hebe Nicholson 
Contact Details: hn7@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisor:  Nina Laurie 
Contact Details:         gg@st-andrews.ac.uk 
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Participant Consent Form 
(NGOs) 
Identifiable / Attributable 
Data 
 
Project Title 
Knowledge Production of Environmental Mobility in Malawi 
 
Researcher Name 
Hebe Nicholson 
Supervisors Names 
Dr David McCollum and Prof Nina Laurie 
 
The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research.  We therefore ask 
you to consider the following points before signing this form. Your signature confirms that you are happy 
to participate in the study. 
 
What is Identifiable/Attributable Data? 
‘Identifiable/Attributable data’ is data where the participant is identified, such as when a public figure gives 
an interview, or where consent is given by a participant for their name (including perhaps gender and 
address) to be used in the research outputs.  The raw data will be held confidentially by the researcher(s) 
(and supervisors). The published research will clearly identify and attribute data collected to the participant. 
 
Consent 
The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to let you understand 
what it entails.   Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do and you are free 
to withdraw at any stage. 
 
Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the research data. 
I have read and understood the information sheet.  Yes   No 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.  Yes  No 
I have had my questions answered satisfactorily.  Yes  No 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time without having to give an 
explanation. 
 Yes  No 
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I agree to being identified in this interview and any subsequent publications or use. If 
I do not what to be identified, I understand that although every effort will be made 
not to use my name, the answer I give may betray my identity 
 Yes  No 
I understand that my raw data will be kept securely and will be accessible only to the 
researcher(s) (and translators, transcribers and supervisors).  
 Yes   No 
I agree to my data (in line with conditions outlined above,) being kept by the 
researcher and being archived and used for further research projects / by other bona 
fide researchers.  I understand that this may allow other researchers to de-code the 
data and identify me. 
I agree to take part in the study 
 Yes 
 
 Yes  
 No 
 
 No 
 
Part of my research involves taking tape recordings.   These recordings will be kept secure and stored with 
no identifying factors i.e. consent forms and questionnaires.     
Photographs and recorded data can be valuable resources for future studies therefore we ask for your 
additional consent to maintain data and images for this purpose. 
I agree to being tape recorded  Yes   No 
I agree for my tape recorded material to be published as part of this research  Yes  No 
 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary and your consent is required before you can participate 
in this research.   If you decide at a later date that data should be destroyed we will honour your request in 
writing. 
 
Name in Block Capitals 
 
Signature  
Date  
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Participant Information 
Sheet (Community) 
 
Project Title  
Knowledge Production of Migration and Environment in Malawi 
 
What is the study about? 
We invite you to participate in a research project about the process of knowledge production of 
environmental migration in Malawi 
This study is being conducted as part of my, Hebe Nicholson, PhD in the School of Geography and 
Sustainable Development. 
 
Do I have to take Part? 
This information sheet has been written to help you decide if you would like to take part.   It is up to 
you and you alone whether or not to take part.   If you do decide to take part you will be free to withdraw 
at any time without providing a reason.    
 
What would I be required to do? 
You will be asked to complete an interview that we anticipate will take between 30-60 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Will  my participation be Anonymous and Confidential? 
Only the researcher(s), translator(s), transcriber(s) and supervisor(s) will have access to the data, 
which will be kept strictly confidential. Your permission will be sought in the Participant Consent form 
for the data you provide. Anonymity of the data is guaranteed. 
 
Storage and Destruction of Data Collected 
The data we collect will initially be accessible by the researcher, translator, transcriber and supervisor 
involved in this study only, unless explicit consent for wider access is given by means of the consent 
form.   Your data will be stored indefinitely in an anonymised format on a computer system. This 
research is funded by the ESRC, therefore to fit with their guidelines, after the completion of the study 
the anonymous data will be put on a public database for other researchers to access if required. 
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What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be finalised by September 2020 and written up as part of my PhD  
 
Are there any potential risks to taking part? 
No 
 
Questions 
You will have the opportunity to ask any questions in relation to this project before giving completing 
a Consent Form. 
 
Consent and Approval 
This research proposal has been scrutinised and been granted Ethical Approval through the University 
ethical approval process. 
 
What should I do if I have concerns about this study? 
A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical Committee 
is available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/ 
Contact researcher directly 
 
Contact Details 
Researcher:  Hebe Nicholson 
Contact Details: hn7@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisor:  Nina Laurie 
Contact Details:         gg@st-andrews.ac.uk 
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Participant Consent Form 
Coded Data (Community) 
 
Project Title 
Knowledge Production of Environmental Mobility in Malawi 
 
Researcher(s)  Name(s) 
Hebe Nicholson 
Supervisors Names 
Dr David McCollum and Prof Nina Laurie 
 
The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research.  We therefore ask 
you to consider the following points before signing this form. Your signature confirms that you are happy 
to participate in the study. 
What is Coded Data? 
The term ‘Coded Data’ refers to when data collected by the researcher is identifiable as belonging to a 
particular participant but is kept with personal identifiers removed.   The researcher(s) retain a ‘key’ to the 
coded data which allows individual participants to be re-connected with their data at a later date.   The un-
coded data is kept confidential to the researcher(s) (and Supervisors).   If consent it given to archive data 
(see consent section of form) the participant may be contacted in the future by the original researcher(s) or 
other researcher(s).  
Consent 
The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to let you understand 
what it entails.   Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do and you are free 
to withdraw at any stage. 
Material gathered during this research will be coded and kept confidentially by the researcher with only the 
researcher and supervisor having access.   It will be securely stored indefinitely in anonymous format. This 
research is funded by the ESRC, therefore to fit with their guidelines, after the completion of the study 
the anonymous data will be put on a public database for other researchers to access if required. 
 
Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the research data. 
I have read and understood the information sheet.  Yes   No 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.  Yes  No 
I have had my questions answered satisfactorily.  Yes  No 
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I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time without having to give 
an explanation. 
 Yes  No 
I understand that my data will be confidential and that it will contain identifiable 
personal data but that will be stored with personal identifiers removed by the 
researcher and that only the researcher/supervisor will be able to decode this 
information as and when necessary. 
 Yes   No 
I agree to my data (in line with conditions outlined above) being kept by the 
researcher and being archived and used for further research projects / by other 
bona fide researchers.  I understand that this may allow other researchers to de-
code the data and identify me. 
 Yes  No 
I have been made fully aware of the potential risks associated with this research and 
am satisfied with the information provided. 
 Yes   No 
I agree to take part in the study  Yes   No 
 
Part of my research involves taking photographic images and tape recordings. These images and recordings 
will be kept secure and stored with no identifying factors i.e. consent forms and questionnaires.     
Photographs and recorded data can be valuable resources for future studies therefore we ask for your 
additional consent to maintain data and images for this purpose. 
I agree to have my photo taken and to being tape recorded   Yes   No 
I agree for my photo, tape recorded material to be published as part of this research  Yes  No 
I agree for my photos, tape recorded material to be used in future studies   Yes  No 
 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary and your consent is required before you can participate 
in this research.   If you decide at a later date that data should be destroyed we will honour your request in 
writing. 
 
Name in Block Capitals 
 
Signature  
Date  
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ZOFUNIKA KUDZIWA OTENGA NAWO MBALI 
(MABUNGWE OMWE SI A BOMA) 
 
 
 
 
Mutu wa Kafukufuku 
Kapangidwe ka Chidziwitso cha Nsamuko olingana ndi Chilengedwe ku Malawi 
Kafukufukuyu ndi okhudza chani? 
Tikukuitanirani kuti mutenge mbali mu kafukufuku amene akukhudza momwe ntchito yopanga 
chidziwitso cha nsamuko obwera kamba ka chilengedwe imakhalira ku Malawi. 
Kafukufukuyu akuchitidwa ngati mbali imodzi ya maphunziro a Hebe Nicholson a 
ukachenjedwe wa PhD ku sukulu yoona za chilengedwe ndi chitukuko. 
Kodi ndikuyenera nditenge nawo mbali? 
Chipepala ichi chalembedwa kuti chikuthandizeni kupanga chiganizo ngati mungakonde 
kutenga  nawo mbali kapena ayi. Zili kwa inuyo kupanga chisankho chimenechi. Ngati 
mungapange chiganizo chotenga mbali, ndinu omasuka kusiya kutenga nawo mbali pa nthawi 
ina ili yonse ndipo simudzafunsidwa kuti mupereke chifukwa.  
Ndidzayenera kupanga chani? 
Tidzakufunsani kuti ticheze nanu ndipo tikuyembekeza kuti kuchezaku kudzatenga nthawi ya 
pakati pa mphindi makumi atatu ndi ola limodzi. 
Kodi kutenga nawo mbali kwanga kudzakhala kwa chinsisi komanso kopanda maina? 
Ndi opanga kafukufuku, omasulira, olemba zoyankhulidwa ndi oyang’anira kafukufukuyu okha 
amene adzakhale ndi mwayi ogwira zopezeka mkafukufukuyu. Pa zonse zopezeka mkafukufuku 
zomwe tidzatenge kwa inu, tidzapempha chilolezo chanu pogwiritsa ntchito fomu ya chilolezo 
cha otenga mbali.  Sitingalonjeze kuti sipadzakhala kutchula maina a omwe anatenga nawo 
mbali chifukwa cha udindo wa otenga mbaliwo ku mabungwe omwe si a boma, ku boma 
kapenanso mu dera, zimene zingapezeke zatchulidwa mukucheza kwathu.  
Kasungidwe ndi kaonongedwe ka zopezeka m’kafukufuku 
Pachiyambi, zopezeka m’kafukufukuyu zidzagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi opanga kafukufukuyu, 
omasulila, olemba zoyankhulidwa ndi oyang’anira kafukufukuyu okha, pokhapokha ngati 
otenga mbali wapereka chilolezo kuti anthu enanso akhonza kugwiritsa ntchito zopezekazi.  
Zomwe tidzatenge kwa inu zidzasungidwa mu njira yosaonetsera kuti ndi za ndani mu makina 
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a kompyuta. Kafukufukuyu akuchitika ndi thandizo lochokera ku ESRC, chotero molingana ndi 
ndondomeko zawo, kafukufukuyu akadzatha, tidzasiya zotsatira za kafukufukuyu mu malo 
amene opanga kafukufuku aliyense akhoza kuzipeza ngati angafunike kuti atero. 
 
Zotsatira za kafukufukuyu mudzazichita chani? 
Ntchito yonse ya zotsatira za m’kafukufukuyi idzatsirizidwa usanadutse mwezi wa Seputembala 
chaka cha 2020 ndipo zotsatirazi zidzalembedwa ngati mbali imodzi ya maphunziro anga a 
ukachenjede wa PhD. 
Kodi pali chiopsezo china chili chonse kwa otenga mbali? 
Ayi, palibe. 
Mafunso 
Mudzakhala ndi mwayi ofunsa mafunso okhudzana ndi kafukufukuyu musanapatsidwe kapena 
kulemba fomu ya chilolezo. 
Chilolezo  
Lingaliro la kafukufukuyu linazukutidwa bwino ndi kupatsidwa chilolezo  kupyolera mu 
ndondomeko yoona za khalidwe loyenera lopangila kafukufuku la ku sukulu ya ukachenjede ya 
St Andrews. 
Ndingatani ngati ndili ndi dandaulo ndi kafukufukuyu? 
Tsatanetsatane la khalidwe loyenera la kafukufuku lomwe limayang’aniridwa ndi komiti yoona 
za khalidwe loyenera mu kuphunzitsa komanso kupanga kafukufuku ku sukulu ya ukachenjede 
ya St Andrews likupezeka pa:  
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/ 
Mukhoza kumupeza opanga kafukufuku pogwiritsa ntchito kalata ya makina a kompyuta:  
Dzina la opanga kafukufuku: Hebe Nicholson 
Kupezeka pa:    hn7@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Dzina la Oyang’anira:   Nina Laurie 
Kupezeka pa:    gg@st-andrews.ac.uk 
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FOMU YA CHILOLEZO KUCHOKA KWA 
OTENGA MBALI (MABUNGWE OMWE SI 
ABOMA) 
 
Kuzindikirika kwa zopezeka m’kafukufuku  
 
 
Mutu wa kafukufuku 
Chidziwitso cha nsamuko obwera kamba ka chilengedwe ku Malawi 
 
Dzina la opanga kafukufuku   Mayina a oyang’anira kafukufuku 
Hebe Nicholson    Dr David McCollum, Prof Nina Laurie 
 
Sukulu ya za ukachenjede ya St Andrews imasamala kwambiri za kuonetsetsa kuti kafukufuku 
wachitidwa mu khalidwe loyenelera. Chotero tikupempha kuti muganizire bwino mfundo 
zotsatirazi, musanasaine fomu iyi. Kusayina kwanu kutanthauza kuti ndinu osangalatsidwa 
kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu. 
Kodi zopezeka m’kafukufuku zozindikirika ndi chani? 
Zopezeka m’kafukufuku zozindikirika ndi zopezeka m’kafukufuku zomwe munthu yemwe 
anazipereka adzadziwidwa kapena kuzindikiridwa. Mwachitsanzo, tikacheza ndi munthu 
odziwika kwambiri kapena munthu otenga mbali akapeleka chilolezo kuti dzina lake 
(mwinanso kuphatikizapo komwe amapezeka kapena kunena kuti iwo ndi aakazi kapena 
aamuna), zidzagwiritsidwe ntchito mu zotsatira za kafukufukuyu. Opanga kafukufukuyu (ndi 
oyang’anira kafukufukuyu) adzasunga mwachinsisi zopezeka m’kafukufuku zonse 
zosazukutidwa.  Zotsatira za mkafukufukuyu zomwe zidzasindikizidwe zidzaonetsa bwino 
lomwe yemwe anapeleka zopezekazo.  
Chilorezo 
Cholinga cha chilolezochi ndi kuonetsetsa kuti otenga mbali apeleka chilolezo kuti  atenga 
nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu, ndipo amvetsetsa zotsatira za kutenga mbali kwawo. Kusaina 
chilorezochi sikukutanthauza kuti inu ndinu okakamizika kupanga zinthu zomwe inuyo 
simukufuna ndipo muli omasuka kusiya kutenga nawo mbali pa nthawi ina ili yonse. 
 
Chonde yankhani mfundo zili munsimu, zokhudzana ndi katoleledwe komanso kagwiritsidwe 
ntchito ka zopezeka mukafukufukuyu. 
 
Ndawerenga ndi kumvetsetsa zofunika kudziwa otenga mbali ¨Eya       ¨Ayi 
 
Ndapatsidwa mwayi ofunsa mafunso okhudzana ndi kafukufukuyu  ¨Eya  ¨Ayi  
Ndakhutitsidwa ndi mayankho omwe ndapatsidwa     ¨Eya      ¨Ayi  
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Ndamvetsetsa kuti ndili ndi ufulu osiya kutenga mbali mu  
Kafukufukuyu pa nthawi ina iliyonse opanda kupeleka chifukwa  ¨Eya      ¨Ayi 
 
Ndavomeleza kuti nditha kutchulidwa dzina mu kucheza kwathu  
ndi muzosindikiza zonse. Ngati sindikufuna kutchulidwa,  
ndikumvetsa kuti ngakhale adzayesetse kusatchula dzina langa,  
zomwe ndingakambe zikhoza kudzandiululitsa kuti ndine ndani ¨Eya     ¨Ayi 
 
Ndamvetsetsa kuti zomwe mutenge kwa ine zidzasungidwa 
motetezedwa ndipo zidzagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi opanga kafukufuku  
yekha (kuphatikizapo omasulila kafukufuku, olemba zoyankhulidwa 
mu kafukufuku ndi oyang’anira kafukufukuyu)   ¨Eya       ¨Ayi 
 
 
Ndavomereza kuti zomwe mutenge kwa ine m’kafukufukuyu,  
(mogwirizana ndi mfundo zili pa mwambazi,) zidzasungidwe ndi  
opanga kafukufuku ndi kuti zitha kusungidwa malo abwino   
nkudzagwiritsidwa ntchito m’tsogolo mu akafukufuku ena.  
Ndikuzindikira kuti opanga kafukufuku enawo atha kudzandizikira 
kuti ndine ndani       ¨Eya        ¨Ayi 
 
Ndikuvomereza kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu  ¨Eya        ¨Ayi 
 
Kafukufukuyu akukhudzanso kujambula zomwe zikuyankhulidwa. Zojambulidwazo 
zidzasungidwa mosamalitsa ndinso mosalemba  dzina kapena chizindikiro chilichonse 
chosonyeza mwina wake yemwe anajambulidwa monga kalata ya chilolezoyi kapena pepala la 
mafunso. Zithunzi komanso mawu ojambulidwa ndizofunika kwambiri maka mu kafukufuku 
wina amene  angachitike mtsogolo. Choncho tikupempha kuti mutipatse  chilolezo chosunga 
zithunzi ndi mawu ojambulidwa pa chifukwa  chimenechi.      
                
Ndikuvomereza kuti zoyankhula zanga zijambulidwe              ¨Eya    ¨Ayi  
 
Ndikuvomereza kuti mawu anga omwe ajambulidwa akhoza  
kusindikizidwa monga mbali ya kafukufukuyu               ¨Eya    ¨Ayi  
 
Kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu ndikosakakamiza ndipo ndikofunika kuti mupeleke 
chilolezo chanu musanatenge nawo mbali mukafukufukuyu. Ngati mungapange chisankho pa 
nthawi ina ili yonse kuti simukufunanso kutenga nawo mbali ndipo kuti zonse zomwe 
mwatiuza zitaidwe, ife tidzapanga mwakufuna kwanu ngati mungatilembele za khumbo lanu. 
 
Dzina lanu mu malembo akulu akulu ____________________________________ 
 
Siginecha yanu _______________________________________________________ 
 
Tsiku _______________________________________________________________ 
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ZOFUNIKA KUDZIWA OTENGA NAWO MBALI 
(KUMADERA) 
 
 
 
Mutu wa Kafukufuku 
Kapangidwe ka Chidziwitso cha Nsamuko olingana ndi Chilengedwe ku Malawi 
Kafukufukuyu ndi okhudza chani? 
Tikukuitanirani kuti mutenge mbali mu kafukufuku amene akukhudza momwe ntchito yopanga 
chidziwitso cha nsamuko obwera kamba ka chilengedwe imakhalira ku Malawi. 
Kafukufukuyu akuchitidwa ngati mbali imodzi ya maphunziro a Hebe Nicholson, a 
ukachenjedwe wa PhD ku sukulu yoona za chilengedwe ndi chitukuko. 
Kodi ndikuyenera nditenge nawo mbali? 
Chipepala ichi chalembedwa kuti chikuthandizeni kupanga chiganizo ngati mungakonde 
kutenga nawo mbali kapena ayi. Zili kwa inuyo kupanga chisankho chimenechi. Ngati 
mungapange chiganizo chotenga mbali, ndinu omasuka kusiya kutenga nawo mbali pa nthawi 
ina ili yonse, ndipo simudzafunsidwa kuti mupereke chifukwa.  
Ndidzayenera kupanga chani? 
Tidzakufunsani kuti ticheze nanu ndipo tikuyembekeza kuti kuchezaku kudzatenga nthawi ya 
pakati pa mphindi makumi atatu ndi ola limodzi. 
Kodi kutenga nawo mbali kwanga kudzakhala kwa chinsisi komanso kopanda maina? 
Ndi opanga kafukufuku, omasulira, olemba zoyankhulidwa ndi oyang’anira kafukufukuyu okha 
amene adzakhale ndi mwayi ogwira zopezeka mkafukufukuyu zomwe zidzasungidwe mwa 
chinsisi. Pa zonse zopezeka mkafukufuku zomwe tidzatenge kwa inu, tidzapempha chilolezo 
chanu pogwiritsa ntchito fomu ya chilolezo cha otenga mbali. Tikukutsimikizirani kuti dzina 
lanu silidzatchulidwa.  
Kasungidwe ndi kaonongedwe ka zopezeka m’kafukufuku 
Pachiyambi, zopezeka m’kafukufukuyu zidzagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi opanga kafukufukuyu, 
omasulila zopezeka mkafukufuku, olemba zoyankhulidwa ndi oyang’anira kafukufukuyu okha, 
pokhapokha ngati otenga mbali wapereka chilolezo kuti anthu enanso akhonza kugwiritsa 
ntchito zopezekazi.  Zomwe tidzatenge kwa inu zidzasungidwa mu njira yosaonetsera kuti ndi 
za ndani mu makina a kompyuta. Kafukufukuyu akuchitika ndi thandizo lochokera ku ESRC, 
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chotero molingana ndi ndondomeko zawo, kafukufukuyu akadzatha, tidzasiya zotsatira za 
kafukufukuyu mu malo omwe opanga kafukufuku aliyense akhoza kuzipeza ngati angafunike 
kuti atero. 
 
 
Zotsatira za kafukufukuyu mudzazichita chani? 
Ntchito yokonza zotsatira za mkafukufukuyu idzatsirizidwa usanadutse mwezi wa Seputembala 
chaka cha 2020 ndipo zidzalembedwa ngati mbali imodzi ya maphunziro anga a ukachenjede 
wa PhD. 
Kodi pali Chiopsezo china chili chonse kwa otenga mbali? 
Ayi, palibe. 
Mafunso 
Muzakhala ndi mwayi ofunsa mafunso okhudzana ndi kafukufukuyu musanapatsidwe kapena 
kulemba fomu ya chilolezo. 
Chilolezo  
Lingaliro la kafukufukuyu linazukutidwa bwino ndi kupatsidwa chilolezo kupyolera mu 
ndondomeko yoona za khalidwe loyenera lopangila kafukufuku la ku sukulu ya ukachenjede ya 
St Andrews. 
Ndingatani ngati ndili ndi dandaulo ndi kafukufukuyu? 
Tsatanetsatane wa khalidwe loyenera la kafukufuku lomwe limayang’aniridwa ndi komiti 
yoona za khalidwe loyenera mu kuphunzitsa komanso kupanga kafukufuku ku sukulu ya 
ukachenjede ya St Andrews likupezeka pa:  
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/ 
Mukhoza kumupeza opanga kafukufuku pogwiritsa ntchito kalata ya makina a kompyuta:  
Dzina la opanga kafukufuku: Hebe Nicholson 
Kupezeka pa:    hn7@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Dzina la Oyang’anira:   Nina Laurie 
Kupezeka pa:    gg@st-andrews.ac.uk 
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FOMU YA CHILOLEZO CHA OTENGA MBALI 
Zopezeka mkafukufuku zozimbaitsidwa (m’madera) 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutu wa Kafukufuku 
Chidziwitso cha nsamuko obwera kamba ka chilengedwe ku Malawi 
Dzina la opanga kafukufuku   Mayina a oyang’anira kafukufuku 
 
Hebe Nicholson    Dr David McCollum, Prof Nina Laurie 
 
Sukulu ya za ukachenjede ya St Andrews imasamala kwambiri za kuonetsetsa kuti kafukufuku 
wachitidwa mu khalidwe loyenelera. Chotero tikupempha kuti muganizire bwino mfundo 
zotsatirazi, musanasaine fomu iyi. Kusayina kwanu kutanthauza kuti ndinu osangalatsidwa 
kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu. 
 
Zopezeka m’Kafukufuku Zozimbaitsidwa ndi Chani? 
Mawu akuti ‘Zopezeka m’kafukufuku zozimbaitsidwa’ amatanthauza zopezeka m’kafukufuku 
zomwe zimazindikirikika kuti ndi za otenga mbali wakutiwakuti koma zimasungidwa 
zitachotsedwa china chili chonse chomwe chingazindikiritse mosavuta kuti mwini wake ndi 
ndani. Opanga kafukufuku amangopereka chizindikiro chimene amachidziwa ndi iwo chokuti 
chidzawathandize patsogolo kuzindikira kuti zopezeka m’kafukufuku zimenezo anazitenga 
kwa ndani. Zopezeka m’kafukufuku zosazimbaitsa zimasungidwa mwa chinsisi cha opanga 
kafukufuku (ndinso oyang’anira kafukufukufuyo). Ngati chilolezo chaperekedwa kuti 
zopezekazo zidzasungidwe kwa nthawi (onani gawo la chilolezo), otenga nawo mbali akhoza 
kudzafunsidwanso mafunso ena patsogolo ndi opanga kafukufuku uno kapenanso opanga 
kafukufuku ena. 
 
Chilolezo 
Cholinga cha fomu iyi ndi kuonetsetsa kuti ndinu olola kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu 
komanso kukuthandizani kuti mumvetsetse kuti kafukufukuyu ndi wa chiyani kwenikweni. 
Kusaina fomu iyi sikukutanthauza kuti ndinu okakamizika kupanga zinthu zimene inu 
simungafune kupanga, ndipo muli ndi ufulu osiya kutenga nawo mbali pa nthawi ina ili yonse. 
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Zonse zopezeka mu kafukufuku uyu zidzapatsidwa zizindikiro zozizimbaitsa ndipo china chili 
chonse chozipangitsa kuzindikirika chidzachotsedwa. Kuphatikiza apo, opangakafukufukuyu 
adzazisunga zopezekazo mwa chinsinsi. Chotero ndi opanga kafukufuku yekha pamodzi ndi 
oyang’anira kafukufukuyu omwe adzakhale ndi mwayi ogwira zopezeka m’kafukufukuyu.  
Kafukufukuyu akuchitika ndi thandizo lochoka ku ESRC. Choncho, molingana ndi 
ndondomeko zawo, kafukufukuyu akadzatha, tidzasiya zotsatirazi mu malo amene opanga 
kafukufuku aliyense akhoza kuzipeza ngati angafunike kuti atero. 
Chonde yankhani mfundo zili munsimu zokhudzana ndi katoleledwe komanso kagwiritsidwe 
ntchito ka zopezeka mukafukufukuyu. 
 
Ndawerenga ndi kumvetsetsa zofunika kudziwa otenga mbali.   ¨Eya       ¨Ayi  
 
Ndapatsidwa mwayi ofunsa mafunso okhudzana ndi kafukufukuyu.¨Eya   ¨Ayi  
Ndakhutitsidwa ndi mayankho omwe ndapatsidwa.     ¨Eya     ¨Ayi  
 
Ndamvetsetsa kuti ndili ndi ufulu osiya kutenga mbali mu  
Kafukufukuyu pa nthawi ina iliyonse opanda kupeleka chifukwa.     ¨Eya   ¨Ayi 
 
Ndamvetsetsa kuti zomwe zitengedwe kwa ine zidzasungidwa 
mwa chinsisi ndipo kuti ngakhale zidzakhale ndi zozindikiritsa 
kuti ndi za ndani, pa nthawi yozisunga zozindikiritsa zonse 
zidzachotsedwa ndi opanga kafukufuku komanso ndi opanga 
kafukufuku yekha ndi oyang’anira kafukufuku amene adzathe 
kuzizindikira zopezekazo pa nthawi yomwe zidzafunike.                 ¨Eya ¨Ayi 
 
 
Ndavomereza kuti zomwe mutenge kwa ine m’kafukufukuyu,  
(mogwirizana ndi mfundo zili pa mwambazi), zidzasungidwe  
ndi opanga kafukufuku ndi kuti zitha kudzagwiritsidwa ntchito  
mtsogolo mu akafukufuku ena. Ndikuzindikira kuti opanga kafukufuku 
enawo akhoza kudzamasula kuzimbaitsa kuja ndikundizindikira  
kuti ndine ndani.            ¨Eya  ¨Ayi 
 
Ndafotokozeredwa momveka bwino za ziopsezo zomwe zingakhalepo 
 mu kafukufukuyu ndipo ndakhutitsidwa ndi zonse zomwe ndauzidwa ¨Eya  ¨Ayi 
   
Ndikuvomereza kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu       ¨Eya   ¨Ayi 
 
 
Kafukufukuyu akukhudzanso kujambula zomwe zikuyankhulidwa ndi kujambula zithunzi.  
Zithunzi komanso mawu ojambulidwawa zidzasungidwa motetezedwa komanso mopanda 
chizindikiro chilichonse monga fomu yachilolezo kapenanso pepala la mafunso 
 
Zojambulidwazi zikhoza kukhala zofunika kwambiri mu akafukufuku ena a mtsogolo.  Chotero 
tikupemphanso chilolezo kuti tizathe kusunga zopezeka m’kafukufuku komanso zojambulidwa 
pachifukwa chomwe tafotokozachi.  
  
 Ndikuvomereza kuti ineyo komanso zoyankhula zanga 
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 zijambulidwe       ¨Eya    ¨Ayi  
 
Ndikuvomereza kuti mawu anga ojambulidwa  
komanso chithunzi changa,zidzasindikidwe ngati mbali  
imodzi ya kafukufukuyu     ¨Eya    ¨Ayi 
 
Ndikuvomereza kuti chithunzi changa ndi mawu anga  
ojambulidwa, zidzagwiritsidwe ntchito mu akafukufuku  
ena amtsogolo.       ¨Eya    ¨Ayi 
  
Kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu ndikosakakamiza ndipo ndikofunika kuti mupeleke 
chilolezo chanu musanatenge nawo mbali mukafukufukuyu. Ngati mungapange chisankho pa 
nthawi ina ili yonse kuti simukufunanso kutenga nawo mbali ndipo kuti zonse zomwe 
mwatiuza zitaidwe, ife tidzapanga mwakufuna kwanu ngati mungatilembele za khumbo lanu. 
 
Dzina lanu mu malembo aakulu _________________________________________ 
 
Siginecha yanu _______________________________________________________ 
 
Tsiku _______________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX 4 – COMMUNITY INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
 
Interview Schedule for Resettled Community 
 - What is your name? - Can you tell me your role in your household? - How many are in your household? - How many are in your community?  - What is your household’s main form of income? - Can you tell me how flooding effects your livelihood? - How do you manage the effects of flooding? What do you think are the best ways to 
manage it? - Can you tell me why your community resettled? - Were you in favour of the resettlement? - Can you tell me a bit more about the process involved in deciding to resettle? How 
did you decide where to resettle? How much involvement from government and 
NGOs was there? Were you happy with how the process went? Would you have 
changed anything? - Why do you think the government and NGOs are in favour of resettlement? - Can you tell me a bit more about your relationship with government and NGOs? - How do you communicate with government and the NGOs involved in your 
community? Do you feel your voice is heard? How/Why? - Would you change anything about your relationship with NGO or Government? - Are you happy with your current situation? Would you change anything? - How do you see the future for your community? 
  
 268 
Interview Schedule for Undecided Community 
 - What is your name? - Can you tell me your role in your household? - How many are in your household? - How many are in your community?  - What is your household’s main form of income? - Can you tell me how flooding effects your livelihood? - How do you manage the effects of flooding? What do you think are the best ways to 
manage it? - Would you ever consider resettlement as a way to cope with the flooding? Why? - What would need to happen for you to consider resettlement? - Would your opinion change if another flood event, such as that that occurred in 
2015 were to happen? - What is the long-term solution for increase severity of flooding? - Why do you think the government and NGOs would like you to consider 
resettlement?  - Can you tell me a bit more about your relationship with government and NGOs? - How do you communicate with government and the NGOs involved in your 
community? Do you feel your voice is heard? How/Why? - Would you change anything about your relationship with NGO or Government? - Are you happy with your current situation, would you change anything? - How do you see the future for your community? 
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Interview Schedule for Unwilling Community 
 - What is your name? - Can you tell me your role in your household? - How many are in your household? - How many are in your community?  - What is your household’s role in the community? - What is your household’s main form of income? - Can you tell me how flooding effects your livelihood? - How do you manage the effects of flooding? What do you think are the best ways to 
manage it? - Would you ever consider resettlement as a way to cope with the flooding? Why? - What would need to happen for you to consider resettlement? - Would your opinion change if another flood event, such as that that occurred in 
2015 were to happen? - What is the long term solution for increase severity of flooding? - Why do you think the government and NGOs would like you to consider 
resettlement?  - Can you tell me a bit more about your relationship with government and NGOs? - How do you communicate with government and the NGOs involved in your 
community? Do you feel your voice is heard? How/Why? - Would you change anything about your relationship with NGO or Government? - How do you see the future for your community? 
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APPENDIX 5 – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR NGO AND GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS 
 - What’s your role in the NGO/Government? - Can you tell me your involved with this community? 
o How often do you see them? 
o What aid do you give them? 
o Do you view them as a high priority? - What is your opinion on their resettlement situation? 
o Are you happy for their resettlement? 
o Do you think they should resettle? - Why do you think a community may be unwilling to resettle? - Do you think any incentives or conditions should be given alongside resettlement – 
like the promise of houses, schools etc? - What problems do you think resettlement can bring? 
o How do you find land? 
o What about the host community? How do you integrate? Make sure they are 
adequately represented? 
o What about previous leaders? Should they retain their leadership? 
o How do you address these? How do you communicate information? - What other ways do you advocate to manage flooding? 
o How do you spread information about these? 
o Can you tell me about the early warning system in place? I hear not all 
communities were aware of the 2015 flooding? 
o What do you think of the idea of ‘living with floods’ concept? 
o Where do you get your information from? - What do you think is the way forward for this community? - Any comments? 
 
  
 271 
APPENDIX 6 – CODING TREE 
 
Name Files References 
Fieldwork Sites 1 1 
Jombo 6 13 
Mwalija 4 9 
Nyachikadza 5 5 
IK vs TK 0 0 
Governance 
Structure 
18 32 
Participatory 
Governance 
Approach 
11 20 
Role of 
Government in 
Flooding 
9 11 
Mistrust 4 9 
Recovery 2 3 
Response 7 9 
Indigenous 
Knowledge 
23 34 
Community 
Response to 
Flooding 
24 33 
Information 
Dissemination 
34 46 
Radio Station at 
Nyachikadza 
2 2 
International 
Influence 
1 4 
MFERP 4 4 
Resettlement 8 10 
Change People's 
Mindset 
7 9 
Solutions to 
Flooding 
2 2 
Community 
Mapping 
2 2 
Relationships 0 0 
Early Warning 
System 
15 24 
Mistrust of EWS 5 7 
Happy with Current 
Situation / What is 
Future 
48 50 
Miscommunication 
Between 
Governance and 
Communities 
9 15 
NGO and DC 
Assistance 
12 18 
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Dependency 
Syndrome 
18 22 
Negative Opinion 10 16 
No-Go Zone 26 46 
Election Visits 2 2 
Trapped 
Populations 
0 0 
Bongo 13 27 
Physically 
Trapped 
5 6 
Vulnerability 1 2 
Flooding Impact 5 5 
2015 Event 
Impact 
41 59 
Fear of 
Flooding 
16 23 
Jombo 14 16 
Livelihood 
depletion 
2 2 
Mwalija 11 15 
Nyachikadza 9 14 
Reason for 
Increasing 
Flooding 
2 3 
Brick Molding 1 1 
Deforestation 5 6 
Overpopulation 7 9 
Rural-Urban 
Migration 
Impact 
1 1 
Trend in Flooding 39 48 
Other 0 0 
Armyworm 
Devastation 
5 6 
Climate Change 9 12 
Interconnected 
Nature of 
Flooding 
8 12 
Fear of Influence 4 5 
Health 6 10 
Livestock Scheme 2 2 
Living with Floods 1 1 
Low Literacy 2 2 
Malawi as an LEDC 1 1 
Natural 
Resources 
1 1 
Malawi Culture 1 1 
PDNA 1 3 
Religion 1 2 
Role of Small 
Businesses 
4 4 
Urban Flooding 1 2 
Anti-resettlement 0 0 
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Attempted 
Resettlement 
1 1 
Challenges 8 10 
Amenities 27 39 
Analogies for 
Resistance to 
Resettlement 
4 4 
Ancestral 
Importance 
12 13 
Autonomy 5 9 
Chieftancy 41 61 
Ulterior Motive 
of GVH 
3 6 
Hostile Host 
Community 
13 30 
Livelihoods 29 44 
Fertility 18 19 
No Funds to 
Move 
15 33 
Sense of 
Belonging 
5 10 
Sense of 
Community 
13 14 
Take our Land 2 3 
Worse Life 2 2 
Different Ideas of 
Resettlement 
1 1 
Following 7 7 
Forget 6 7 
Housing and 
Infrastructure 
10 28 
Zoning 4 5 
Lack of 
Government Power 
7 9 
Lack of Resources 10 16 
Land 27 52 
Not Worried about 
Flooding 
2 5 
Reforestation 13 17 
Superstition 7 7 
Technocratic 
Knowledge 
16 23 
World Bank Project 3 5 
Pro-resettlement 0 0 
Already Resettled 1 1 
Change in Opinion 
of Flooding 
10 11 
Change in Opinion 
of Resettlement 
12 12 
Circle of 
Deprivation 
9 14 
Consider 
Resettlement 
20 22 
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Importance of 
Policy 
10 17 
Multiple Strategies 4 6 
Pro resettlement 34 44 
Responsibility 17 24 
Individual 
Resettlement 
1 1 
Sensitisation 13 21 
Technical Solutions 
to Flooding 
19 26 
Housing 
Construction 
3 6 
Temporary 
Migration Strategy 
51 88 
Government 
Knowledge 
7 7 
Seasonal 
Migration 
1 1 
Using Previous 
Resettlement as an 
Example 
7 8 
 
 
 
